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INTRODUCTION 
WHY RE-READ KANT'S HIGHEST GOOD?: 
AN INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT 
Ver; t~ notions .. in Kant scholarship have caused as 11\UC;h c;on.troversy 
as .the highest good. Is. it heteronoll)Ous7 Is it superfluous? Is it ~~ answer 
and to.what quqtion? Wliat .is it apout l<a,nt's doctrine of the ht.ghest good 
' . 
~t has ca\,lSeQ so :Wu.ch confusion? Much of the confusion sµrroup<:Ung the 
highest gCK>d.~J bf. ~n to be a cq~quence of its presentation throusp,~t .. 
tll,e ~~ corpus. That is, Kant devotes no one trea~ to a. ~F<f 
tr(a~~t of;~.objectof pm-e,practical reason .. In beingp~~~ted 
uuou.~~ut, v~ous, works wh,ose tasks themselves vary as well, the highest 
good often ~om~ a handmaid.t<? the general.t¥k with whicll Kant is 
~Q~med. We are thus lFft with myriad co~eptions of the high~st good,: 
whi<:4 in m.<,>st ~s. can each _be supported through their presence iil specific;: 
texts ... , This situa,tion has led. to c.onfli~g. albeit prolific, scholarsJiip relative 
. to. the higl)est good. . 
Sin<+ thc;re is so. much. controver~ and conflict with regard to the 
highest good, it is ne~~ t~ take an integrated look at this object in order 
to take Kant seriously. In doing so, we must appreciate that the various 
manifestations of the highest good are obviously not random, but can appear 
to be unrelated, especially when each manifestation of the highest good is 
treated in isolation. As a consequence of this isolationist approach, there 
appears a false notion of competing or exclusive concepts of the highest good. 
2 
Inst.cad of interpreting the highest good through its apparently isolated 
instances, I- will argue for a new way of approaching and interpreting the 
highest·good. Through this interpretation, I have· sought to overcome ·the 
cacophony of conflicting interpretations and thereby offer a method towards 
quieting the din •. In so doing, I have realized that much of contemporary 
Kmtian scholarship-bu a decidedly Kantian flavor. Often it reads similarly to 
the antinomies in that it addresses two competing solutions to the same 
problem, denies each of them, then asserts a middle solution that contains the 
best aspects of the two ,that were previously denied. 
, The approach of this analysis is no exception, although its results in my 
~n of a middle solution is unique. What I have done, is to examine the 
two predominant schools of thought with regard to the highest good: that of 
µic highest good• unifier and that of the highest good as a moral ideal. 
Undcc these two broad rubrics, all of the interpretations of the· highest good, 
both pro and con, can be subsumed. After analyzing these conceptions of the 
' ' 
highest good; ·.1 have asserted that neither of them is completely correct in 
3 
isolation, yet both of them are correct to a certain extent. That is, both of 
these viewpoints are a necessary part of the complete understanding of the 
highest good: that of the ethical commonwealth. Furthermore, in 
appreciating the ethical commonwealth as the consummate articulation of the 
highest good ·my interpretation presents· Kant's develomental plan for 
achieving this complex end 
Thus,. to grasp the· highest good in its complete relation to the moral law 
and moral )8#'ftts ~ tC> appreciate the moral object as it is manifested iri its 
entirety: Kant tiltnselftiVes somcrpractical advice:m this regatd as he 
... grasp rorrcctly the idea·of the whole, and then to stt all tho$e 
parts in th~ir reciprocal interrelations, in the light of their 
· derivation fmm the concept ofthe whole. 1 
In genenl, this is the plan which I have attempted to follow. In the 
organization ,of my project I, have attempted to correctly grasp the idea of the 
highestigooct as·a ~neric whole determined by the moral law, and then to see 
it spedfically manifested in its parts. After appreciating the highest good in its 
parts·( a stage. where many studies are arrested thereby causing controversy 
· ant0ng Kantian commentators since their individual· interpretations compete 
1CPR, 10-11 (Beck, 10). John Silber, in his article, "The Importance of the 
Highest Good in Kant's Ethics," also cites ~ ·passage as a way to authentically 
approach the highest good, (Ethics. April, 1963) 183. 
and are never reintegrated), I have proceeded to see the parts of the highest 
good relative to their reciprocal interrelations deriving from their unifying 
concept. As a result of this theoretical backdrop to the aforementioned 
organization, .the outline of my project is as follows. 
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In Chapter One, I argue for an understanding of the highest good 
centeinl around its presentation in -the Dialectic of the second Critique. This 
is the.highest good as a dialectical ideal of reason. In· appearing as a dialectkal 
ideal, the highest .good manifests .itself as a unifier through which the duality 
of the human will as superscnsuously and sensuously determined is unified. 
This is a conceptio1rof the highest good as the all inclusive. object of pure 
practical reason. This undemanding of the highest good has met with the 
critic:Bn that it is superfluous to the practical aspects of the moral project. 
In Chapter Two, 1 argue for an understanding-Of the,highest good 
centered aroWld its presentation in the Analytic of the ~nd·Critique. This is 
the highest good ·as. a mor;ll· ideal insofar as it semes :3#1 a guide for. action. The 
conreption ,of the highest good in· this manner comes about as a consequence 
of Kant's command that,:we ,act in such a way to work towards making the 
· highest good an actwdity in the world. This understanding of the highest 
good has met with the criticism that in its implementation, it will have 
hcteronomous constqucnces for the moral agent. 
, 
s 
In Chapter Three, l wi11 demonstrate that the ethica1 cornrnonweahh, 
Kant's social understanding of the highest good as it is contained primarily in 
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, contains both aspects of the 
highest good disawed in Chapters One and Two. That is, a conception of the 
highest good as the ethical commonwealth serves as a unifying ideal as well as 
a moral ,ideal. ,In addition to including both of these strains of thought, the 
ethical commonwealth oontributes an entirely new perspective· to the ,highest 
good. , For it· is through the ethical commonwealth that the highest good takes 
on a dedde<ily social componen~ becoming a duty for all humanity .. Jn 
addition,, it1.is through this.understanding oftheihiglwst goodYt:hat the 
criticisms of supmfhtity, artEl: heteronomy are to· be met:as:they are addressed in 
Chapter,five. ; , r , , , . · :,· 
· .. 1, Chapter Pour; l will dcmonstrattt the devclopmeI\tal plan contained 
in the Kantianco:rip~;for the :rcalization,of the highest good as an ethical 
commonwealth!based on perpetual peace. In so doing, I will demonstrate llow 
it is that the ethical cominonwealth. includes the integration.of the 
understandings of the highest good,previously.presented. · This integration 
oonsists ,of thedewlopment of the ·hip.est good through the moments of the 
individual, the state and the human race, in which the afore)J\CI\tioncd 
articulations of the highest good are subsumed and brought to th.cir 
6 
cu1mination in the ethica1 commonwea1th based on perpetua1 peace. 
Finally, in Chapter Five, I will further illustrate how it is we achieve the 
consummate articulation of the highest good. That is, the ethical 
commonwealth is brought about through the careful plan Kant articulates for 
the manifestation of the Kingdom of God on earth. In concluding Chapter 
Five, I will summarize the results of this analysis as they pertain to 
contemporary scholarship on Kant's highest good and the shadow that these 
sorts of reflections can cast relative to the Kantian project as I perceive it. 
The above explains my overall goal, to articulate· the various faces of 
Kant's moral object fairly and completely since it is through the notion of the 
highest good that we are led most concretely to the requirements of the moral 
law. A useful metaphor is the cube. Each of the typical articulations of the 
highest good is a side of the cube which, seen in isolation, gives only a picture 
of a square. This is a picture that is unsatisfying to anyone who is more than 
two dimensional. I have attempted to not only delineate each of the squares, 
but then to put them together in their natural form as a cube. The squares 
taken as a whole and assembled properly make up this cube just as each facet 
. of the highest good makes up the program of the ethical commonwealth based 
on perpetual peace. This is an understanding of the highest good as the moral 
object of the pure practical reason that is far from being empty, free from 
heteronomy, and not superfluous. Instead, it is an object through which we 
are given a vision of the Kantian moral system, including the concerns of 
moral individuals, nations and the human race, thereby rounding out Kant's 




THE ORIGINS OF THE HIGHEST GOOD: 
THE SUMMUM BONUM AS DIALECTICAL 
IDEAL OF.REASON 
Throughout his work, Kant was concerned with establishing how it is 
that ·human moral agents were freely subject to the moral law. · In the second • 
Crltup,e, Kant begins to directly address this col\SUJtliag passion. How is it 
that pure. reason·.( objective and necessary). is able to be the determining · 
grotlitd for our action? In other words, how is the moral law, that which 
reside$ in the noumenal realm able to serve· as a determinant for. actions which 
take place in the anpirieal'world and hence reside in the practical or 
phenomenal realm? Kant articulates the solution to how moral actions are to 
take pl~ through :the· serond Critique, where Kant seeks to unify and 
imcgrate the ·htdnan will as he M.ablishes how it ls that pure reason can be 
practical. 'fhis:.establishment anchors the moral law as it demonstrates how we 
att subject to such a law, and in so doing, anchors and rcqui:res its object, the 
highest good. In so mchoring the object of the law as necessitated by pure 
practical reaso~dw highest good manifests itself as a unifying concept·insofar 
as it theoreticaHy uniflcs the dual aspects·of the human will as supersensuously 
8 
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and sensuously determined. This is its function as a dialectical ideal of reason. 
The object of pure practical reason, the highest good as happiness in 
proportion to worthiness to be happy, had up until the second Critique almost 
never been treated in a concentrated manner. However in this work, through 
the Dialectic of pure practical reason, Kant remedies this neglect. In the 
Dialectic, he gives a concentrated, albeit comparatively brief as compared to 
Kant's other interests (e.g., freedom, God, etc.), treatment of the highest good. 
As.a result of this treatment, we are left with one of the few sustained 
statements about the function of the highest good in the Kantian project. 
Unlike its appearance inotherplaccs in the Kantian corpus, where the role of 
~ highest<good must be :gleaned from a careful gathering of supporting 
evidence, in the .Dialectic Kant generously delineates aspects of its role and 
function. 
Consequently, in this chapter I will concentrate on this manifestation of 
the highest good in its appearance as a unifier of the legislation of our reason 
through its function as a dialectical ideal of reason. It is. my thesis that in this 
section of the second Critique where the highest good manifests itself as unifier 
we are presented with one of the two major roles of Kant's highest good. In 
addition, through this presentation we are given hints of the other major role 
of the highest good, that of a-final end for moral action, and moral ideal which 
IO 
serves as a guide for conduct. 1 These two understandings of the highest good 
exhaust the presentation of the highest good in the second Critique. That is, in 
presenting both of them, we are left with a complete picture of Kant's highest 
good as it appears in this text. Returning to the task of this chapter, I will 
argue for my thesis through analysis of primarily the second Critil(lle, with its 
theme of grounding the moral law for beings who are members of both a 
superscnsuous and a sensuous realm; that the highest good in its role as a 
dialectical ideal serves as .. a unifier of the apparently disparate aspects of the 
moral self. 
Without the unification accomplished by the highest good the call to be 
moral would fall .'on the deaf ears of impotent moral beings. That is, insofar as 
moral agents heed the call of the law, and are not morally impotent, human 
moral agents require the highest good as that object of the law which unifies 
the duality of their wills as rational beings. This duality arises as a 
consequence of Kant's conception of: 
... the will of a rational being, as belonging to the .sensuous world, 
recognizes itself to be, like all other efficient causes, necessarily 
subject to the laws of causality, while in practical matters, in its 
other aspect as a being in itself, it is conscious of its existence as 
. I 
1The highest good as a moral ideal and guide for conduct will be treated in 
Chapter Two. 
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determinable in an intelligible order of things. 2 
Hence in being human, moral agents reside in this sensuous world as well as in 
that of the supersensuous. The command to be moral is heard by and heeded 
by their supersensuous self, while the law, insofar as it is to be effective must 
dictate actions able to be enacted in the sensuous realm, by the sensuous self. 
Thus for the law to be enacted there must be some way for the theoretical 
realm of the supersensuous to become real for the practical realm of the 
sensuous. If the moral law is not to be regarded as sensuously ineffective, and 
not merely as that which is binding for our supcrsensuous self, there must be 
some means to .bridge our separate selves allowing for the supcrsensuous law to 
be sensuously effective. l:n what follows, I will show that this seeming chasm 
separating these two realms is bridged by the concept of the highest good as it 
serves as a unifying concept able to bring together both aspects of the self of 
the moral agent, thereby providing a means for the law to be effective in the 
empirical realm. 
In presenting the highest good as a unifier through its presentation as a 
dialef;tical ideal of reason, I will address: I }the way in which the highest good 
2 
·! .• ~,w,,ilfr:ch Jer Wi~ eines JIC'fflu,,,,/tigen 1 Wf'ens,. das, · als ZUT Sinnenwelt gehorig, 
sich gleich anderen wirksamen Ursachen notwendig den Gesetzen der Kausalitiit 
untmw,,jen etkennt, im Prllktiseltm .d«J, zugleich sich a,if einer 11-,uleren Seite, nilmlich 
,,ls Wesen ,,,, lid, .. selbst, saws in einer inuJJigU,elm Ordnung der Dinge &stimmgarm 
Dtuei1ls bewujJt ist, ... [CPR, 42 (Be~ 43)1. 
12 
is established as a relationship of happiness in accordance with worth (virtue). 
This will require a)an elucidation of "the good" [das Gute], that which Kant 
refers to as the bonum supremum; and b )an elucidation of happiness as the other 
concept under which all other objects of the moral will are organized. 3 Next, I 
will ·treat 2 )the positive statement of the highest good as it is presented as a 
dialectical ideal of reason that is made up of these two aforementioned 
components; This discussion will consist of an analysis of the antinomy of 
pure practical reason and its results. Finally, I will address 3 )the consequences 
of this understanding of the highest good for Kant's project4 
The·organization of this chapter follows Kant's criterion for analysis as 
it was ~scussed in the introduction. That is, with a broad general 
und:t!tStmding of the highest good as a whole, I will then analyze it relative to 
its parts, after whlth, l will address,the. consequences of this interpretation 
3 There is a certain ambiguity in the use of the term object throughout the 
Critique. Happiness is an object of the will insofar as it is an object of 
inclination. The good, or evil is an object of the will insofar as it is an object 
· of practical reason. This ambiguity will be treated later in this chapter. See 
Lewis White Beck, A·Commentaty on Kant's.Critit(Me ff;Practictd Reason. 
( Chicago: University ofChicago .Press, 1960) 9 I fn and 92. 
41n short, these consequences consist of interpreting the highest good under the 
rubric of unifier, not only as it appears in the second Critique, but also as it 
appears elsewhere in the corpus of Kantian commentary. 
13 
relative to the function of these parts as they are reintegrated into the whole 5 
The Summum Bonum and its Parts 
Kant's treatment of the highest good in the second Critique could be said 
to begin with his discussion of its primary component, "the good" [das Gute]. 
Kant's discussion of the good rests on his claim that even though a moral will 
is to be determined purely by the law, that does not mean that this will is to 
be without an object. The will must have an object as a consequence of its 
form. The will, Kant says: 
could be defined as the faculty of ends, since they are always 
determining grounds of the faculty of desire according to 
principles. 6 
If the will were to be without objects, it would be a will without volitions, and 
to be a human will is to be a will with volitions and ends. However, to be a 
will with volitions and thus with objects, does not necessarily mean that the 
will is dete'rmined by those volitions and objects. To quote Kant: 
Now it is certainly undeniable that every volition must have an 
5As a reminder, Kant suggests that it is the task of analysis to: 
.. grasp correctly the idea of the whole, and then to see all those 
parts in their reciprocal interrelations, in the light of their 
derivation from the concept of the whole. 
CPR, l 0-11 (Beck, 11 ). 
. I 
6 
: •• den Willen durch dlis VemuJgm der Zwecke definieren kmmte, indem. sie jederzeit 
&stimmui,gsgriinde Jes. &gehrungwermogens nad, Prinzipien sintl... [Ibid., 59 ( 61) ]. 
object and therefore a material; but the material cannot be 
supposed, for this reason to be the determining ground and 
condition of the maxim. If it were, the maxim could not be 
presented as giving universal law. 7 
14 
Thus in his discussion of the good, Kant demonstrates that the good provides 
the moral will with an object. This object of pure practical reason allows the 
will to remain autonomous insofar as it is an object that preserves the moral 
will' s decision to choose to be determined exclusively by the form of the law 
and not by its material. 8 Hence in his discussion of the good, Kant proceeds 
to establish that which will serve as the object of the moral will which has as 
its determining ground the law. In so doing, Kant is departing from the 
classical ethical ttadition whiclt based its moral principles on the good and did 
not derive the good from the law, as Kant does. The consequence of the way 
in which Kant establishes the moral object not only validates the way in which 
his system values ends for action, but it also stresses that although the will 
7Nun ist freilich unleugbar, daft alles Wollen auch einen Gegenstand, mithin eine 
Matnie hdbelt milsse; aber dieu ist dtt111m nicht eben der Bestimmu:ngsgrunll rmd 
Bedingung der Maxime; denn ist sie es so la.flt diese sich nicht in allgemein gesetzgebender 
Form darstellen, [Ibid., 34 (34)]. 
8lt would,be useful here to mention that Kant refers variously to the good as 
the concept of an object o( pure practical reason ((;PR, 58 [Beck,59]);as the 
sole object of a practical reason (CPR, 58 [Beck, 60]); and as an end that is 
also a duty (MM, 386 [Gregor, 190]). This is no surprise considering the 
multifarious ways in which the good serves the task which Kant has delineated 
for it. This will be treated as the chapter develops, but should be pointed out 
here in order to highlight the difficulties of Kant's language. 
15 
requires an object, it is not necessarily determined by such an object. q 
In what follows, I will present Kant's discussion of the good, that which 
is the object of the good will. This moral concept gains its viability as it 
serves to establish the means by which there is a connection between the call 
to morality and its claims on the moral will. Typically concepts gain 
acceptance to the will through the will' s being determined by the concepts of 
the objects it desires. However, in the case of a moral will, in order to remain 
autonomous, the will must be determined by nothing but the law itself. For 
in a moral will, 
The mere fonn of a law, which limits its material, must be a 
condition for adding this material to the will but not presuppose 
it as the condition of the will. 10 
That is, in the connection between the consequences of the moral law and the 
law itself, a means must be established through which·we carry out that which 
the law requires while remaining true both to the law and to our autonomy. 
This task calls into question the relationship between the principles of 
morality and their ability to determine our moral will. That is, if the moral 
9For a more detailed discussion of the·way in which Kant is not indifferent 
to, ends, see Mary Gregor, Laws of Freedom (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), 
89ff. 
10Also die blo.fte Form eines Geutzes, welche die Materie einschriinkt, mu.ft zugleich ein 
Grund sein, diese Materie zum Willen hinzuzuftlgen,, aber sie nidrt vorauszusttzen. 
[CPR, 35 (Beck, 35)]. 
16 
law is to determine the will, the will must be free; yet in being free, the ground 
of the will should not be determined by anything empirical. Hence in being 
moral, "a free will must find its ground of determination in the law, but 
independently of the material of the law." 11 Although the will of a moral 
agent is determined independently of the sensuous world, the same will resides 
in and works to bring things about .. in the sensuous world. This occurs as the 
will brings ~utobjects or states of affairs in the world. Yet in being free, the 
groµ.nd of the detennination of the will should not lie in the objects it seeks to 
bring about, ~ the determinatiqn of the autonomous will must only be 
sub~ to tl:).e.law inJts ground of d(termination. When the law of the will is 
the wiU's grqund. of determination, the will determines itseH and is thus 
},·' ' < 
autonw,ious .. In.short, if the object ~f the law is to be added to the will as 
part ~ parcel o~ the will, and the will is to remain autonomous, its. object 
must be determined by the law and not otherwise. 12 
By compari,son, in a sensuously determined or heterol\omous will, the 
will. is directly determined by .an o~ject, or the concepts of objects. 13 These 
11 
•• • so mu.fl ein freier Wille, unabhangig von der Materie des Gesetzes, dennoch einen 
· Bestimm'llnpgnuul in dem Gesetze antrrJJen. Es ist aber aujer der Materie des Gesetzes 
nichts ... [Ibid., 29 (28)]. 
12Ibid., 58 (60). 
13Kant is. particularly careless about his determination here with regard to 
whe~r $( will.is dete~4 by ,concepts of ~bje~ pr objects themselves, 
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objects are sought as a consequence of the will desiring these objects. That is, 
the sensuously determined will is determined by the concept of the objects it 
desires. In any will, when an object serves as the determining ground of the 
will, the object is brought about through principles or maxims which serve as 
the conditions of the action insofar as they are the conditions that the agent 
fulfills as she works towards bringing about these objects. Consequently, all 
principles have ·material insofar as they seek to bring about the material of an 
object, insofar as the material is determined by its object. Yet it must'be 
differentiated that tin bringing about objects, although all principles ·have 
mAtt!rial •. ( since al volition's have objects),· all principles are not material 
principles.; ·A,principle is ailed a materiat principle only if its material directly 
• I 
causes the action bld\lght aboo.t by the principle. That is, when an action is 
brought about as a direct ·consequence of dte material· of the object, the will 
can be said to have been determined by the ·material of the object; thus the 
will wasdetetmined:by a mattrial:prindple. Hence, a will that is determined 
by an objtct has a material principle or maxim. 
It should, however, be noted that a will can still be subject to bringing 
about objects and not have a material maxim. This is the case when the . 
material of th.e will has not determined the object, but something other than 
/ 
see footnote number ~n, as ~n as Beck's discussion of the very same; and 
an example of the problems Mth this translation, [Ibid., 58 (5 9)]. 
the object provides the condition for the principle or maxim which aims at 
bringing about the object or state of affairs. 14 
18 
Consequently, if the Kantian moral law is to have any efficacy in the 
world, in that it is able to allow the will to pursue objects, it must be able to 
allow the will to bring about objects or states of affairs independently of the 
will being determined externally. That is, the law must be able to capitalize on 
the will' s ability to not always be determined by material principles in its 
realization of objects. Without this freedom from material determination all 
determinations of the law are contingent, empirical, and unable to lead to the 
law as a determination of the will, because: 
· All practical principles which presuppose an object (material) of 
the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will are 
without exception ,empirical and can furnish :no practical laws. 15 
Therefore, freedom from hetcronomy is only possible when the decision as to 
whether or not to bring about an action (realize an object) is made 
independently of a material principle. That is, there is no object presupposed 
as the detennimng ground of the will. Thus the will is able to be free from 
14See Onora O'Neill Constructions of Rc:ason (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989) 83-89 for a discussion of the formulation of maxims 
and their universality and subjectivity for objects of desire. See also, CPR, 20-
21 (Beck, 18·19). 
15Alle praktischen Prinzipien, die ein Objekt (Materie) des Begehrungsvermogens als 
Bestimmungsgnuul des Willms vurllussetzen, sind insgesamt empirisch u,ul k/Jnnen keine 
praktischen Gesetze abgeben. [CPR, 21 (Beck 19)]. 
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empirical determination. In these freely determined instances, the maxim or 
principle of the will is not determined by the object or end towards which it 
aims. So, if the will is not to be sensuously determined, which would be 
impossible if the will were to remain autonomous, the source of the 
determination of the will must lie elsewhere than in its empirically determined 
objects. In stresmng that the will can possibly be free from direct 
determination by objects, Kant asserts that the will can be free, and such a free 
will has chosen.to be determined "by the law.of reason" alone.·16 
Yet if the will is to have any effect, the will must bring about objects. 
Kant has always recognized that to be human is to be purposive, seeking to 
satisfy the conatus of human existence by bringing about objects and satisfying 
desires. Hence, if the law is to be practically effective it must not thwart what 
it is to be human, nor must it serve the sensuous aspects of the very same. 17 
Consequently, a moral will does bring about objects; yet as was stated above, 
in so doing, these objects must not be the ground of the will but rather objects 
that come about as a consequence of the will being determined by the law. 
Hence, if the will is to be subject to the law, in seeking its objects, these 
16sofern dieser durchs Vernunftgesetz bestimmt wird ... [lbid., 60 (62)]. In addition, 
see Beck, Commentaxy. l 30ff. 
I 
l7For a discussion of human action as purposive see Gregor, Laws of 
Freedom, 79ff. 
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objects must be pursued and organized under an object or consist of an object 
that will be compatible with practical reason. As such, the object will hold 
sway with the will, and will be determined by the principles of the moral law. 
That is,. this object will fulfill the demands of our supersensuous self as the 
object is a consequence of and not a ground of the law. 
The object that Kant proposes as the object of the moral will is the 
concept of the moral good; for the good can be the only concept of an object 
of the pure practical reason as such. In.being so determined, Kant informs us 
that: 
By a concept of an object of practical reason I understand the 
idea of an object as an effect possible through freedom. 18 
The good satisfies the above criterion insofar as it conforms with the 
requirements of freedom as reflected in the free will. This is the case since the 
good is derived from the practical law and in no way serves as its ground. In 
so doing, it allows the will to remain autonomous, freely determined, and 
effective insofar as it has an object. 
As the object of a practical reason, the good serves as "a necessary 
18Unter einem Begriffe eines Gegmstandes der pralctisdtm V ernunft verstehe ich die 
VOT'fldung eines Ob~ a'ls,einer moglichm Wirkung mch Freiheit. [CPR, 58 
(Be~S9)]. 
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object of the faculty of desire ... according to a principle of reason. "19 It is a 
necessary object insofar as its pursuit is not optional. That is, the good is an 
object of desire as compared to evil, which is an object of aversion. It is to be 
desired as a consequence of the setting of a good will. That is, the effects 
possible by means of an autonomous will are necessarily good insofar as the 
autonomy of the will is ptesetved. Furthermore, its origin and worth lie in 
practical reason and the principles. of practical r~n and only as such is the 
good allowable as a concept of pure practical reason-an effect possible through 
freedom.20 
Throughout this analysis it should be emphasized that Kant has two 
different JlleaJ\Uilgf at work for "object". An object. can be something out there 
in the world for which we have .a desire and thus we seek to bring about the 
particular state of affairs through our action, by which the desire for this 
something is satisfied. Hence the object is an object of desire. In addition, 
19 
••• einm notwmtligen Gegauta,ul des &g#hrwnplurch ... nach einem Prinzip der 
Vernunft. [Ibid., (60)]. 
20It should be noted here that Kant refers to the good [ das Gute] --( as well as 
evil [das Bo.re]) vcmously as an object9.(p;r~ou reason~ as an object of 
pure practical reason. This variation can be seen in both forms in one page of 
Kant's~ (e.g. 58). However, in the title to this section he refers to The 
Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason [Von dem Begriffe eines 
Gegenstandes der reinen pralctischen Vernunft], hence I have followed Kant's lead 
in referring to the good as that object of pure practical reason ( as has Beck in 
his COQUJ\Cfttaty). 
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Kant uses the term object to describe an internal setting of the will insofar as 
this setting forms a part:icular disposition of the will. That is, the particular 
setting of the will is the will' s object, ( or another translation could be the will' s 
objective). The setting of the will, as good or evil, is the object of the will as a 
consequence of the will having made the adoption of this particular moral 
disposition its object or goal. With relation to the moral will and its setting, 
the form of the principles of the law have determined what as an object, for 
the disposition or setting of the will, is and is not good. 
The object of the will, as the object of pure practical -reason, is 
determined by the! law and in no way externally determined. This 
determh\atiQn of goodness occurs irrespective of whether or not the object is 
possible or mrt.ua:l insofar a it takes place in the world This determination of 
the will (in adopting the good as its object), presents the moral object-the 
good-to the will as its determination, and as the object of its principles for 
act.ion. · This notion of act.ion, since it coincides with the inner disposition 6f a 
moral will coincides with the latter sense of object as discussed above. 21 
Hence the good, as the object of pure practical reason is not an effect of 
act.ion insofar as it consists of bringing about a state of affairs in the world .. 
This object has not material. Instead, the good consists in the act of the will 
21CPR,. 58 (Beck, 59); see also Beck, Commcnt.aty. 133-36. 
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in committing or determining itself. Thus, a good will in having the good as 
its object has itself as its object, since in so doing the will provides itself with 
its own underlying moral disposition. This can be likened to the way in which 
humanity serves as an end in itself, as the categorical imperative takes 
humanity as its object. In the case of both the good and humanity, the end as 
object does not consist of a state of affairs in the world as much as it refers to 
what comes before states of affairs, as a requirement to be included within the 
command of the law. Both ends-humanity and the moral good-are 
compatible with the command of the law and thereby follow from it as they 
bring vision to the law in supplying an object ,for the will. 
'This good is compatible as an object, with the moral law, insofar as it 
consists of that status of ,the will as it is a will determined by the moral law. It 
is an internally required state of affairs, as a setting of the will morally 
determined such that "a principle of reason is thought of as already the 
determining ground of the will ... ( and thus as a determining ground only 
through the lawful form of the maxim.)"22 Through the good, it is as if Kant 
sets as the object of the moral will "a moral will." Thus the object of a moral 
will as the good, is a will of a certain disposition. In this manner, the will has 
22ein Vernunftprinzip wird schon an sich als der &stimmungsgntnd des Willens 
gedadtt ... (also bloft surch die gesetzliche Form der Ma.rime.) [CPR, 62 (Beck, 64)]. 
24 
itself, and its ovvn perfection as its object.23 
In the moral will.having the good as its object and hence its own 
perfection as its object, Kant is demanding that the will be virtuous. In the 
Analytic, Kant does not make this point completely evident, but when the 
analytic is read in conjunction with what Kant later says about the good in the 
dialectic this point becomes obvious. 24 In further describing the good will as a 
virtuous will, the demands of the law arc made more clear. That is, through 
understanding what Kant means by.virtue and the command to be virtuous, 
we learn what is demanded by the law as a consequence of the recognition that 
the good is the only possible object of the will For example, with· regard to 
virtue, Kant ~ 
The utmost that finite practical reason can accomplish is to make 
sure of the unending progress of its maxims toward this model 
(the holy will) and of the constancy of the finite rational being in 
making continuous progress. This is virtue, and as a naturally 
23CPR, 58ff (Beck, 60ff ); see also Beck, Commentazy. 135ff. 
241n the beginning of Chapter Two of the Dialectic, Kant says: 
That virtue ( as the worthiness to be happy) is the supreme 
condition of whatever appears to.us to be desirable and thus of 
iUl qur pursuit of happiness and, co~quently, that it is the 
: supreme good hav~ [sic] been proved in the Analytic. 
Daft Tugmd (al$ du Wurdigkeitp glucklich zu sein) du oberste Betling,mg alles tlessm, 
mis uns nur wunschenswert sclzeilien mag, mithin auch aller unserer &werbung um 
Gluckseligkeit, mithin tlas oberste Gut sei, ist in tier Ana{ytik bewiesen worden. 
[CPR, 110 (Beck 114)]. 
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acquired faculty, it can never be perfect ... 25 
Virtue, for Kant, means nothing more than a serious concerted effort towards 
successful moral progress. In being human, Kant recognizes that we are not 
holy wills, but rather a combination of what is supersensuous and sensuous. 
Thus, in calling us to be virtuous, being virtuous is no more than being ·a 
"moral disposition in conflict. "26 However, a virtuous will is also no less than 
constant striving towards making the human will in conflict approximate a 
holy will insofar as it is possible, as determined by the law, and the object of 
the moral will, the good. 
This good is obviously not a subjective sense of good. Instead, this good 
is that moral good to which any rational will would assent, merely because it is 
a rational will. Kant stresses that the good is not optional. It is not to be 
confused with any sort of hedonistic or pleasure based good. It is the good 
that springs from the law and not vice versa. This is the case because: 
... the moral law is that which first defines the concept of the 
good--so far as it absolutely deserves this name--and makes it 
25V on -welchem ins. Unendliche gehenden Progressus seiner Maximm und 
Unwandelbarkeit derse"lben ZJtm-bestllndigen Furtschreiten sicher zu sein: d.i. Tugend, 
ails Pllchste 1st, was nulltclre praktiscke Vernunft bewtrken kann, die selbst wiederum 
wenigstens als natilrlich mvorbenes VennDgen nie vollendet sein kann, [Ibid., 32/33 
(33)]. I 
26moralische Gesinnung im Kampfe, [Ibid., 84 (87)]. 
26 
possible.27 
As such, its pursuit is necessary to the will that is subject to the law of reason. 
We relate to the good as an inner call to perfection through which our own 
will is made to be as moral as possible. The good relates to the moral will and 
the. bringing about of states of affairs which are determined by this setting of 
the will; that is, the good determines those actions brought about through the 
maxims dictated by the good will. This is the case because: 
... good ( or evil) always indicates a relation to the will so far as it 
is determined by the law of reason to make something its object, 
for the will is never determined directly by the object and our 
conception of it; rather, the will is a faculty which can make an 
object real.• Thus good or evil are properly referred to actions and 
not the the sensory state of the person. 28 
In a good will, or in a will that has adopted the good as its object, actions that 
follow from this will are perfectly good, because their possibility as moral is 
already secured since the form of the law and "the object, so far as the object 
27 sondern umgekehrt das moralische Gesetz allererest den Begriff des Guten, sofern es 
diesm Name schluhthm verdlent, bestimme und miJglich mache. [Ibid., 64 ( 66)]. 
28Das Gute oder Bise bedaltet .aberjederzeit eine Beziehung auj den Willen, sofern 
dieser durchs V ernunftgesetz bestimmt wird, sich etwas zu seinem Objelcte zu machen; 
wie er limn lurch daS, Objekt und des,,-n VtJTstellung,n~ Jm11Uttelbar bestimmt 
wird, sondern ein V ermDgen ist, sich eine Regel der vernunft zur Bewegursache einer 
Handlung dadurch em Object witklich werden hinn) zu machen. Das Gute oder Bose 
witd also eigintlich au/ Handlungen, nicht au/ den Empfindungszustand der Person 
bezogm; [Ibid., 60 (62)]. 
27 
is the moral good, of the maxim coincide. "29 It is in this manner that the 
moral good serves as the criterion by which actions are to be measured. As the 
moral will that has the good as its object has a good disposition, all of its 
objects are thus conditioned and can thereby be considered good as well. 
Thus, actions that follow from the moral good are perfectly good actions that 
further the moral •status of the good will. 
To summarize, the moral good is the object that the moral law holds 
before us as a command to make our will more moral and to perfect our 
rational nature iRS()far as it consists of what it is to be a rational will and thus 
tatioruilly·will th~t which brings about moral objects. As the object of a pure 
practical~ a:nd,deter-mined· as· sueh it has the ability to serve· as the 
measuring stick :by which we·can assess our actions .and· hence it· also serves as 
that which classifies actions and objects in the world as desirable, relative to· 
the law. For a truly moral action would have its source in such a will and 
thereby'be good. 
With this presentation and analysis of the good in place, we can move 
on to its relation to that other part of the highest good, happiness. That is, 
the moral good· alone is not enough to account for all of our actions; it 
accounts only for those actions that are perfectly good insofar as they follow 
/ 
29Beck, Commentazy. 134. 
28 
from the good will. This could be a possible state of affairs for angels, or for 
other non~sensuous beings, but it falls terribly short of the human condition. 
Hence, as we are both noumenal and phenomenal moral agents, we have 
myriad desires, and obviously not every volition will have as its object, or be 
able to be conditioned by, some thing that is completely good. Even so, this 
does not mean that the resulting object is thus perfectly evil. Kant recognizes 
that as humans, we would have desires for other things than those which 
would fit under the criterion of the concept of the object of the pure moral 
good .. 'fhcse rcsultingdcsires.forw:hich the purely moral will and its object 
cannot alone aa:oun~ Kant t.etms happiness . 
. Jn what follows, I will present ,a brief discussion of the other component 
in Kant's highest good, happiness.· I will do so only briefly since a lengthy 
treatment of happiness is not germane to this task. Instead, what is presently 
at· stake is: 1 )why does Kant seek to establish happiness as the second 
comportcnt of the highest good and 2) what broadly does Kant mean by 
happiness in this context? Obviously, both of these are very complex 
questions which, in their abundance of controversy, have been treated 
elsewhere. 30 I will seek to avoid these controversies through beginning my 
30For an in~epth discussion of the controversy surrounding the role of 
happiness in Kant's ethic, and a defense of its importance, see Victoria S. 
Wike, Kant on Happiness in Ethics, (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1994 ). 
29 
discussion of happiness in Kant with the presupposition of the veracity of 
Kant's own claim that happiness plays an important role in his ethical project. 
Through the moral good, Kant has established what he calls the 
supreme good. As such, it is the unconditional condition, that which is not 
subordinate to any other condition. 31 The moral good, as a setting of the will, 
is that condition under which all other pursuits of the will must be 
conditioned. However, other things are desirable to the moral will. As has 
been previously established, in order for the moral will to be truly practical, it 
must bring things about•in the world. Yet, the good only accounts·for the 
objects whidt can· be subsumed under that which is wholly moral · If Kant's 
account ofsthe moral will were to stop here, many desires for other objects 
would be left out of the picture.· To completely account for the objects .of .the 
moral will, Kant articulates that the moral good is not the only good, that is; 
for the most complete good, "happiness is also required. "32 . 
Happiness is required as the second component of the highest good 
because the moral law would be absurd if those that were worthy of happiness 
were to go without it. As strange as this may seem, since everyone is aware of 
many cases where seemingly worthy people are terribly unhappy through no 
31CPR, 110 (Beck 114). 
32.wird auch Gluckseligkeit dazu erfordert, [Ibid., 110 (114)]. 
30 
fault of their own, Kant holds that to merit happiness through moral worth, 
and go without, would demonstrate that the moral law was contradictory. The 
law would lead to a contradiction insofar as the law would be creating a 
command that would lead to the perversion of the natural end of the moral 
species as it seeks to fulfill its own happiness. Kant explains why this is the 
case, as he explains that happiness is required to be achieved by those 
deserving of it, 
not merely .in the partial eyes of a person who makes himself his 
end but even in the judgment of an impartial reason, which 
impartially regards persons in the world as ends-in-themselves. 
For to be in need of happiness and also worthy of it and yet not 
to partake of it could not be in accordance with the complete 
volition of an omnipotent rational being, if we assume such only 
for the sake of the argument. 33 
The point of this passage consists in Kant's appeal to the order in the world 
that is perpetuated by the moral law and furthered by the idea of an 
omnipotent rational being. In such an ordered world, if one were worthy of 
happiness, such happiness would be forthcoming. The world must be so 
ordered, according to Kant, or else the moral law would be contradictory. 
33Zwar nicht blofl in den parteiischen Augen der Person. die sich silbst zum Zwecla 
macht, sondern selbst im Urteil einer unparteiischen V ernunft, die jene uberhaupt in der 
Welt· asl Zweck an sich betraehtet. Denn der Gliickse.ligk.eit bedurftig, ihrer auch 
wurdig, dennoch aber derselben nicht teilhaftig zu sein, kann mit dem vollkommenen 
Wollen.eines vernanftigen Wesens, welches zugleich all Gewalt hiltte, wenn wir uns auch 
nur mi soldtl8 zum·.Vmuche denkl,,, garnicht ZJUtlmmen beslllmi. [Ibid, 110 
(114/5)]. 
31 
Kant has thereby established happiness as that other aspect of the highest 
good such that the moral law is not to be in conflict with the natural ends of 
human moral agents. 
In order for the highest good to live up to its claim of being the bonum 
consummatum, or most complete good, it must thereby account for happiness as 
a desire of rational beings. That is, in providing a complete object for pure 
practical reason, the highest good must actually be the will' s most complete 
object. As it is, moral interests alone do not completely account for the 
interests of the human moral will. It is the nature of all human will, moral or 
otherwise, to desire happiness. Kant says, "To be happy is necessarily the 
desire of eve:ry rational but finite being."34 If the highest good were not to 
account for happiness, Kant's highest good would further supplement the 
various arguments propounded against Kant which accuse his moral system of 
not being a realistic one for rational but finite beings. In addition, in failing to 
account for happiness, the highest good would not live up to its claim of being 
the most complete object of the moral will. 
From the above discussion it is clear that the highest good, in seeking to 
be the most complete object of the moral will, does include happiness. Hence, 
it is left to consider what Kant means by happiness in this context. In the case 
3x;lileklit:h zu sein, ist notwendig das Verumgen jedes vernunftigm, 11ber endli&hm 
Wesens [Ibid., 25 (24)]. 
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of happiness as the second component of the highest good, Kant means by 
happiness the non-moral goods that the agent pursues. This sense of 
happiness can best be understood as a sensible one. In this sense, happiness is 
a "determinant of the faculty of desire" through which we fulfill our non-moral 
needs.35 Kant further classifies happiness as: 
the condition of.a rational being in the world, in whose whole 
existence everything goes according to wish and will. 36 
This is a sensible definition of happiness insofar as Kant is careful to express 
that it is a condition of happiness for a being "in the world". This condition 
is comprised of those objects that are pursued merely for the sensuously 
positive effects they may have on us. 
Furthermore, once we have adopted the moral good as a determining 
principle for the moral will; we are still left with the task of pursuing objects in 
the world. In so doing, not all objects will necessarily be determined by the 
moral will, some objects that are brought about by the law will not even have 
moral import, (e.g. what flavor ice cream to eat on a hot summer day). 
Through being human, we are required to pursue some ends that are not 
perfectly moral; however, this does not mean that they are immoral either. 
35Bestimmungsgrund seines Begehrungsvermogens [Ibid., 25 (24)]. 
I 
I 
36Glueks1ligknt ist der Zmand eines vernilnftigen Wesens in .dlr Wilt,. dan es· im 
Ganze,, seiner F,xistenz alles nach Wunsch und Willen geht. [Ibid., 124 (129)]. 
33 
About this very condition, Lewis White Beck writes that a consequence of our 
"devotion to the moral good does not require renunciation of other 
goods; ... Some desires are compatible with devotion to the good or can be 
made compatible with it. "37 That is, although we are faced with desires that 
may compete with the moral good, by their mere presence we are not doomed 
to failure before we make a moral action. Other desires that are present in the 
will are entirely permissible without running into contradiction with the moral 
law. Yet these ends must be subsumed, conditioned and tempered by the 
influence of our perfected or sought to be perfected rational nature, which 
seeks as its highest end its own perfection. 38 
In short; alt.ltough we are to supremely desire the good, it is clear that 
other desires can be compatible with this over-arching desire, namely those 
desires Kant organizes under the desire for happiness. This is permissible 
within the Kantian scheme as long as the desire for happiness is subsumed 
\tnder the determination of that will which has the moral good as its object. 
As Kant explains: 
... virtue (as the worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition 
of whatever appears to us to be desireable and thus of all our 
37Beck, Commentaty. 136. 
38As Beck explains, ''The only purpose of moral action as such is to secure 
the teign of law, and every moral action in part accomplishes this aim." [Ibid., 
136]. 
34 
pursuit of happiness ... 39 
Hence, the desire for happiness need not be thrown away, although it must be 
tempered by the good, and pursued only on condition that the form of its 
pursuit is dictated by the good 
Thus, in the same way the moral good, as an object of the moral will, 
serves as the rubric under which all perfectly good moral actiQn can be 
subsumed, happiness serves as an overarching rubric under which all of our 
desires for objects •Of self inteiest ( as non-moral) can be subsumed. With 
these treatments of each of the constitutive parts of Kant's highest good in 
place, the analysis now moves on to that way in which the highest good is 
established as a unifier of the. duality of our human wills. As a part of the 
recognition that the highest good is made up of two heteronomous parts, Kant 
recognizes that all of the not purely moral objects of desire must still be 
t 
compatible with and not contradict the desire for the absolutely moral, moral 
good. Thus, the will' s desire for the moral good, in desiring that it be a 
morally good will is that which is required as the will's over-arching desire. 
39Dafl Tugend (als die Wurdigkeit, gliicklich zu sein) die oberste Bedingung alks 
dessen, was uns nur wunschenswert scheinen mag, mithin auch all.er unserer Bewerbung 
um Gl;;ekseligke;it, [CPR, 110 (Beck 114)]. 
35 
The Highest Good as a Dialectical Ideal of Reason 
In the Dialectic section of the second Critique, the highest good appears 
against the backdrop of unpacking reason's confusion over what the practically 
unconditioned is, a consequence which demonstrates that the highest good 
provides for the completeness of human experience and the unification of all 
of the human desires under one concept. Through the concept of the highest 
good, as it unifies the heterogeneous aspects of ourselves, Kant .gains for the 
moral project a theoretical completeness and unity. In what follows I will 
concentrate on Kant's demonstration of the highest good as a unifying concept 
of reason as it appears in the Dialectic section of the second Critique. 
Since it has been previously established that desires for happiness are 
compatible with.the supreme moral good, Kant points us towards the pursuit 
of something still beyond the supreme moral good through which our pursuit 
of the supreme moral good and our pursuit of happiness are able to be united. 
That is,· this supreme moral good is not the highest good, it is not the 
summum bonum. For it is only through the summum bonum as the unifier of 
the two,he~rogeneous aspects of.existence (virtue and happiness) that we are 
provided w.itl}. . "the concept of a supreme end which unites all other ends."40 It 
is in this sense that I refer to the highest good as a unifier, as that which 
40Beck, Commentary. 242. 
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unites all other ends. That is, the summum bonum is that end, as the object 
of a moral agent, through which the two heterogeneous ends of ourselves are 
united into one. This unification of ends is not satisfied by the supreme object 
of the moral law, the "good", since that is merely the object that is desired by 
and rules over the moral will. The moral good alone is unable to provide that 
object which umfies the other ends that arise as a consequence of moral agents 
being both phenomenal and noumenal. That is, there is a .difference in the 
notions of the good as they are presented in the Analytic and the Dialectic. 41 
To summarize, in the Analytic, we have the moral good as it has been 
propounded in the above sections, while in the Dialectic we arrive at the 
highest~ .that to which we will proceed. The highest good involves a 
moral system that entails an amalgamation of our phenomenal and noumenal 
selves. As such, it must incorporate both moral and non-moral, or even 
morally neutral desires. This requires ;a connection between the moral good 
and these other goods under a moral system. 42 
41 Kant refers to the high~ good variously· as both an end and an object. 
This point is rarely addressed directly in the secondary literature, however 
mention 9f it is m~ explicitly by John Atwell in his work Ends and Principles 
·in Kant's Moral Thought. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 1986, 
102ff., 
42As Beck.ex.plains in his oommerttary: . 
While the Analytic, in the doctrine of the moral good, taught 
that the moral good is the sole object of pure practical reason, the 
Dialectic does not abstract from all the diverse purposes of will 
37 
This connection of human ends and objects, which Kant accomplishes 
through the highest good, is the a priori synthetic combination of the moral 
good as bonum supremum and the totality of all other goods, which Kant 
sums up as happiness. Kant names this concept the bonum consummatum 
or the complete good. This combination accounts for the unity and ability of 
the pure practical reason to account for the pursuit of all ends. It is a unifying 
concept of the dual aspect of our will as phenomenal and noumenal.. In 
addition, this unity is able to account for our human moral purposiveness as it 
projects an end for moral action 1hat accounts for all ends of the moral 
individual1ay accounting for happiness conditioned by virtue. 43 
This unity is expressed by Kant as an a priori unity.44 As such,·it is not 
an empirical unity; but rather, the Jughest good .as a unifier is a theoretical . 
concept in that it accounts for the unity of happiness and virtue in the 
theoretical realm. That is, virtue and happiness are enacted in the practical 
realm, b1.lt.the issue of their w.lification is an issue for theoretical reason, "a 
but defines the condition under which they can and must be 
synthesized in, a single system . 
. · [Beck, Commenwy, 242J; 
43CPR, 110 (Bede, 114)1 
44For as Kant says, "The highest good is a synthesis ofconcepts ... " and as 
such a synthesis, "this combhlation is know as a priori." .. s""""1, eine Synthesis 
der Begriffe sei. Weil aber dine V erbindung Ills a priori, [Ibid., 113 ( 117)]. 
practical problem which is assigned solely by pure reason and without any 
concurrence of sensuous incentives. "45 
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As an aside, it is of interest here to note that although in this section 
of the second Critique Kant refers to the sumrnum bonum, the highest good as 
the bonum consummatum, he refers to this very same concept in varied ways, 
if only in this work alone. That is, in the second Critique alone, Kant refers to 
the highest good as the summum bonum, bonum consummatum, the Kingdom 
of God and the intelligible world. For present purposes, my investigation is 
only concerned with the sumrnum bonum as it is expressed as the highest good 
which is made up of the bonum supremum and happiness, resulting in the most 
perfect good or 1"'num consummatum. 46 Insofar as this is the notion of the 
highest good as bonum consummatum, with which this aspect of the analysis 
is concerned, this concept has been treated. 47 
45praktischen Aufgabe, welche ohne alien Beitritt sinnlicher Triebfedern blofl durch 
reine Vemunft vorgeschrieben wird, [Ibid., 124 (128)). 
46
.As bonum consummatum see: CPR, 110 (Beck, 114); as Kingdom of God 
see: CPR, 129 and 131 (Beck, 133 and 135); as intelligible word see: CPR, 
133 (Beck, 13 7). See also Beck's mention of the very same, in which he notes 
the disparity of terms but deems it unnecessary to give them individual 
treatment [Beck, Commentacy. 242, (fn 11)]. 
47lnsofar as Kant describes the highest good as consisting of the kingdom of 
God, that conception of the surtunum bonum will receive treatment in 
Chapter Three, while the· conception of the sumntum bonum as an intelligible 
-world wm · receive treatment in Chapter Two. 
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Once Kant articulates the summum bonum as bonum consummatum he 
moves on to address how it is that this concept is possible. This is the matter 
with which the antinomy of practical reason is concerned. This concern must 
take place in the antinomy: 
... since the possibility of the highest good therefore rests on no 
empirical principles, the deduction of this concept must be 
transcendental. It is a priori (morally) necessary to bring forth 
the highest good through the freedom of the will; the condition 
of its possibility, therefore, must rest solely on a priori grounds of 
knowledge. 48 
In the antinomy, Kant seeks to establish how it is that the highest good as the 
unity of two heterogeneous concepts of our will is possible. This possibility, 
since it surpasses expression through the categories of space and time, is 
established transcendentally. The establishment of the highest good since it is 
such a complex object and morally necessary has its origin and establishment 
in a priori reason. Thus, the possibility of the highest good is grounded 
through pure practical reason's a priori "expression in theoretical reason. 
Furthermore, the possibility of the highest good is of central focus 
throughout the rest of the Dialectic. With regard to this Dialectic, it is 
somewhat unusual that Kant would have a dialectic of pure practical reason 
48Und die Moglichkeit des hikhsten Guts also au/ keinen empirischen Prinzipim 
beruht so wird die Deduktion dieses Begriffs transzendental sein miissen. Es ist a priori 
( moralisch) notwendig, das hochst( Gut durch Freiheit des Willens hervorzubringen; es 
mu.ft also auch die Bedingung der milglichkeit desselben lediglich au/ Erkmntnisgriinden a 
priori heruhm. [CPR., 113 (Beck, 117)]. 
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since it is not expected that in practice practical reason would over-extend 
itself. However, Kant promises us a dialectic that will address an illusion of 
practical reason as exposed through its very own judgments. It is important to 
appreciate that the Dialectic does not arise as a consequence of pure practical 
reason in its practical use. Instead, it arises as pure practical reason seeks to go 
beyond its practical use. 
In his analysis of this Dialectic, Beck very succinctly presents its implicit 
assumptions. The following summarizes his presentation. 
l )So far as pure practical reason is practical, it has no dialectic 
and creates no illusions because it issues no declarative 
statements. 
2)So far as pure practical reason is reason, it seeks the 
UllCQnditioned condition for its actions and judgments and 
decisions. 
3 )In seeking the unconditioned, pure practical reason is 
theoretical reason employing practical data. 
4)The unconditioned condition for pure practical reason is the 
summum bonum, that which is at stake in the present antinomy. 49 
Through the highest good, Kant establishes the concept through which 
practical reason searches for its unconditioned condition. In this notion of the 
highest good, .qot only are our heteronomous ends united, but as Beck argues, 
we theoretically seek to unite the pursuit of our theoretical and practical 
49Beck, Commentary. 242-246. 
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reason as ,vell. '50 This can also be seen as unification of the supersensuous and 
E. sensuous realms. That is, we have our pursuit of the ends of the 
~-
- supersensuous realm--the moral good and the sensuous realrn--happiness. 
They are united in the highest good. Furthermore, we have the pursuit of an 
unconditioned condition insofar as we are superscnsuously driven by our 
reason; this is the unconditioned condition for those conditions subject to our 
practical sensuous concerns. As such, the highest good as the unconditioned 
condition setves as the sum of all conditions (virtue and happiness) thereby 
uniting the duality of our human nature. 51 
Tt> summarize, it is very important to appreciate what is being 
accomplished as a result of this Dialectic. That is, the highest good is being 
consid~red from a theoretical perspective; or at the very least, its practical 
aspects are being considered theoretically. As a result of this consideration, we 
are left with a concept of the highest good which unifies the two legislations of 
~ '~ that•this is the case since in addressing the highest good we are 
led to a consideration of the question, "What may I hope?" [Ibid.] 
' ,, ,, \ 
51 As Beck explains: 
Explicitly, there is one illusion arising from the fact that practical reason is 
reason and therefore seeks the unconditioned ... .it may seek the unconditioned 
as the totality of the object of pure practical reason in the concept of the 
highest good and seek to know it theoretically. 
[Ibid., 241]. 
42 
our will. This is a unification of ourselves as nournenal and phenomenal and 
as supersensuous and sensuous selves. This unification also manifests itself as 
we consider not only the way in which our supersenuous and sensuous 
concerns of reason are united, but also the way in which our supersensuous 
and sensuous ends as moral agents are united. As was discussed earlier in this 
chapter, it is through the highest good that our supersensuous end-the moral 
good, is united with our sensuous end-happiness. The consequences of this 
will be discussed further, once the nature of the antinomy has been 
, With this background established, we now tum to the issue of the 
antinomy itself. ,Im what follows, I will summarize K.apt' s antinomy, the 
structure of which has been called into question. That is, it has been 
questioned whether or not what Kant has expressed as an antinomy of pure 
practical reason is actually a legitimate antinomy. 52 For present purposes I will 
ignore this contl'Overs.y since it is not germane to the issue at hand, which is 
what is at stake in the antinomy for Kant, as Kant presents it. 
To be~ Kant denies the following thesis: striving for happiness 
produces a ground for a virtuous disposition. This denial is obvious as a 
5
~l.ewis White Beck argues tlmt the antinomy of the Dialectic is not a real 
antinomy insofar as it does not contain a real thesis and antithesis, and hence 
there is not so much at stake in this antinomy. [Ibid., 247ff]. 
L 
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consequence of Kant's discussion of the law as that alone which can serve for 
the ground of a virtuous disposition. If the striving for happiness were to serve 
as a ground for a disposition, the disposition would not only be heteronomous, 
but far from virtuous. With regard to the antithesis of the antinomy, Kant 
asserts that it is not absolutely impossible that a virtuous disposition could 
necessarily produce happiness. This is false insofar as a virtuous disposition is 
regarded as the form of causality in the world of sense. That is, it is false if 
e,dstence is merely understood as that existence which occurs in the sensuously 
cobditioned world, as the only mode of e,nstence that is possible for a rational 
t,eq.53, 
Kant allows that it is possible for a virtuous disposition to necessarily 
produce happiness if: 
1 )the moral agent· is justified in thinking of her 
existence as that of a noumenon in an intelligible 
world. 
2 )the moral agent has in the moral law a pure 
intellectual determining ground of her causality 
insofar as it takes place in the sensuous world. 
It is not impossible that the morality of intention 
should have a necessary relation as cause to 
happiness as an effect in the sensuous world. 54 
53Es mu.ft also entweder die Begierde nach Gl-/lckseligkeit die Bewegursache zu 
Maximen der Tugend, oder die maxime der Tugend mu.ft die wirkende Ursache der 
Gluckseligknt sein. [CPR, 113, (Beck 117/118)]. 
54lbid., 113/114 (117/118). 
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Hence in typical Kantian style, the apparent antinomy is put to rest. This 
quieting is accomplished as we come to the appreciation that we reside in the 
noumenal as well as the phenomenal realms. This antinomy arises as the 
establishment of the highest good as the combination of morality with 
happiness was called into question. The questioning arises Kant says through 
the misconception of difficulty in conceiving of bringing about the highest 
good. Obviously, if we were limited to the world of sense and its faculties the 
highest good would be alarmingly difficult. Yet when the relationship between 
appearances is no lon~r perceived as a relationship of these appearances to 
things in themselves, the moral law is given vision as it appears through the 
actual noumenal realm. 
The notion of the highest good so expressed is accomplished by means 
of the cause and effect relation of virtue to happiness. This relation is 
indirect, since any sort of direct causality would be impossible since it would 
somehow require an immediate reward of happiness for virtuous action, 
requiring direct control over the causality of nature (imaginable perhaps, but 
nonetheless impossible in the Kantian scheme). This indirect relation is 
mediated by God which Kant thereby describes as "an intelligible Author of 
nature. "55 Hence this combination of virtue and happiness can occur only 




contingently in a system of nature which is merely the object of the senses 
and, as such, is not sufficient for the highest good. 56 
45 
It is through this apparent antinomy that the highest good accomplishes 
a primary aspect of its ultimate role in the Kantian project. 57 This role 
consists in the ability of the summum bonum to deal with the way in which 
pure reason in its practical applicationis able to account for and unify the two 
pursuits of a finite rational being. These pursuits consist of the pursuit of the 
ends and objects of the supersensuously and sensuously determined moral 
agent. The question of how the summum bonum is possible is answered 
through the antinomy. That is, the possibility of the highest good is 
guaranteed as we recognize ( as in the other antinomies) that ~ are not always 
limited to seek moral possibilities in the realm of nature. For present purposes 
the solution to the antinomy is of little import. What is of consequence is the 
role that it provides for the summum bonum. 58 Thus relative to its 
56The constitutive role which God plays, as the guarantor of the highest 
good will ·receive in depth treatment in Chapters Three and Five. 
571.ewis White Beck has contended that this role as a dialectical ideal of 
reason is the only role that the highest good legitimately seives in Kant's 
project. The incorrectness and limitedness of this position will be treated in 
Chapter Five. 
5%e only other possible·consequence of the summum bonum is its seIVing 
as the anchor for the postulattrs that guarantee its possibility. See Beck, 
GointPmtu:y, 248ff. In addition, this perspective is given considerable 
treatment in the work of Sharon Anderson-Gold. See especially Sharon 
46 
__,,... presentation in the Dialectic of this Critique, the role of the highest good is 
• limited to that of a unifier insofar as it is a dialectical ideal of reason, the 
i=. · .: consequences of which entail its accomplishing the unification of the dual 
• aspects of ourselves as moral agents in the world. 
The Consequences of the Highest Good as Unifier · 
~ In the previous sections of this chapter, the•highest good was 
established as that concept which serves as a unifier· of our superscnsuous and 
sensuously determined moral selves. This assertion has led us to examine the 
highest good as a unifier of the$e two disparate parts of our moral selves. To 
summarize, in this chapter I have sought to demonstrate that one of the major 
roles that the highest good plays is that of unifier. By unifier, I mean that the 
highest good unifies the dual aspects of the human will insofar as it is 
supersensuously driven to be grounded in the moral law ( and thus to pursue 
the moral good as its object) and insofar as it is sensuously driven to fulfill its 
empirical desires ( and thus pursue its own happiness). This was demonstrated 
to be the case as a result of the way in which the highest good is established as 
· a relationship between the good, as the object of the moral will and happiness. 
Anderson-Gold, "God and Community: An Inquiry into the Religious 
Implications of the Highest Good," in Kant's Philosophy of Religion 







This is a union vvhose possibility, as a dialectical ideal of reason, was treated in 
the antinomy of pure practical reason. Thus, as a result of this analysis we· are 
left with a comprehensive understanding of the highest good as unifier through 
which we are inf?rmed as to how it is to serve in the Kantian moral project, 
not only as it appears in the second Critique, but also as it appears elsewhere in 
the corpus of Kantian commentary. With the highest good established as 
unifier, we can next understand the way in which it is presenteed in the second 
major role, that of a final end for action, or moral ideal which serves as a guide 
for conduct. 
•
• • •• 
" 
CHAPTER2 
THE AIM OF THE HIGHEST GOOD: 
THE SUMMEM BONUM AS MORAL IDEAL 
In Chapter One, I sought to establish that within the Kantian corpus, 
de~,· 
especially as evidenced in the second Critique, there is a conception of the 
:1 fl i r · 
highest good as unifier. This is the case insofar as the highest good unifies the 
;;).:·, 
dual aspects of the supersensuously and sensuously determined human will 
f.f}kt· 
through the highest good's function as a dialectical ideal of reason. In so 
,: ·. 
doing, the highest good provides the human moral will with an object. In and 
of itself, this conception of the highest good leaves Kant's complex object open 
,.: ' , 
to the accusation that it does nothing for us in our moral lives. Granted, it is 
,~ 
through this conception of the highest good that the ends of ourselves as both 
supersensuous and sensuous beings are united in an object of the moral will; 
however, as it thus stands, this object alone contributes nothing towards the 
management of our day to day moral concerns. In short, Chapter One 
demonstrated that the moral law provides a unified object or end to the moral 
will through the highest good, but in the way in which this object ls 





our moral life beyond the guide of the command to pursue the moral good. 1 
. 
Although it has been established that the highest good serves as an 
object for the human moral will through which its pursuits of various human 
goods (the moral good and the natural good) are unified, I will argue that this 
is not an exhaustive understanding of the highest good. In this chapter, I will 
defend the view that accepting the fact that the highest good serves as a 
fl1\ifier of the human will (as established in Chapter One), does not preclude 
another role for the highest good. In short, unification is not the complete 
10:le of the highest good. In addition to its role as unifier, the highest good 
also provides the human moral agent with a moral ideal. It is, my thesis that 
~· highest good manifests itself as a moral ideal insofar as it provides a 
~g concept for action. It does this in its function as a final end of moral 
lttion. 
In arguing for my thesis I will again, as in Chapter One, concentrate 
ptimarily on the texts of the second Crltupu. I have chosen to approach my 
argument in this manner because, as was stated in Chapter One, the second 
~, chiefly 'in the Dialectic, offers one of the few sustained treatments ·of 
11ltis is the crux of Beck's criticism of the highest good as a dialectical ideal 
ef t'eaSOn~ Beck argues that this understanding of the highest good contributes 
ftbthmg to the moral project beyond what the categorical imperative implores 
Us·to·do as it commands us td be moral. Yet the highest good as a dialectical 
fcteal of reason is not an exhaustive understanding of the highest good, as will 








the highest good. Furthermore, in going beyond the confines of the Dialectic, 
in interpreting Kant's discussion of the highest good in the Analytic and 
Methodology sections of this Critique, the highest good appears in a more 
organic manner insofar as it becomes integrated into Kant's overall ethical 
project. Consequently, interpreting the highest good using all of these parts of 
i.;sccond Critique, it could be argued that most of this Critique in some way 
dllJmOther addresses the issue of the highest good.2 That the highest good is 
the most cmcial issue of .the second Critiqw is not really an issue for my 
analysis, Instead, I am concerned with presenting the highest good in a way 
1ilat is •most true to Kant. In so doing, I have chosen to concentrate on the 
woad Critique since it is one of the first (and only) sustained treatments of 
._complex object. My strategy for doing sa follows as a direct Tesult of my 
~-to demonstrate that although the same text is being treated, two rubrics 
fer,analysis can be drawn out of the text. That is, in demonstrating that the 
highest good supports the two rubrics for analysis I have highlighted irt this 
onelWOrk, a mo~ convincing case is made for my overall thesis. This thesis 
IISatS that: there is only one highest good which has been appreciated, more 
.. l : 1• ·.; 
2This argument has in fact been made by John Silber. Silber has argued 
lhtt: Kant's doctrine ofthe highest good offexs a me~s for understandingthe 
second Critique insofar as the entire Critique deals with the establishment and 
...,_a.nentation of this~ in one way or another. See John Silber, "The 
Importance of the Highest Good in Kant's Ethics," Ethics: An International 
louma) of Social, Political and Legal Philosophy, 73 (1962-3), 179-97. 
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and less accurately, from different perspectives relative to the particular parts 
of Kant's discussion of the highest good on which different commentators 
have concentrated. The highest good is a complex object able to be 
appreciated in myriad ways, and key to this appreciation is realizing that these 
ways are complementary, not competing or exclusive. In sum, when these 
various interpretations of the highest good are integrated, we are able to see 
that not only is the highest good present in its role as an object of the law, but 
it also includes a developmental plan fur its consummate realization. With 
regaid to the multifarious undetstandings of the highest, good, they come 
fl,out even when the analysis of the highest good is centered on only one of its 
textual presentations, as Chapters One and Two demonstrate ... Hence, my 
analysis results in the two rubrics for categorizing these interpretive analyses 
(unifier and moral ideal) for which I argue in Chapters One and Two 
respectively. 
As a reminder, the thesis of this chapter is that the highest good 
manifests itself as a moral ideal insofar as it provides a guiding concept for 
~ in its function as a final end of moral action. I will argue for this thesis 
. · thlo.ugh: I) establishing that Kant recognizes that the human will requires a 
moral ideal as a guide for conduct;. 2) establishing that in the command to 
~e the highest good pomble in the world, the need for a moral ideal is 




satisfied; and 3 )addressing the consequences of understanding the highest 
good as moral ideal. 3 
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• Kant's Argument for a Moral Ideal 
-
In understanding the ~ghest good as a unifier of the human moral will, 
;we are left with a notion of the highest good that contributes nothing to the 
4ay to day workings of the moral will. Instead, in the abstract, we have an 
~.oft.he will that unifies the human wilts pursuit of its moral good 
1tyirtµe) and its natural good (happiness).•· .In so do~ the highest good 
,-wWes the unified object of pure practical reason that includes the totality of 
objects ptiJISUCd by the duality of the hum.an moral will. Yet in the 
consequen.ces of its pursuit so far articulated. this concept of the highest good 
leaves the moral will without a substantive end. That is, understood merely as 
the all inclusive object of pure practical reason, the highest good only includes 
the command to pursue the ends of the will which the moral will would be 
r-::r· ~· 
\ 
31n short, as in Chapter One, these consequences consist of interpreting the 
highest good under the rubric of moral ideal, not only as it appears in the 
scco.-.d .Critique, but also as it appears elsewhere in the corpus of Kantian 
··~~ntaty. 
thi'- , - ·, . . : 'i.. '!. 
;: (·~.4.J'9hn Silber supports this ~terpretation of the highest good as a u~er of 
~ heterogenous aspects of the good. He discusses this issue relative to Kant's 
ambiguity in the language of Ahe terms moral good and natural good. · See 
~r's article: "The Moral Good and the Natural Good in Kant's Ethics," Iht 






pursuing anyway. That is, the highest good merely conditions the pursuit of 
the ends that are already in place in the moral will as the highest good merely 
consists of the command to pursue the moral good through which the pursuit 
of the natural good is conditioned. 5 
Yet it is important to realize that not only does the highest good 
provide the object through which human moral volition is unified, but it also 
satisfies the need of the human will for an end of volitidn. nm· is obviously a 
fine distinction which can be clarified ·as the analysis of the highest good 
develops. However, a brief, preJ.mrlmrry tluctdation is appropriate here, and 
possible in Kant's own words . 
... the highest good (is) the entire.object of pure practical reason, 
which pure practical reason must necessarily think as possible 
because reason commands us to contnbute everything possible to 
its realization. 6 
In the prior chapter, the highest good as object of the law, was seen to 
determine the form of the action of the human moral agent insofar as the 
pursuit of the agent's natural end was conditioned by her pursuit of her moral 
5This understanding of the highest good is of course not where this analysis 
· will stop. · it is my purpose in this section of the chapter only to demonstrate 
th~ problems with which we are left if the analysis of the highest good were to 
stop with this understanding of the highest good. 
6 
•• .ist das hiichste Gut das gaiize Objekt der reinen praktischen V ernunft, die es sich 
notwendig ab; miiglich vorstellen mu.fl, weil es ein Gebot derselben ist, zu dessen 
Hervorbring,mg aT/ts m/Jgliche beirutragen. [CPR, 119 (Beck, 123)). . 
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end. Through this unification, we arrived at the "entire object" of pure 
practical reason. This is the case because it was through this conception of the 
highest good that it was possible to account for all of our pursuits. After the 
determination of the highest good as the entire object of pure practical reason, 
something more must be attended to: we must necessarily think of the highest 
good as possible. Kant articulates the possibility of the highest good as 
"necessary according to practical principles. "7 The law commands that the 
highest good be pursued. Thus, we must think of th.e highest good as possible 
since the moral law does not command the impossible. This requirement, to 
pursue the highest good, established after the highest good 'is demonstrated as 
the all inclusive object of the will, is necessary since we an:· required to 
"contribute everything possible to its realization" (from prior quote). This 
leaves us with a notion of the highest good as not only that object which is 
able to account for all of our desires in the world, but as also a necessarily 
possible object which gives us guidance towards how to act in the world in the 
ends that we pursue. The highest good gives us a guide for conduct as we 
strive to bring about··the highest good. a pursuit which is a requirement, as a 
. , consequence of the will being determined·by the law. This definition of the 
highest good, as that which gives us a substantive guide for conduct as the 
I 
7 nach praktischen Prinzipien notweJulig... [Ibid., 120 ( 124)]. 
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final end of moral action, is that which shall receive treatment in this chapter. 8 
In proving that the moral law requires the realization of the highest· 
good as the most complete object of pure practical reason, Kant recognizes 
that something else is necessary to the operation of human moral agency. 
Hence the conception of the highest good as unifier is not and cannot be all 
that the highest good provides. That is, with an understanding ofthc· highest 
good as metely the complete object of the pure practical reason, Kant realizes 
the will would.lack a substantive· end that could guide our moral action. · Kant 
articulatesthis human need as h~ wams: 
Without an end of this sort a iwill, eIMsaging to· itself no d£finite 
goal for a contemplated act, either objective or subjective (which 
it has, or ought to have, in view)~ is indeed informed as1to howJt 
ought to act, but not whither, and so can achieve no satisfaction. 9 
Thus, the will, if it is to be effective must somehow provide a substantive end 
: ~ , ; \ '· ' 
for the moral agent. In the previous discussion of the highest good, the 
presentation concentrated on that aspect of the highest good through which 
9Jb.e highest good as the final end for action, and thus the complete end to 
be pursued is· that which guatantees the efficacy of the law in its employment. 
For further explication of thispoint see Stephen Engstrom, "The·Concept of 
·· the Highest Good in Kant's Moral Theory," Philosophy and Phenomenalo_gj,cal 
Researclt. 52: 4 (December, 19'2 )~· 7 4 ?-8 L 
9 olme weldien eine Willldu. llir sich seinm · wetler objmiv nod, suJ1iectiv bestimmten 
Gepnsta,ul ( den ·sie hat oder ubm sol"Jte) zur vorluillenden Handlung hiJfZlUlmst, %Wllr 
wie sie, aber nicht wohin sie Zit wirten ha.IN, angewinm sieh selbst nieh G-. thun 
k.ann. [REL, 4 (Greene an.d Hudson, 4)]. 
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the object was that which determined the form of the pursuit of other objects. 
Yet Kant himself articulates that the human will requires something more. 
Kant explicates a requirement of the human will as that which demands a goal 
for its action. That is, the will must have a goal for its acts; it must not see 
itself as performing individual isolated acts, but it must be able to conceive of 
some sort of whole to which its acts can contribute. The highest good 
provides a definite goal for the will. The highest good provides an end which 
serves as a final end to individual moral acts, thereby performing a valuable 
service to the will, which is now able to envision in what its acts will result. 
Without this goal, obviously the will knows how it ought to act-always so that 
the law is the ground for its action-but the will is not able to know if it should 
act. Kant posits this goal of human action as the means through which the 
human will achieves satisfaction; yet in its being brought about, no commands 
of the law are transgressed. 10 
It should be highlighted that this requirement for an end of action does 
10lt should be noted that there is obviously some difference in the role of 
the highest good as a moral ideal and as a final end. Yet this difference is not 
. crucial to my argument. For present purposes, I discuss the highest good as a 
moral ideal that serves as a final end As an ideal; the highest good is that 
concept which determines our final end. The final end is that which is to be 
realized, while the. moral ideal is that which is to guide the realization. For a 
more detailed discussion of .this differentiation in the roles of the highest good 
see John Silber, ~Kant's Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and 
Transcendent," The Philosophical Reyiew. 68 (1959), 469-92. 
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not arise as a result of a shortcoming of the law in its ability to determine the 
human will. Duty itself requires nothing outside of itself to be obeyed. As 
Kant says, 
The moral law is the sole determining ground of the pure will ... 
though the highest good may be the entire object of a pure 
practical reason, i.e., of a pure will, it is still not to be taken as 
the determining ground of the pure will: the moral law alone 
must be seen as the ground for making the highest good and its 
realization or promotion the object of the pure will. u 
The moral law alone is always to be the determining ground of the will if the 
will is to be autonomous. Hence the will that requires some other motive in 
order to be determined by duty is thus .a patholO'gi.cally determined will and 
thereby hetcronomous. The law consists of the sole auwnomous determining 
ground of the will. Yet in so doing, the law not only determines us, but it also 
provides us with a goal for our action. This goal is brought about as we make 
the "realization or promotion" of the high$.g0Qd the end of the pure will. 
This co~ to rriake the highest good Ute• object or end of the will is always 
understood ~ being conditioned by the law. Needless to say, this provision of 
the law, in an object or end of the pure practical reason, satisfies a human 
. ' 
11Das moralische Gesetz ist Iler alleinige Bestimmungsgrund des reinen 
Willms ... Mithin mag dtas ·h4chste Gut. immer tier gana .~d einer r,inm 
praktischen Vermmft, dJ. eines reinen Willms sein, 3fJ ist es darum doch 'nicht fiir dm .. 
&stintmunpgnmd desselbm zu ltalter4lund dllS mt11't1lis&hl Geutz1TJu/1,;111Jein 11,ls der 
Grund ang,sehen werden. jents untl des.,en Bmirkung Oiler Beftrdmacg,sieh' sum 
01,jekle zu maehen. [CPR, 109 (Beck, 113)]. 
58 
need. Angels would have no use for the highest good because their vvills are 
entirely holy and pure insofar as they are free .of sensuous determinants. Thus 
the highest good is a need satisfied within the limits of the law. 12 In having a 
goal for our action, we are in no way subverting the law as the ground of our 
action. Kant explains how this is possible in an oft qooted passage of the 
second Critique where Kant even. goes so far as to say that it is possible for the 
highest good, that which also serves hs an ~nd, to determine the·will. This is 
the case because: 
... it is self-evident not merely that..jf the moral law is included as 
the supreme condition in the concept of the highest good, the 
· highest good·is then tne object but: also that the c.o~pt ofit and 
the idea of its existence as possible through our practical reason 
are ·likewise the determining ground of the pure will. 13 
12As John Silber writes: 
The moral law does not have its foundation in some object, nor is 
it incomplete as the law of morality if it fails to determine an 
object. The concern· for the determination of an object stems· 
from a human need. It is the need of the human will for an 
object in the act of volition that forces Kant to this consideration 
of ends and the extension of the law beyond its own limits alone 
to the condition of man: 
See Silber, "The Importance ... ," 192-93. 
13 Es versteht sich aber von selbst, daft, wenn im begriffe des hiJchsten Guts das 
.. moraliS&he Gesetz als o#Jerstl Bedingimg sdwn mit eingesd,lossm ~ alsdann das hoehste 
Gut nicht blofl Objekt, sondern auch sein Begrijf und die V orstellung der durch unsere 
praktische V emunft m6glkhm Existenz desselben rug'/eid, der Besthnm,mgsgrund des 
reinen Willens sei; [CPR, 1 10 (Beck, 114)]. In addition, Kant explains how it is 
th.at the highest gQOCl can senre as a goal for our action• w Religion Within the 
Limits of Reason Alone. Kant's explanation of this will receive treatment in 
Chapter Three. 
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Thus the highest good can be seen, within the very careful qualifications Kant 
delineates, as a determining ground of the pure will. This is possible only so 
far as the bonum supremum, the supreme aspect of the highest good is seen as 
the primary ground of the highest good. That is, in the will' s consideration of 
all other objects and ends, these are possible in their pursuit only as they are 
conditioned by the moral law. The bonum supremum or the moral law itself is 
always the ultimate ground of the will. This is true for the will when it is 
considered in isolation as well as when it is considered through its object, the 
highest good. In sum, although the requirement for a:n end is a merely human 
requirement, the will's requirement ofa.n end is allowable within the 
constraints of the law. 
Kant argues that not only is it allowable for the will to have an end that 
serves as a goal, but the will must also envision a goal for itseH. Throughout 
his discussion of the highest good, in its confusing vacillations between end, 
object, and their entailments, Kant is careful to highlight that we are humans 
and the will is determined by this glory and frailty. Thus, if the moral law is 
to inform us not only how to act but also enjoin us to actually act, it must 
··provide an end of this sort, an end that answers the demand of a goal for our 
action. That is, the law must not only provide the means through which we 
are allowed to harmoniously combine both aspects of ourselves as 
supersensuous and sensuous beings (in providing the highest good as a 
dialectical ideal of reason), but the law must also provide a guide for our 
action such that we are able to determine: "What is to result from this right 
conduct if ours?"14 In arriving at and being guided by a result of the law, the 
law is given vision, and we are further able to ascertain its demands. 
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That Kant considers what OUI' good action will result in is really of no 
surprise. Throughout his work, Kant was ,consistently critical of a rationalistic, 
to him vacuous, notion of the law and the· good.. This;is evidenced in his 
criticisms of the rationalistic ethics o£Wolff and Baamgarten. Kant thought 
these rationalistic ethics· had little prad.iaalsignificance; henm he 
characterized ·such an ethic as follows: ·· 
· ... a medical man told a patient suffering from constipation that 
he ought to loosen his bowels and to perspire freely and digest his 
food well. .This, is iust telling him t.Q·do what he·wants to know. 
how to do. Such propositions are tautological rules of decision. 15 
Hence, for the good to be practically efficacious, it must include something 
further than the command merely to do this good. Kant realizes this and 
realizes the law must somehow inform us as to how to do what it is we have to 
14was dann aus diesem U'IJSerm Rechthandeln herauskomme, [REL, 5 (Greene 
and Hudson, 4)]. 
15This point is made, and this passage is cited by Silbel". See Silber, 
"Importance," 186-187; in which he cites Kant's Lectures on Ethics. trans. 
Louis Infield (New York: Harper & Row, 1963) 25/6. 
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do. In so doing, Kant points to a need of the human will. This is a further 
need of the will, further in the sense that not only does the will require an · 
object insofar as all volitions have objects, but also that the will has a need for 
a goal. It is through the specter of the projection of a goal that the 
individual's objects of volition are to be considered. 
It would be helpful at this point to consider Kant's language. As was 
previously discussed, there is an ambiguity in Kant's language. That is, Kant 
refers to the highest good as well as the mow good as both an object, end, and 
as an object that serves to guide our action (as a moral ideal). In and of 
themselves, these constitute no great difference, but in realizing how each of 
these are made manifest, the role of the highest good becomes more clear. 
The highest good, as well as the moral good, are the objects of the will. In this 
sense, these objects are required to be adopted by the will, as determined by 
the law. This is an adoption of a non•material object, and much more aligned 
with the discussion of the highest good as presented in Chapter One. Yet the 
highest good also serves to guide our action, it serves as a moral ideal. That is, 
in its conception as an object, sometimes referred to as a concept of an object, 
.. the highest good serves as a mow measuring stick. For example, when other 
objects are being determined as to whether or not to be brought about in the 
practical realm, these objects .( as states of affairs or actions) can be compared 
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to this moral ideal and thereby assessed as to how effective they are in 
furthering the highest good. This assessment serves as a criterion for 
determining whether or not the action should be brought about. In both 
instances the highest good is an object, or end, as the coincidence of virtue and 
happiness, but it is also a guide for action insofar as it determines the objects 
that will bring about its actualization. Kant thus says of the highest good that 
its possibility 
belongs wholly to the supersensuous relations of things and 
cannot be given under the laws of the world of sense, even 
.though the practical consequence of tais,id~ i.e.;., ·U\e actiQns 
which are devoted to realizing the highest good, do belong to this 
.. world. 16 · 
It is in this manner, as stated above, that the highest good serves as a guide for 
action under which our objects as ends of action are able to be subsumed. As 
a moral ideal the highest good does belong "wholly to the supersensuous 
relations of things." This is the case insofar as the highest good follows from 
the law, which relates to the supcrsensuous aspects of ourselves. Yet, the 
practical consequences of this aspect of the highest· good take place in the 
world as we strive to bring about the highest good. These practical 
consequences consist of~ objects we ,seek to bring about as the ends of our 
16 
•.• .gimzlieh ZJUn abersinnlichen Verhilltn~ derDi1tge gehiJrt untl nach Gesetzen 
Iler SinnenrMlt gar nicht gegeben :,,erden h11m, obzwar die prllktische Folge "ieser ldee, 
niimlich die Handlungen, die t1Ar111lf•bdeltm. ·das ltoehsl;e. Gut ·wirklieh zu machen, zur 
Sinnmw,lt gehiiren: [CPR, 120, (Beck, 124)]. 
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action--as the objects of the highest good. These specific actions work to bring 
about the highest good, but they are able to be subsumed under the organon 
of the concept of the highest good as object since the concept of the object of 
the highest good contributes to their being accomplished. This contribution 
consists of the highest good' s role as moral ideal and guide for conduct. 17 
As a consequence of thewill's need to perceive of an end for action, the 
will then requires a mechanism through which we can perceive a guide for our 
actions and somehow maintain a vision of what will come about as their result. 
h is my position that the highest,good as a moral ideal provides just that as it 
demonstrates exactly what will JeSUlt.from this right· conduct of ours. For it is 
through the highest good as a moral ideal, that end which the law determines, 
that we ascertain 
17 Once again, Kant seemingly collapses the terms end and object, and 
object and concept of an object, in reference to the highest good. In the 
passage qu~ted .in footnote thirteen Kant uses the tean Obj1Jcte and Gegmst111Ui 
to refer to the highest good. Yet, a few paragraphs later [CPR, 111 
(Bed(l 15) ],· when ,the highest good is referred to as SQmething to be concretely 
brought about in the world Kant refers to it as: Objekte, Gegenstand and Zweck. 
As vy.as discus$ed in Chapter One, object has more. than one meaning fol'. Kant, 
in this instance it should be understood as both a setting for the will and as a 
. stat~ of affairs to be brought about (objective), the latter which conforms more 
closely to Kant's depiction of Zweck. In short, there seems to be no consistent 
use of the terms Objekte, Gegenstand and Zweck in reference to the highest good. 
To avoid confusion, I will refer to the highest good primarily as an end for this 
chapter and as an object for Chapter .One in orocr to highlight the different 
roles at stake for the highest good, thereby imposing some sort of .system 
where none seems to exist. 
... towards what, as an end--even granted it may not be wholly 
subject to our control--we might direct our actions and 
abstentions so as at least to be in harmony with that end ... 18 
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In directing our action towards harmony with an end, the will fulfills its 
ambition to bring about the effects of the law in the world. This need for 
direction, result and guide is that which Kant has enumerated for the human 
will and is that to which the next section turns as I will outline how it is that 
the highest good satisfies this need. 
The Highest Good as Moral Ideal 
Although Chapter One treats one of the integral roles of the highest 
good, it is not an exhaustive portrayal of the highest good In what follows I 
will work out Kant's presentation of the highest good insofar as it consists of a 
moral ideal and guide for action. In so doing, the highest good will be 
demonstrated to be a substantive guide for moral conduct through which we 
are able to actualize the requirements of the moral law. In understanding the 
highest good as a moral ideal, it becomes something far from an empty object 
or end of the law; instead, it will be shown to fulfill the demands of the human 
· will as they were articulated in the previous section. It is Kant's position, as 
18Und worauf wir, gesetzt aM,h, wir hAtten kieses ntd,t villlig in unserer Gewalt, 
doch als auf einen Zweck unter Thun und Lassen richten kiJnnten, um damit wenigstens 
zusammen zu stimmen. [REL, 5 (Greene and Hudson, 4)]. 
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was argued in the previous section, that this moral ideal is required if the 
human moral agent is not only to know what should be done, but to actually 
do it. Through this conception of the highest good as a moral ideal, we bear 
witness to the world that is determined as a consequence of a commitment to 
the moral law. 
As it has been presented thus far, with the highest good understood 
merely as a dialectical ideal ,of reason, the moral law leaves. us without the 
tools for its .application. That is, the law must provide some way ,of guiding 
the tramlation of the law at its noumenal· levcl into,an •actuality for our 
phenomenal lives. Kant accomplishes this through the highest good as it 
includes a command to be.brought •about in the world. I will demonstrate how 
this is the case through presenting the highest good as: I )including a 
command to pursue ·happiness in proportion to desertl' 2)including ·a command 
to bring about a state of affairs in the world that complies with happiness in 
proportion to virtue and 3~ is discussed as dlc ectypal world in the Analytic 
of the second Critique through whim the law·automatically sccks,to·become 
manifest in the sensuous world. 
The highest good consists of a moral ideal insofar as we are given 
guidmu:e into what morality requires as Kant's moral law commands us to 
pursue this highest good. In so doing, we are called to make actual, as far as 
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possible within human limitations, the highest good in the world. The content 
of the highest good which we are called to actualize is the very same as that of 
the dialectical ideal: happiness in accord with virtue. Hence, what was 
perceived as a mere theoretical possibility becomes a.practical actuality as 
Kant includes within its consequences not only a determination of the will, 
but also a command to pursue the state of affairs this determination includes--
happiness in accord with virtue. Thus what was, in its establishment, 
demonstrated to include the unity of goods human moral agents pursue, in its 
consequences can be demonstrated to include the pursuit of these goods in 
accord with the aforementioned unity. 
In discussing the highest good in this manner, the form of the command 
of the law is given content. This is possible insofar as the highest good 
includes the command to bring about this highest good in the world. In 
discussing the highest good as the "entire object of pure practical reason," 
Kant goes on to say that "reason commands us to contribute everything 
possible to its realization. "19 Furthermore, in giving the form of the command 
some content in commanding us to pursue the highest good, there is no issue 
.of heteronomy. That is, the highest good and its pursuit is allowable, as was 
previously discussed, because it is an end that was deduced from the law and 
19ganze Objekt der remen praktischen Vernunft, ... weil es ein Gebot derselben ist, zu 
dessen Hervorbrmpng lllles miigliehe beizutr11gen. [CPR 119 (Beck 123)]. 
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not an end that determines the law. Thus, the command to pursue the highest 
good is a concrete command in that it includes an actual program for action. 
This program consists of the way in which we are called to the realization of 
the highest good. The command includes a call to bring about a state of 
affairs within ourselves as well as in the world, a state of affairs where 
happiness accords with the worthiness to receive it. As Kant directs our 
pursuit of the highest good individually and socially, he describes these ends as 
follows: 
Inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute the 
possession of the highest good for one person, and happiness in 
exact proportion to morality ( as the worth of a person and his 
worthiness to be happy) constitutes that of a possible world ... 20 
From the above, it is evident that Kant differentiates the task of the highest 
good in its individual and social pursuit. Not only are we to bring about a 
highest good for ourselves insofar as we strive to make equitable our possession 
of happiness in proportion to virtue, but we must also seek to make this a 
global condition in the world. The consequences of this distinction 
demonstrate that the highest good does include a pursuit that takes place in 
the world, and not merely within the will of an individual. That is, the 
20Sofern nun Tugend und Glackselighit zusammen den Besitz des hochsten Guts in 
einer Person, hierbei aber auch Gluckseligkeit. ganz genau in Proportion der Sittlichkeit 
( ab Wert tier Penon und demi Wiirdigkeit. glileklidi ~ sein) ausgeteilt, das h«hste 
Gut emer mliglidlm Welt allSlnlld,m. ,[Ibid.;, H. l.1:15)1. : , , !' 
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individual is to work to make her own happiness commensurate with her 
virtue as a condition of worthiness. In addition, the moral agent is to seek"to 
bring about a state of affairs in the world where this condition persists. 
According to the above, it is not enough to be as worthy of happiness as 
possible. The moral agent must also strive to actually make her happiness 
commensurate with her worthiness to receive it. That is, individual moral 
agents cannot become moral· matt.yrs, working to ·make their own wills ·as 
virtuous as possible with no reganl for the commensunbleness of their· 
happiness. In and of itself, this condition is highly difficult te imagine without 
its <kt:ermination being conditioned by pathological motives and thereby 
condemning ·the moral agent te a state of hetcronomy. FurthemtOl'C, this 
condition would not be• natural, insofar as human moral agents are not pure 
will, but within them abides a sensuous nature as well .. This nature is worthy 
of respect and must not be ignored. Hence, in bringing about the highest 
good, the moral agent must act so as to be virtuous in order to be deserving of 
happiness. In addition, when opportunities for hapJ)itte$s arise, the moral 
agent must seek to appreciate these opportunities, recognizing that her 
. appreciation of said happiness is always conditioned by her worthiness to 
receive it.21 
21With regard to the connection between happiness and virtue, Kant 
explains that if a virtuous individual receives happiness and is not deserving of 
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Beyond the command to make the highest good an actuality for oneself, 
Kant articulates a command to pursue the highest good in the world, for all 
humanity. That is, the task of the highest good does not stop with the 
commensurableness of one's own happiness and virtue. We must work to 
bring about the highest good in the world, creating a state of affairs such that 
virtue is commensurable with happiness for everyone. This notion of the 
highest good as including a social component, in bringing about a possible 
world, will receive detailed treatment in Cll.apter Three. I mention it here only 
to demonstrate that even in his early treatments ·of the highest good,• Kant 
recognizes that it is a task to be made·. manifest·.individually· and socially. 
With the command to bring, about a state of affairs -Of happiness in 
proportion to virtue, it is pos.gble to look at other passages in Kant's work in 
order to gain still more insight into the role of the highest good as a moral 
ideal. That is, in looking at what Kant has said about happiness in the 
it, she is unable to enjoy that happiness. As Kant explains: 
... the upright man cannot be happy if he is not already conscious 
of his righteousnes.5, since with such a character the moral self~ 
condemnation to which his own way of thinking would force him 
in case of any transgression would rob him of all enjoyment of 
the pleasantness which his condition might otherwise entail. 
Und in tier Tat 'ktmn tier Rlchtsduij.fene sich nicht glikklich fi,uJ.m, wmn er sich nicht 
zuvor seiner Rechtschaffmhrit bmltflt ist; weil bei jener Gesinnung die Verweise, die er 
bei (Jbertretungen sich selbst zu "lf'llchen durdi seine eigene Dmlcungsart ge,wtigt sein 
wirde, und die moralische Selbstvmu,11J11Jung ihn al'les Gmusses tier Annehmlichkeit, die 
S01ISt sein Zustand enthalten mag, berauben wurden. [Ibid., 116 ( 120 ). 
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Analytic of the second Critique, we may glean valuable information on the 
pursuit of happiness. In the above I argued that we are to make our happiness 
commensurable with our virtue; yet how is this to be accomplished? Kant 
gives some concrete guidelines for the pursuit of happiness, and it is to these 
which we shall now tum. 
Happiness is to be pursued insofar as we are worthy of it; yet even once 
we are worthy of happiness, its pursuit is. ®nditioned by very special caveats: 
The mere form of a law,.whkh limits.its material1c must be a. 
condition for adding this material to the will but not presuppose 
it as the condition of tbe,will. Let th¢·. tJW.Crial cpqtent be, for 
example, my own happiness .. .it can become an objective practical 
law only if I include within k U\¢• ha.ppine$$ of ~thers,22 
For Kant the pursuit of happiness. is conditioned· by the form of the law. This 
means that the pursuit of happiness is conditioned by universality as the form 
of the law. Hen<;e. the pursuit o(happiness is P9~Qle only insofar as we 
pursue the happn,.es& of other$. 
· . This. artiC\,llation of the conclitions. (<)r tbe pu.Quit of ba,ppiness adds . 
content to the law insofar as it leaves 1JS wit)l some co~te ~ ,for our 
own pursuit of happiness. First and foremost, we are to pursue our individual 
22Also die blofa Form etnes Gesetze$, welche die materie eimchrilnkt, m"!fl zugleich 
ein Grund sein,. diese. Materie zum Willen hi~zuzujagen, aber sie nicht vorauszusetzen. 
Die M.aterie sei z]J. meine eigCM Glw:kseligkeit ... kann nur alsdann ein objektives 
praktisches Gesetz werden, wenn ich anderer ihre in dieselbe mit einschliefle. [Ibid., 35 
(35)]. 
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happiness only as we are worthy of said happiness. Yet this is not all of the 
information we are given in regulating our pursuit of happiness. Kant further 
informs us that in our individual pursuit of happiness, this pursuit is to be 
conditioned by the form of the law--as universal. We are only able to pursue 
our own happiness, then, insofar as we pursue the happiness of others. 
Beyond the above, there is also the function of the highest good as a 
moral ideal in its most obvious guise. That is, in fulfilling the command to 
pursue the highest good possible in the world, we are able to immediately 
appeal to the command to apportion happiness with virtue in our daily moral 
dealings. 23 That is, in instances where it is possible, we should distribute 
happiness to those who are worthy. As trite as this may sound, there is -some 
guidance available in this simple command As John Silber has explained: 
.. in rearing children, serving on juries, and grading papers one 
tries to do and actually can do something "about apportioning 
happiness in accordance with desert. "24 
It is possible to apportion happiness with desert, if only in this very mundane 
manner. The command of the law is nothing more than that which can be 
231n his later works, Kant articulates the highest good concretely as the 
ethical.commonwealth. In so doing, he explicates stages to be achieved in its 
being brought about, thereby giving an even more detailed and concrete 
program for enacting the highest good in the world. These issues will be 
treated in Chapters Three, Four and Five. 
24Silber, "The Importance ... " 183. 
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expressed in so banal a way. Kant never articulates the pursuit of the highest 
good as that which is to be a super human endeavor. Instead, the command to 
pursue the highest good is merely to be understood as the command which 
follows from the very human adoption of this object·as an end for action, 
insofar as it is demanded of the law. 25 
Kant gives another clue as to the way in which the highest good 
becomes manifest in the world as a moral ideal in the Analytic section of the 
second Critique. In the Analytic sectio~ Kant articulates how it is that the 
highest good, as a consequence of the will making the moral good its object, is 
brought about. As a reminder, as was previously ~d in Chapter One, 
the human moral will is• a will of desilc. This is-ttue for us as phenomenal 
beings in that we have desires for sensuous objects, and as moral ;(noumenal) 
beings·as well. In giving an object for the merely moral will, Kant.accounts for 
the way in which a will determined by law takes. the moral good as. its object. .. , 
This is required in order to demonstrate that.even though a will is moral,. it is 
still able to have objects and ends. Yet with this merely moral end, Kant 
recognizes that if he does not then again· relate the. determination of the 
25Jeffrie Murphy ~s that it is impossible to,~ppo(tion happilless with 
desert since we are in no way able to determine what human beings deserve. 
Obviously; it is my position tbat this is simply.wrong, a discussion I will save. 
for Chapter Five. See Murphy, "The Highest Good as Content of Kant's 
Ethical Formalism," Kant-Studien 56 (1965) 102-110. 
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supersensuous aspect of the 'Nill to this other aspect of the will, that which 
determines our other objects, moral and otherwise we are left with an empty 
moral object. With the moral object remaining abstract in this state of affairs, 
the law remains a supersenuous concept lacking any sort of connection to the 
world. Thus, Kant needs to provide the moral will with soJM sort of tool 
through which it will be able to tr:rnsccnd the disparate realms of the 
supersensuous and sensuous. In so doing, the will is provided with a guide for 
conduct, an ideal, insofar as the form of the supersensuous will is to determine 
the matter of the sensuous will. 
In the Analytic section of the second Critique, Kant points to a means 
through which we are able to conceive of what will become of our action as 
determined by the law. That is, Kant points to a bridge between the 
supersensuous and sensuous realms through which we are provided an end for 
action. This moral ideal is possible as a consequence of the adoption of a good 
will, a will determined by the law as its end or object. This end comes about 
as a consequence of recognizing the moral good as the object of the pure moral 
will. As a consequence of the will' s adoption of this end, Kant argues that the 
· will is transferred into a supersensuous realm insofar as the will is free. In 
being so located in the supersensuous realm, the moral law immediately drives 
us to bring about the state of1affairs dictated by the law-the highest good. As 
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the Jaw determines our supersensuous self, it then determines our sensuous 
self, and the world wherein this sensuous self abides. If this were not to be. the 
case, the law would not be effective in the world, but merely in the noumenal 
realm as that which determines our will. 
For, in fact, the moral law ideally transfers us into a nature in 
which reason would bring forth the highest good were it 
accompanied by sufficient physical capacities; and it determines 
our will to impart to the sensuous world the form of a system of 
rational beings. The least attention to ourseH shows that this . 
idea really stands as a model for the determination of our will. 26 
Here Kant demonstrates that merely by adopting the moral law as the ground 
for our will, reason is driven to bring about the highest good as an end in the 
world. In so doing, the will is determined to "impart to the sensuous world 
the form of a system of rational beings." Hence, it is through the moral law 
that the command to pursue the highest good in the world appears. Included 
in this command to bring about the highest good is the role of the highest 
good as a model for the determination of the will. 
In what follows I will unpack the sources and consequences of the way 
in which the law, in determining the will, and in the human moral agent 
accepting that determination, results in an ideal for our action. This ideal 
26Denn in der Tat versetzt uns da$ .moralische Gesetz der ldee nach in eine Natur. 
in welcher reine V ernunft, wenn sie mit dem ihr angemessenen physischen V ermogen 
begleitet wilre. das hiJchste Gut htrvorbringen wurde, und bestimmt unseren Willen. die 
Ft1m1-tler Sinnenwelt,·als einem Ganzen vemunftiger Wesen. zu erteflm. [CPR, 44 
(Bcck45)]. 
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consists of the way, as articulated above, in which we are required to transfer 
Kant's archetypal world into the sensuous realm, resulting in the ectypal 
world.27 
It is important to remember that this discussion takes place in the 
Analytic section of the second Critique. This is important insofar as we should 
keep in mind that Kant's task in that section is the deduction of the idea of a 
concept for the pure practical reason. In so doing, Kant is careful to stress 
that the object or end of the law is determined afttt tac law, and in no way 
prior. Hence, he is anchoring the law in the a priori realm, whereby it is in no 
way contingent or empirical. In this way; Kant i:cmoves the possibility of 
compromising the universality and necessity of the law. In being universal and 
necessary and completely free of sensuous matter, the law is able to result in 
the autonomous determination of the will. As Kant says: 
The law of this autonomy is the moral law, and it, therefore is the 
fundamental law of supersensuous nature and of a pure world of 
the understanding, .. 28 
27This transference from the archetypal world to the ectypal world resulting 
in a moral ideal is the main focus of the work of Thomas Auxter. Auxter then 
goes on to·use this interpretation to exclude any other from seNing as a moral 
ideal. See especially: Thomas Auxter, "The Unimportance of Kant's Highest 
Good," Jou,maI of the Histocy of Philosophy. 17:2 (1979) 121-34. 
28Das Gesetz dieser Autonomic aber ist das moralische Gesetz; welches also das 
Gnmdgaetz.m,er ilbersinnlidten Nature 1l1lll eiMT reinm V~lt ist, [CPR, 43 
(Beck, 44)). 
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The moral law and the will which is determined by it reside in a "pure world". 
This world is named by Kant the archetypal world. The archetypal world · 
only contains the conditions of the moral law; it contains no guide for its 
implementation, and as such it can serve as no guide for our action. In 
addition, the "archetypal world (natura archetypa)" can be known "only by 
reason. "29 Hence, as was previously articulated, the demands of the moral law 
require more than the archetypal world alone can provide. Insofar as the 
archetypal world is where the law resides; Kant must articulate a means to 
overcome the limitations of this realm and thereby allow the law to become 
active in the sensuous realm. Without this further articulation, the 
supersensuous, pure realm is where the law would remain. That is, alone and 
without an object or end, the law relates merely to our will, but it is not 
merely a moral will that we are; we are creatures in and of this world. When 
the law is unable to connect us to our world, it is only a vacuous concept 
without import for our practical lives. 
Yet as was seen in the prior quote, once the will is determined by the 
law, we are immediately transferred "into a nature in which reason would 
bring forth .the highest good ... ". This transference is accomplished through the 
determination of our will to "impart to the sensuous world the form of a 
29Man kilnnte jene die urbildliche (1111tura lll'dletypt,)~ die wir bwft in der Vernunft 
erkennen, [Ibid., 43 (44)}. 
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system of rational beings. "30 Thus, through the moral law, in its adoption of 
the end of the law-the highest good-the will is connected to the sensuous 
realm as a consequence of its being grounded in the supersensuous realm. 
Kant, then, provides a means through which the archetypal world immediately 
transfers us into the sensuous realm-- by means of the concept of the highest 
good. In so doing, the moral law and its object or end, insofar as it resides in 
the archetypal world, must create: 
a counterpart (which) must edst in the world of sense without 
interfering with the laws of the latter. 31 
This counterpart is made manifest through bringing about the highest good in 
the world. What has served as a unifying object for the will now is able to 
serve as an end ( object as a desired state of affairs) of the will insofar as we are 
commanded to strive towards bringing about this state of affairs. Kant names 
the counterpart to the archetypal world "the ectypal world (natura ecrypa), 
because it contains the possible effect of the idea of the former (the archetypal 
world) as the determining ground of the will. "32 
Through the ectypal world Kant allows us to fashion the sensuous world 
30lbid., 44 (45), as quoted in footnote twenty-seven. 
31 
••• deren Gegenbild in der Simrenwelt. 1tber doch 'zugleim ohne Abbrueh ur Gesetze 
derselben existieren soil. [Ibid., 43 (45)]. 
32 
••• well sie die mogliche Wirkung der I dee der ersteren als Bestimmungsgrundes des 
Willens enthillt. tlte nachgrbt/Jete (1Udllm ectypa) nennen. [Ibid., 43 (45)]. 
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of which we are members into a reflection of our moral selves. As Thomas 
Auxter, the main advocate of this role of the ectypal world explains, it is 
through the determination to work to bring about the ectypal world that we 
are provided with "an ideal we can use in our moral efforts to fashion the 
world we are given. "33 This ectypal world is that which the highest good 
determines in its role as a moral ideal. 'This is the highest good, insofar as· 
Kant origmally said, as it consists of what wov.ld ·be brought, about through the 
transference of the form of the supersensuous world (the archetypal world) 
into the ~nsuous 'WOl'ld (the cctypal world). In• short, it is through the highest 
good ·as end of the moral la-w, an• end which the moral law requires and 
commands us to bring about, that we apply the law to the world; thus the 
supersenuous meets the sensuous; and• are given a guide for action.; 
In sum, the above has argued for an understanding of the highest good 
as moral ideal. This role for the highest good gains credence through its basis 
on Kant's own articulation that the will requires such a guide for conduct. 
Furthermore, the highest good is· shown to fulfill this requirement of the will 
as reason commands that this aH inclusive object as the totality of our ends be 
brought about in the world. Included in the command to bring about the 
highest good in the world is the command to make one's own happiness 
33Auxter, "Unimportance" 126. 
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commensurate vvith one's own virtue and then to make this a state of affairs in 
the world. In addition, this command is further fleshed out through the 
caveats Kant gives with regard to the pursuit of happiness. This command 
also gains content through an examination of the way in which we can reward 
virtue with happiness in our daily existence. One final means by which the 
highest good serves as a moral ideal is through the way in which the law, in 
determining the will, automatically seeks to become manifest in' the sensuous 
world. 
In analyzing the issue of the highest good as a moral ideal, it would be 
wise to consider two related· points of controversy. First; there has been some 
controversy concerning where the highest good is· located. Second, there has 
been some controversy concerning ~ther or not it is possible·to achieve the 
highest good. It is my view that both of these controversies collapse into the 
same issue and that an extended discussion of either of them consists primarily 
of energy ill spent. Yet, for the sake of the present analysis, I will demonstrate 
why it is not purposeful to give these concerns extended consideration. 
The primary question at issue in the above controversy is typically 
articulated as whether or not the highest good is possible. l will treat this 
question first, because if the highest good is not possible, it makes no sense to 
discuss "where" the highest good is not possible. In response to the question, 
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there can be no doubt that the highest good consists of a real possibility for 
the Kantian ethical system. This is the case, because Kant's ethics requires 
that the highest good be at the very least possible because its pursuit is 
required as a demand of reason. It is my view that there is something behind 
these points of controversy. That is, the issue as stake is not really whether or 
not the highest good is possible in Kant's system, this point is clearly made by 
Kant throughout his work. Rather than the issue of the possibility of the. 
highest good, these commentaries seek to establish whether or not the highest 
good is justified or necessary to Kant's system.34, For •my purpose, such 
considerations are not germane. .It·is my task .to be as tJue as-possible to .. 
Kant's texts. I am not attemptmg to correct Kant, or develop a new ethic. 
Instead, my analysis merely seeks to present a means through which the · 
Kantian ethic, in its object the highest good, is best understood. 35 
The second aspect of this controversy, is'.wl\ere is the ,highest good to be 
n--alized; That is,• if the· highest good is a teal possibility in the Kantian system 
is it to be actualized in this world orthe ncxtJ,This ~ is.more complicatil 
341n addition to the questions of justification and necessity, concerns with 
. the possibility of the highest good often consist of a desire to eliminate God 
from Kant's system. See A,uxter. Kant's Moral Teleology. (Macon: Mercer 
University Press, 1982) especially Oiapters Five.and Six. 
35 At the conclusion of the antinomy of practical reason Kant states his 
conclusion very clearly. The highest good "is practically possible", as this 
antinomy has proven. ..• ist prdtisch mlglidz, [CPR, 115 (Btck 119)]. · 
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than the former. The complication lies in the ambiguity of Kant's texts. Kant 
has articulated a concrete program for action through which the highest good 
is to be made manifest here on earth. In addition, he has demanded that 
humanity be immortal, to account for the moral progress that the highest good 
requires. The highest good could possibly take place in this world. However, 
Kant has often expressed doubts as to the actuality of such a program being 
brought to fruition in the time in which humanity is to reside on the earth. 36 
Kant's support of the view that the highest•good takes place in the next world 
is necessarily limited since his discussion.of such a possibility is obviously 
limited by the way in which the categories could conceive of such a possibility. 
In short, there is evidence for either view and· nothing·to be gained by 
attempting to exclude one or the other under the pretext of having found the 
correct view. Thus in answering the question where the highest good is to be 
realized, Kant would perhaps answer that concern with such a question is 
dangerous insofar as it could possibly lead to .heteronomy insofar as humanity 
could possible seek the realization of the highest good as an incentive towards 
moral conduct. Rather, we should strive with all our power and possibility to 
make the highest good a reality with little concern for its location, and thus 
without concerns for the location of the possible rewards in which such 
36See the presentations of the highest good in: TIP, REL and PP. 
82 
striving might result. 
The Consequences of the Highest Good as Moral Ideal 
To conclude,. this chapter has articulated an analysis of the highest good 
as moral ideal. Obviously this analysis has depended to a great extent on 
those points established in the previous chapter. A lesson· to be learned from 
this is that the various manifestations of the highest good, whether they be 
categorized under the rubric of unifier or moral ideal, are to a great extent 
symbiotic. They are symbiotic insofar as there is not a clear distinction 
between where the role of unifier and moral ideal begins and ends. This is no 
great surprise in a Kantian concept. Kant's project is veiy complex and the 
way in which he deals with the highest good varies relative not only to his 
philosophical acumen but also to the difficulty of the tasks to which he turns 
his attention. Kant presents the highest good differently as he approaches it 
from different perspectives relative to which aspect of the highest good each of 
his discussions highlights. 
This lack of a clear distinction is not a disadvantage or weak point to 
this analysis. Instead, it provides further evidence for my position, which 
holds that there is a consistent concept of the highest good. The highest good 
appears inconsistently and in a contradictoiy manner only when its various 
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interpretations are treated in isolation, as competitive and not complementary. 
It is with this in mind that we tum to Chapter Three and the presentation of 
the highest good as it is contained in Religion Within the Limits of Reason 
Alone. In this presentation of the highest good, Kant specifically articulates 
the highest good as an object of the law that is both a unifier and a moral 
ideal. In addition, ,this concept contains an ~dded social component through 
• • ••' ' !J ; C, ' 
which :the moral law is given further vision as Kant stresses that the ethical 
• ' , 1 · I I 
commonwealth is the consummat~ arti~ati?n of ~is ~~hest ~ood. 
CHAPTER3 
THE SOCIAL HIGHEST GOOD: 
KANT'S ETHICAL COMMONWEALTH 
In the previous chapters, I sought to establish that within the Kantian 
~orpus, ~~ially 'as evidenc~ in the second Critique, there is a conception of 
the h~ghest good as a unifier and a conception of the highest good as a moral 
j ! ' ' ~' ,' ' ' 
ideal. Chapter One established one notion of the highest good and Chapter 
1 1 t ,. r ( :i. ·.t i ; _ ., ; · , i i;·1; , l (' t: · ... t , ~ 
Two determined this was not an exhaustive notion of Kant's complex object. 
Likewls'e, Chapter Three will esublish that these noti~~s of the high~st good, 
as expres~d iii'lli~· p:..Cvious chapters, do not consist ~fan exhaustive 
understanding of the, highest good. There is an additional conception of the 
highest'good, established thro~gh the presentation of the highest g()()(} as it.is 
contained in one of l<ant' s mo~t ac~essible works. Religion Within the Limits 
of Reason Atone. In this work, Kant sets as his goal to make apparent the 
r~lation of religion to human nature, or in his own words, he sets out to 
explain h~~ "morality leads inevitably to religion."1 In so doing, he presents 




one of the most well rounded articulations of the highest good, including the 
addition of a substantive social aspect. 
In what follows I will demonstrate that the conception of the highest 
good in Kant's Religion adds a new dimension to the object of pure practical 
reason. This new dimension primarily consists of a social component that has 
not been present in the previous articulations of the highest good. In 
addition, it is ,through this·articulation of the highest good ·that the·•· 
representations discussed in the ptior .. chaptCI'S arc brought together-. , I will 
approach the explication of this mw dimension ,t:.hroagh addressing ·the 
following two questions. First, what .is the nomn of the highest good at work 
in Kant's idigi<m Within the Hmm of ReasQn Alone? Next, how is this 
notion of the highest good fulfilled? Through answering each .of these 
questions., we arc given a complete explication of Kant's complex object afoot 
in this work. Furthermore, it is my position that this understanding of the 
highest good, which will become apparent through answering the above 
questions, is the consummate articulation of the highest good. 2 
First, what is the notion of the highest good at work in Kant's Religion? 
. It is my thesis that this conception of the highest good consists of its role as a 
unifier and moral ideal which serves to anchor God in the role of moral 
. / 
· 
2 This claim will receive ext.¢J1.sive treatment in Chapters Four and Five. 
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guarantor. In this discussion of the highest good, God is required because, as 
has been previously discussed, the highest good must be possible if the moral 
law is not to be meaningless. In being required as a condition of the moral end, 
therefore, God is necessary and thereby anchored. Although God has played 
this role previously for the highest good, it is in this discussion of God (in the 
Religion), as moral guarantor, that the consequences of God's role become .more 
apparent. Kant's moral argument for God is not without controversy. 3 
However, it will be.deemed as suchfor this analysis, since,the specific 
relationship between, God and mor.wty is mt presently at stake. Rather,• what 
is at· stake is the consequence of the ·above pairing, resulting in a notion of the 
highest good through which the Kantian notion of God is anchored. 
In the Religiona Kant portrays a markedly different notion of the highest 
good. l will argue that this new aspect of the highest good becomes apparent 
in the discussion of how the highest good is fulfilled. That is, in establishing 
how the notion of the highest good-as unifier and moral ideal, and an end 
which requires God-is to be fulfilled, its new aspect as a social end of human 
life becomes evident. This will be demonstrated through answering the second 
31 do not directly address the controversy surrounding the moral argument 
for God.in the Kantian corpus. .. In short, I do not support the position that in 
his later work, Kant repudiated his moral argument for the existence of God. 
For a detailed discussion of these issues see: G. A Schrader, "Kant's Presumed 
Repudiation of the .. Mor.al Argument' in the Opus Postumum: an Examination 
of Adickes' Interpretation," Philosophy. (July, 1951 ). 
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question, as it is expressed above. 
In addressing this second question, "How is this notion of the highest 
good, as it is expressed through question one, fulfilled?" it is my thesis that 
this notion of the highest good is fulfilled through Kant's notion of the ethical 
commonwealth. Kant provides us with an answer to the question, "How is the 
highest good to be fulfilled?" as he articulates a very specific program for the 
manifestation of this formulation of the highest good. This concept of the 
highest good, as ethical commonwealth, although hinted at elsewhere in Kant's 
works, is arguably one its most attractive formulations. For here, in calling us 
to overoome our propensity to evil, the origin· of which"lies in our social 
nature, Kant urges us to transform our social interactions (by leaving the 
ethical state of nature) into moral interactions~ In so doing, we would be 
working -to bring about an ethical commonwealth which would consist of 
moral interactions'.with others as that nexus ~in which and through whose 
unity alone the highest moral good can come to pass. 114 . 
In what follows I will discuss what the highest good is· and how it is to 
be made manifest as presented in the Religion. I will do so by: I )explicating 
the notion of the highest good as unifier and moral iddl; an end that requires 
God; 2 )addressing how this conception of the highest good becomes manifest 
4in wilchem und durch dessen Einheit es allein zu Stande kommen kann, [REL, 98 
(Greene and Hudson, 89)]. 
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through the ethical commonwealth, explicating its source as the required 
consequence of the social origin of evil that we must overcome as we are called 
to leave the ethical state of nature and work to bring about the ethical 
commonwealth; and finally 3) broadly describing the ethical commonwealth, 
leaving ·the task of a more detailed description to Chapters Four and Five. By 
taking Kant seriously in his presentation; of the ethical commonwealth, we are 
able to address yet another manifestation of the highest good· as it appears in 
the corpus. 
The Conception of the Highest GOQd in .the Relipin 
As was asserted previously, the conception·of,the·highest·good in the 
Religion consists of three aspects. The highest good serves as the unifying end 
of our purposiveness as sensuous and supersensuous agents, it serves as a moral 
ideal and guide for our conduct, and the highest good serves to anchor the 
Kantian conception of God as moral guarantor. In looking at the presentation 
of the highest good in· the early sections of ReJ:igjon Within the limits of 
Reason Alone. these three aspects of the task of the highest good will become 
evident as they take their respective places in the moral venue. 
The roles of the highest good as unifier and moral ideal were discussed 
individually in Chapters One and Two respectively. However, in the Religion, 
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these two aspects of the highest good are not considered in isolation. That is, 
the highest good of the Religion includes both aspects of the highest good as 
previously articulated. In the Religion, the highest good serves as a unifier 
which guides our action. Now, in the Religion, just as in the second Critique, 
we are talking about the same highest good, yet the task of this highest good, 
insofar as it consists of the union of the two tasks in the same concept, is even 
more apparent. In what follows, I will demonstrate that Kant's conception of 
the highest good in the Religion, insofar as it serves as a unifier which guides 
our action· se:rves as an anchor for the Kantian conception of God. In short, 
the conception of the highest good in the Religion· combines both aspects of the 
highest good as previously presented ,(unfier and,moral ideal) while · 
contributing a new social dimension to the highest good. 
In the preface to the first edition of.the Religion Kant begins by asserting 
that the moral law in and of itself is enough. It is eoough to determine our 
will, and it is enough objectively insofar as when we have other needs, they are 
subjective needs, and not required or conditioned by the law. Instead, these 
needs arise as a result of our being human. After making these assertions, 
Kant continues to examine this status of the law as it relates to our being 
human. That is, although the law has no need for any supplements, perhaps it 
provides us with something of ,that nature. Throughout this discussion Kant 
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remains faithful to his conception of the moral law as not requiring anything 
at all for it to become manifest. In its manifestation, morality becomes related 
to an end not in such a way that the end is the ground of moral action but 
rather the end comes about as a result of the sum of the consequences of the 
law. With these caveats, Kant clears a path for the appearance of the highest 
good as a unifying and guiding moral end to which we shall now turn. 
Kant has presented-the command, to .bring.about the highest good 
possible in our sensuous world as a command that goes beyond the moral law. 
This is so -since the law requires, that we give no amsidea.tion to consequences 
in considering .our duty. The moral ,law-commands without qualification, 
making duty an object of respect "without proposing to us an end ( or a final 
end)" through whim we are helped to determine what duty reC,Ommends -to us 
or through which we are given an incentive to pursue our duty. 5 • This is the 
case because in waiving any concern with the consequences of duty, we 
thereby ~ duty an object of the highest respect without -regard to any 
other end that could perhaps wrongly serve as an incentive to the fulfillment 
of our duty. 
However, Kant continues in his explanation of our relation to the law, 
realizing that the above relation of respect is not a complete account of human 
5lbid., 6fn (6fn). 
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experience. Although the Jaw alone should be enough to determine our 
morality, "it is one of the inescapable limitations of man and of his faculty of 
practical reason ... to have regard, in every action, to the consequences thereof''. 6 
Often, the law alone is not enough to determine our actions; as. humans we 
constantly seek to go beyond the mere moral determination of our will and 
consider how the end of the· action that is brought about will serve us. Kant 
claims that although consequences come about last in actual practice, it is 
often the case that they actually are considered first in the representations and 
intentions of our call ui> moral ·action. This $tate of affairs can be understood 
as a direct result of the structure of our volition. 
As human beings, we strive to bring about states of affairs-in the world 
( and in our wills) through action. These actions are not brought about merely 
because we are supcrsensuous, but because we are sensuous empirical beings as 
well. The things or states of affairs we desire to bring about are the objects of 
our inclination. Thus, ·in acting,.we 3tteJnpt to actualize our desires for the 
fulfillment of our ends as objects of inclination. 7 As hum-, rational; and end 
desiring beings, Kant describes oUT having oUT own happiness as a subjective 
6lbid., 6fn (6fn). 
7This does not preclude our recognizing that there are ends or objew of 
our will that are self existing, 9bjective ends. Rather, this discussion merely 
stresses that often these conditions are brought about as a consequence of the 
conditions, as states of affairs in the world, being objects of inclination. 
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end. Thus, in being human we seek to bring about what we understand as 
pleasing states of affairs in the world which, as a consequence of taking place 
in the world, can only bring about synthetic (empirical) propositions. 
Likewise, any call to fulfill this end can only be a subjective, empirically 
determined call just as anything resulting from it is of the same nature. 
However, as rational moral beings we are not merely empirical and our 
actions are not only determined by our empirical synthetic ends. There is of 
course another determining ground within us, other than that of our own 
happiness, a determining ground that we ought to have and· one that is 
proposed to us by reason alone -- the law. 8 The law, since we are called to 
fulfill it not through the "craving for possession of a thing through one's 
action, n9 has ends which are not objects of inclination. Instead, the law is an 
object of respect, and the ends that the law commands "are those proposed to 
8By our nature as beings dependent upon circumstances of sensibility, we 
crave happiness [Gluckseligkeit] first and unconditionally. Yet by this same 
nature of ours ... as beings endowed with reason and freedom, this happiness is 
far from being first, nor indeed is it unconditionally an object of our maxims; 
rather this object is worthiness to be happy, i.e., the agreement of all our maxims 
with the moral law [Wurdigkeit glucklich zu sein, d. i. die Ubereinstimmung aller 
· unserer Maximem mit dem moralischen Gesetze.]. That this is objectively the 
condition whereby alone the wish for happiness can square with legislative 
reason-therein consists the whole precept of morality; and the moral cast of 
mind consists in the dtsposition to harbor no wish except on these terms. 
[REL~ 46fn (Greene and Hudson, 41-42fn)]. 
· 
9lbid., 6fn (6fn). 
93 
us as such by reason alone."10 As humans, then, we are pulled by our tvvo 
different ends. The one end, characterized as subjective and empirical is 
determined by happiness; the other, characterized as objective and practical is 
determined by the law through reason alone. 
It is a fact of our being human that we have two aspects of ourselves 
expressed through our determinations as moral. beings and as worldly beings. 
We desire the fulfillment of our ends, and we are called to fulfill the commands 
of the law. These aspects of ourselves Kant describes as empirical and rational 
respectively. However, with' regard to both of these disparate ends and aspects 
of ourselves, there is a possibility that ,these ends can be "directly presented to 
him (the moral agent) by reason alone,'', through which tht moral agent is able 
to seek "something that he can love." In this final end, the aspects of ourselves 
as rationally and empirically determined are united. In addition, through this 
unification, this very same end guides the pursuit of the empirical en~ that we 
are naturally drawn to pUI$ue. Hence the law provides us with aJt end as 
unifier which guides our conduc;t. 11 
10lbid., 6fn (6fn). 
11lt should be noted that the·present discussion of the hlghest good 
integrates the two approaches articulated in Chapters One and Two. The 
relationship of the highest good as. a unifier and as a moral ide.l is not an 
exclusive one. Rather, the twQ tasks are combined in the same object or end 
of the will. The discussion of each of the previous chapters isolated these 
aspects of the highest good in order to highlight the way in which 
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The highest good serves as a unifier which guides our conduct in its role 
as a final end. Kant recognizes (as was discussed previously), that to be 
human and to seek to bring about an effect of our will, the will must be aimed 
towards some object. The object Kant postulates as the highest moral object is 
the highest good.12 The justification for such an end is given in terms that are 
not usually classified as Kantian, for it is through such an end that the agent 
gains satisfaction. This satisfaction is of course, in typical Kantian 
terminology, not to be the ground of the agent's action but rather a result of 
the agent's action being grounded in the law. The satisfaction of the moral 
agent lies in her being able to have a definite goal for her acts and thereby see 
"towards what, as an end ... we might direct our actions and abstentions ... "13 
This end is the end that arises out of morality as was discussed in the earlier 
contemporary scholarship on the highest good has isolated the tasks of the 
highest good without integrating'therri.. , In short, the highest good ls· always a 
unifier, and always a moral ideal. Yet like Kant's presentation, this one has 
concentrated on one aspect or another in order to highlight the roles of the 
highest good. In what follows, the two previous presented roles will be 
demonstrated to be included in the understanding of the highest good as the 
ethical commonwealth. 
12
"For in the absence of all reference to an end no determination of the will 
can take place in man, since such determination cannot be followed by no 
effect whatever; and the representation of the effect must be capable of being 
accepted ... as an end conceived of as the result ensuing from the will's 
determination through the law.n [REL, 4 (Greene and Hudson, 4)]. 
13lbid., 4 (4). 
section of this chapter. As such, the highest good, in the form 
of an object which takes the formal condition of all such ends as 
we ought to have (duty) and combines it with whatever is 
conditioned, and in harmony with duty, in all the ends which we 
do have (happiness proportioned to obedience to duty) 14 
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serves as a unifier which guides our moral life. It unifies our ends as those 
which we ought to have (supersensuously determined) and those which we do 
have ( sensuously determined). Through this unification, we are given a guide 
for all of the ends that we pursue, ffll end that is in harmony with duty. Thus, 
it is through the highest good that we are able to have an unifying and guiding 
end for our moral actions. 'This end serves our human need for the unification 
of the disparate aspects of ourselves and: for the envisioning of an end that 
allows for the determination of the will through which we can act in a way 
that wiH better serve the demands of the law. 
In sum, it is through this notion of the highest good as a unifying moral 
guide for conduct that we are pushed to recognize action as characterized not 
by what it achieves, but rather by the grounds according to which it was 
determined. In so doing, the highest good, in being an end beyond the law, is 
still in accord with the law. That is, .in the highest good~s role as a unifier and 
moral ideal, the highest good relates to action merely insofar as it is a 
I 
14lbid., 4 (4). 
consequence of the law. 15 This end, in being provided by reason alone, is 
provided through the law insofar as 
the law, which merely arouses his (the moral agent's) respect, even 
though it does not acknowledge this object of love as a necessity 
does yet extend itself on its behalf by including the moral goal of 
reason among its (reason's) determining grounds. 16 
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That is, the moral law can provide us with an end that allows us to integrate 
the demands that are a part of our experience as human beings. Through such 
an end we are left with an object which we can love as well as respect. 
By means of all of this explanation of ourselves as drawn to be 
empirically determined and thereby limited in our moral capacities, and drawn 
to be rationally determined and thus unlimited in our moral responsibilities, 
Kant is progressing to explain how the moral law leaves us with the following 
proposition: "Make the highest good possible in the world your own final 
15With regard to the aspect of the highest good· as both a unifier :.tnd as a 
final end Kant says, as a final end, the highest good: 
... provides them (the moral agents) with a special.point of focus 
for the unification of all ends)[der Vereinigungaller Zwecke 
vmchajft]'; for only thereby can objective, practical reality be 
given to the union of the purposiveness arising.from freedom 
with the purposiveness of nature Zwedcmiiftigkeit aus Freiheit mit der 
Zweckmilftigkeit der Natur] 
[Ibid., 5 (5)]. 
16das Gesetz also was ihm bloft Achtung einftuszt, ob es zwar jenes als Bedii,fn,i.ft 
nicht anerkennt, erweitert sich doch zum behuf desselben zu ausnehmung des moralischen 
Endzwecks der vernunft unter seine Bestimmungsgrunde [Ibid., 7fn (6/7fn)]. 
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end!"17 Kant asserts that this command of the law is a synthetic proposition a 
priori, introduced by the moral law itself through which practical reason 
extends itself beyond the law. This extension is accomplished and allowed as a 
result of the moral law being a law for human beings. That is, for all of our 
actions, we are required to apply the supersensuous law to sensuous 
circumstances. Thus, since we undertake our actions in the empirical world in 
order to bring about states of affairs in the world, it is typical for humans to 
conceive of an end over and above the supersensuous law. For example, when 
l would seek to treat others as ends in themselves, this formal law could 
become manifest through an act the end of which could be feeding the hungry. 
Hence, in treating others as ends in themselves, I would be going beyond the 
law in seeking to bring about a state of affairs wherein I would be providing 
food to those who lack it. Kant allows for this extension beyond the law only 
because, in so doing, we have ends ( such as the highest good) that embrace the 
a priori principle of the determining ground of a free will. That is, through this 
extension of the law, we are giving witness to the effects of morality since in its 
ends we provide a demonstration of the objective though merely practical 
.. reality of the concept of morality as being causal in the world. 18 
17mache das hiihste in der Welt mogliche Gut zu deinem Endzweclc! [Ibid., 7fn 
(7fn)]. 
181bid., 6/7fn (6/7fn). 
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In seeking to bring about this final end, the highest good possible in the 
world, we are subject to the strictest obedience to the moral law which is to be 
considered the cause which ushers in the highest good as end. In so doing, we 
are brought face to face with our human limitations since human beings, in 
our limited capacity, are not able to completely and exhaustively bring about 
happiness in the world proportionate .to worthiness to ·be happy. 19 Thj.s leads. 
Kant to his postulation of God as ''an omnipotent moral Being ... as ruler of the 
world, under whose care the [balance] occuts~1120 God is now a logical 
condition fur the adoption of tM highest good serving the role ofan, 
omnipotent guarantor of our final end 
In ,establishing how it is that God enters the scene, Kant seeks to 
establish bow it is that morality is able to "extend itself to the idea of a 
powerful moral Lawgiver, outside of Mankind," .without becoming u,ntrue to its 
original project~21 In a lengthy footnote, a place where Kant often conceals a 
wealth of information, he indicates the solution to this quandary. Here, Kant 
traces the justification for God through the idea of a highest good in the 
19There are some ways in which we can bring about happiness in 
proportion to virtue, this is discussed by both John Silber and Philip Rossi. 
· 
20ein 1lllvmn6gmdes moralisthes Wesen als Welthemcher angenmnmm werfm, unter 
dessen Vorfarge dieses geschieht [REL, '8fn (Greene and Hudson, 7fn)]. 
21wodurch ,s;e sich zur ldee eines machthabenden muralischen ~bers auszer 
dem Menschen erweitert [Ibid., 6 (5/6)]. 
world, 
for whose possibility we must postulate a higher, moral, most 
holy, and omnipotent Being which alone can unite the two 
elements of this highest good. 22 
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It is because of this that morality for Kant leads inevitably to religion. For 
morality leads to the highest good, and the highest good requires God for its 
possible completion; hence, because it is the organization around God, religion 
comes about. Thus, ip unpacking the requirement to pursue the highest good 
as a synthetic, a priori proposition, Kant delirteates the connection between 
God and the highest good. In what follows, I will unpack this explanation 
which serves to anchor Kant's presentation of the role of God· as 'moral 
guarantor of the highest good.. 
God is required as guarantor because the highest good is a teqtiired end 
of the pure practical reason. As a command of reason, the highest good must 
be possible. If the highest good is to be possible, its possibility requires 
"bringing about happiness in the world propt>rtiohate to worthiness to be 
happy."23 Human capacities are insufficient to exhaustively bring about this 
end; hence, the highest good requires the existence of God to deal with the 
22das ist, die /dee eines hochstm Guts in der Welt, zu dessen MIJglichkeit wir ein 
hiJheres, moralisches, heiligrtes und allvermiigendes Wesen annehmen milssen, das allein 
beide Elemente desselben vereinigen kann; [Ibid., 5 (4-5)]. 
23die Gluckseligkeit in der Welt emstimmig mit der Wurdigkeit glucklich zu sein zu 
bewirken [Ibid., 8fn (7fn)]. 
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aspects of the ,vorld that we are unable to overcome. Thus, it is through the 
highest good that Kant anchors his conception of God as the logical condition 
for the possibility of our final moral end, the highest good. And so it is that 
"morality leads inevitably to religion. 1124 
As the above demonstrate, God is required for the highest good to be 
brought about in the world. An idea of divinity is necessary in this context for 
Kant 11as the cause supplementing our incapacity with respect to the final 
moral end. 1125 Our own powers, nb matter,how moral and perfected they might 
be would still leave us short of any coherent malization. of the highest good. 
This is the case since it is through the 1Mghest good that Wit cori.front the 
sensuousness and this-worlcffiness:ofour"being human: 'Fhat is; we are unable 
to effect, consistently through our own endeavors all that would be, required 
for the world to bring about, for ourselves and ethers, happiness to the degree 
that they are deserving. 
As human beings, we are unable to be certain of our effect on anything 
but our own moral dispositions. 26 This, in and of itself, is more than enough 
24die Moralfahrt unausbleiblich Religion [Ibid., 8fn (7fn)]. 
25 als ergiinzende Ursache unseres Unvermogens in Ansehung des moralischen 
Endzwecks vorstellen [Ibid., 183, (171)]. 
26Although in effecting OUT own moral dispositions, we may consequentially 
effect other things, e.g. the happiness of others. This is not a primary effect, 
since if it were the goal of our pursuit, it would have to be a heteronomous 
IOI 
to ready ourselves for the aid of "a gracious Providence." However, we are 
unable to effect, with any sort of consistency, that way in which our desires for 
states of affairs in the world are brought about or fall short. 27 The world in 
which we live is not under our control. We are unable to have the states of 
affairs in the world consistently conform to our desires for happiness. 
Included in this idea of a falling short is the way in which our own 
moral status cannot guarantee our happiness. As evidence of this incapacity 
Kant appeals to the wodd around us as symptomatic·ofour inability to have 
happiness rewarded in proportion to virtue. Rarely is the righteous man or 
woman the one with the greatest worldly reward. · The nexus of this resolution 
is the highest good which seives to resolve the incommensurableness of the 
world with our moral desert. For it1 is through the highest good that not only 
our purposiveness as happiness seekers and moral beings are united, but also 
that the ends of the world as enacted in the natural realm are unified as nature 
facilitates the satisfaction of the empirical aspect of our desires which our 
pursuit insofar as its ground would be pleasing others, and not in the law. 
Even when we seek to make others happy, thereby universalizing happiness as 
a pursuit, this is a pursuit primarily conditioned by our moral disposition 
· insofar as the disposition is the source of the effect. 
27 An expression for everything wished for, or worthy of being wished for 
which we can neither foresee nor bring about through our own endeavors 
according to the laws of experience; for which, therefore, if we wish to name 
its source we can offer none other than a gracious Providence [gtittge Vorseh,mg] 
[(REL, l07fn (Greene and Hudson, 98fn)]. 
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demand for happiness necessitates. 28 
The presentation of the highest good as that which unifies the natural 
purposiveness of the world as the vehicle for happiness with the moral 
purposiveness of humanity as the condition for our deserving said happiness is 
important in the Religion, but for different reasons than in Kant's other works. 
Here the deficiencies of humanity to affect the natural world are pointed to as 
a causal explanation of the need for God in the moral project. In Kant's other 
works, this union of purposiveness in and of itself was of the greater import 
insofar as it points to a useful and constitutive aspect of the concept of the 
highest good. 29 Although not the key issue of this presentation of the ·highest 
good, here Kant still remains faithful to the concept of the highest good as 
unifier. This unification accomplished in the moral object integrates the 
demands of the moral call which requires its manifestation and its enactment 
through the moral agent's utilization of her agency in both the supersensuous 
and sensuous realms. 
In the preceding explanation, an aspect of the highest good that 
28Moral purposiveness and natural purposiveness are united for the same 
reasons that are cited in Chapter One. Without this cooperative unification, 
all desires to bring about the highest good in the world end in frustration. 
29For a more detailed discussion of this notion of the highest good, as a 
dialectical ideal of reason through which the duality of purposiveness is united, 
see Chapter One. 
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received prior treatment has surfaced again. In the Religion Kant presents the 
highest good as unifying the different sorts of purposiveness afoot in the 
world. However, this aspect of the highest good is part and parcel of the 
notion of the highest good as requiring God as moral guarantor. That is, the 
unification of purposiveness is a symptom of the illness of our general human 
inadequacy to bring about the highest .good in the world. The solution to this 
shortcoming comes through God· as the- champion of the concept of the 
highest good. Without the postulation of the existence of God the moral call 
to pursue the highest good would necessarily -lead to confli~ or frustration 
from our sheer inadequacy. Thus, .it is through the highest good that the 
demands of all realms are met and satisfied. 
In sum, with this more· descriptive idea of the highest good, we are given 
a substantive,. filled-out notion of the highest good which has as its task the 
unification of our ends as a guide for action. Throughout this discussion of 
the highest good Kant continues to stress that although the highest good is 
that which we are required to pursue, its pursuit would be impossible were it 
not for God who guarantees its completion. 30 With this articulation of the 
3
°Kant uses variously illustrative descriptions· for the highest good 
throughout the Preface to the First Edition of the Religion. 
"some sort of final end11, "the concept of a final end of all things", "union 
of the purposiveness arising from freedom with the purposiveness of nature", "a 
final end for his duties, as their consequence". 
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notion of the highest good present in the Religion, there remains only the task 
to determine the form through which this understanding of the highest good is 
to be made manifest. That is, what does the highest good which serves as 
unifier, moral ideal and anchor for God look like? 
The Fulfillment of the Highest Good 
I have articulated above what will be accomplished through the highest 
good (moral guidance and unification of purposiveness), and. what, beyond our 
worthiness, is required for its manifestation (God as moral guarantor). What 
remains is to consider the form of this highest good and why it is that the 
highest good takes this form. In what follows, I will demonstrate how it is 
that here, in the Religion, Kant introduces a conception of the highest good as 
the ethical commonwealth. This conception of the highest good differs from 
the traditional understandings of the highest good as they were considered in 
the other chapters. This notion of the highest good.is unique in that it 
includes a social dimension. As such, the responsibility and duty to be moral 
is no longer that of the individual in her moral isolation. The moral agent is 
. no longer able to 
apply himself exclusively to his own private moral affairs and 
relinquish to a higher wisdom all the affairs of the human race ( as 
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regards its moral destiny). "~1 
The ethical commonwealth goes beyond an understanding of virtue as a 
primarily individual task articulated through individual acts. Hence, the 
requirement to pursue the highest good no longer lies solely with the moral 
individual in her isolation; for now it is placed on the species as a moral unity. 
As Kant describes: 
Now here we have a duty which is sui generis, not of men 
toward men, but of the human race toward itself. For the species 
of rational beings is objectively, in the idea ofreasen, des,t!incd for 
a social goal, namely the promotion of the highest as a social 
good.32 
To bring· about the highest good is· the tkstiny of :the human species, as a, 
species, and as such it is a~ goQ<l. We:are thus required to pUfflle the 
highest social goal, which follows from our primary duty to pursue and make 
perfect our own virtue. The highest good takes this social form as a 
consequence of Kant's full scale treatment of human evil. In presenting Kant's 
ethical commonwealth, I will present Kant's doctrine of evil in order to 
31als ob ein jeder nur seiner moralischen Privatangekgenheit nachgehen, das Ganze 
der Ungelegenheit des menschlichen Geschkchts aber (seiner moralischm Bestimmung 
nach) einer hohen Weisheit uburlajfen dtnfe [REL, 100 (Greene and Hudson, 
92)]. 
32Hier hilben wir nun eine Pftcht von ihrer eignim Art nicht der menschen gegen 
Menschen, so,ulern des menschlichen Geschkchts gegen ,sich selbst. Jede Gattung 
vernunftigtr Wesen ist nitmlich oJ;;ectiv, in der ldee der V ernunft, zu einem 
gemeinschajtlichen Zwecke, nilmlich der Beforderung des hiichsten als eines 
gemeinschaftlichen Guts, bestbnmt. [Ibid., 97 (89)]. 
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demonstrate that the ethical commonwealth is required in order to overcome 
the inherent evil of human nature. This is the case because as humans we are 
radically evil and this state, at the most basic level, is that which thwarts our 
efforts to seek to perfect our state of virtue. As radically evil, we are thereby 
left in an ethical state of nature which we are also required to depart from and 
overcome through our moral relations in ethical community (represented as·. 
the highest good). As a function of the drive to seek our own moral 
perfection, we must strive to bring about this social highest good as a means to 
facilitate and preseive our own virtue, thereby fulfilling the command of the 
law. For present purposes I will articulate the primary characteristics of this 
conception of the highest good concentrating on its social aspects and how it is 
a manifestation of what morality requires. In what follows I will present this 
social highest good relative to its underlying basis in Kant's interpretation of 
radical evil. 33 
In Kant's doctrine of radical evil he goes far towards describing why we 
33This chapter will not include an exhaustive account of Kant's ethical 
commonwealth. Instead, I will present the basic aspects of the ethical 
. commonwealth in terms of its origin as the means through which the 
sovereignty of the good principle is to come to pass. The other issues relative 
to this understanding of the highest good, such as how the ethical 
commonwealth is connected to the other understandings of the highest good 
will be addressed in Chapter Four. Furthermore, the means for the formation 
of the ethical conunonwealth, as well as a critical assessment• of this 
consummate notion of Kant's highest good will be addressed in Chapter Five. 
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act and do what we do and, most relevantly, why it is that we transgress the 
law. Kant's explanation of evil arises as a result of his need to hold us morally 
culpable for our actions that go against the law. Prior to this work Kant had 
said very little about how it is that we could go against our moral vocation and 
still remain free, for free action is moral action and thus autonomous. Yet 
when we look out, at the world~ we are not surprised to see that moral agents 
everywhere appear to be going against the law, and to be doing so freely, that 
is without coercion. Hence, for persons to be held culpable for their actions 
Kant must give an account of how they come about while preserving human 
freedom. 34 
Kant demonstrates that the moral status of our actions as good or evil is 
chosen and that, as such, we are responsible for this choice as it is a function 
of our freedom. To establish this, Kant examines the source of morally good 
and morally evil actions. In so doing, it becomes apparent that the origin of 
our moral actions, whether they be good or evil, if they are to be free, cannot 
be a result of the sensuous inclinations of moral agency. If this were the case, 
an individual moral agent would not be responsible for her actions because 
34John Silber, in the introduction to this work explains the problem as 
follows: ... "Kant had to show how necessity can be combined with freedom in a 
single relationship." John Silber, 'The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," 
introduction to Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone translated by 
Greene and Hudson, (New York: Harper Torchbooks)l 960, lxxxi. 
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they would be understood as a consequence of something over which she had 
no control, her natural state. That is, evil as a part of the sensuous nature of 
moral agents would not originate in free choice; it would in some way be hard-
wired into the natural being of agents. 35 Thus, in order for action not to be 
sensibly determined, its origin must lie elsewhere than in the sensuous drives 
of the moral agent, and, as such, the origin of action must be freely chosen. In 
order to fulfill these aitcria.;Kant concludes that as acting moral agents, our 
actions are:determined by maximStwhich we freely choose. These maxims that 
we choose and •those which .• goycm our acts arc those parts of us that are 
dctemtined. by "mittttt" ·wile:rc natme is understood in a non-sensible manner. 
Kant describes this non.sensible nature as follows: 
... let it be noted :that by "nature of man" we here intend only the 
subjective ground of the exercise (under objective moral laws) of 
man's freedom in.general; this ground--whatcvcr is its character is 
the necessary antecedent of every act apparent to the senses. 36 
Nature, then, is not that which is the opposite of freedom, since that would 
contradict the possibility of our being culpable for our action. Here, nature is 
that means through which we are anchored in "human nature" as we make a 
35Man himse!f must make or have made himself into whatever, in a moral 
sense, whether good or evil he is or is to become. Either condition must be an 
effect of his free choice; for otherwise he·could not be held responsible for it 
and could therefore be moral!, neither good nor evil. REL, 44, (Greene and 
Hudson, 40). 
36lbid., 21 (16). 
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commitment to a subjective disposition for action. This over-arching 
disposition serves as the ground for all other actions for morally culpable 
beings. As such, this subjective ground is and must always be an expression of 
freedom. If this were not the case, the use or abuse of the agent's power of 
choice "in respect of the moral law could not be imputed to him nor could the 
good or bad in him be called moral. "37 
In establishing the charac;ter of what Kant calls the over-arching 
subjective predisposition of our nature, he discusses the pulls that are at work 
in us as moral beings. We previously established that the moral agent is.pulled 
toward, fulfiHing the demands of her moral self-foHowing the law; the moral 
agent also is pulled towat:d fulfilling the demands of her sensuous self-
pursuing her own happiness. These are the two incentives, termed 
propensities, that govern us and are most relevant for the determination of our 
overall maJim. 
These mcentives are specifically good or evil insofar as tMy serve as the 
means·through which the underlying moral propensity of human agency is 
actualized.· That is, through the determination of our underlying moral 
. maxim; as sf,ecifically either gci>od 9r evil, the subjective determination of the 
human moral agent is realized. For Kant, the propensity is that which inheres 
37i11 Ansehung des sittlichen Gesetzes ihm nicht zug,reehnet werden und das Gute 
oder Bose in ihm nicht moralisch heiszen [Ibid., 21 ( I 7)]. 
in the moral agent and thereby determines the subjective disposition at the 
root of all subsequent acting. As he says: 
... by the concept of a propensity we understand a subjective 
determining ground of the will which precedes all acts and which, 
therefore is itself not an act. 38 
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As a result of this account of moral action, the term "act" has two meanings,, 
both of which are reconcilable with the concept of freedom. An "act" in the 
first and more primary sense applies to the general adoption of the basic 
propensity (towards good or evil) which becomes the basis for all other 
actions. These other actions are "~" m the second sense and their status as 
good or as evil is determined in accordance with their determination through 
the original act. The pull toward morality or toward evil-is actualized at the 
most primary level, in the first sense of "act". For the true moral or evil status 
of an individual is not determined by "act" in the second sense, but only in 
that most primary adoption of the basic moral predisposition. The point of 
this differentiation in the two senses of act for Kant lies in safeguarding the 
freedom that underlies our action. We freely choose the underlying ground of 
our maxims as a propensity towards good or evil. After this choice, our actions 
. regardless of whether or not they specifically follow from that original maxim, 
, • i 38versttht, man unt.er dem /3egriffe eines Hanges einen subjectiven Bestimmungsgrund 
der Willkilr, der vor jeder That vorherg,ht. mithin selbst noch ni&ht That ist [Ibid., 31 
(26)}., 
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are determined as such. Thus, our goodness or evil is determined at the most 
basic of volitional levels. 39 
As a consequence of this explanation of our maxims, evil is possible only 
as a determination of a free will. This is the case since the will can be 
appraised as good or evil only by means of its most primary underlying maxim. 
Thus the propensity to evil consists in the underlying ground of the maxims. 
This underlying maxim is subjective insofar.as it is freely chosen and could be 
otherwise. In short, whatever the determination of the moral agent's 
underlying· m.axim--as good or evil-it has a subjective status. This is the case, 
propensity towards good or evil,, and•since the propensity was chosen fntely, it 
could always be otherwise. 
As a result of this, good and evil are not disel!mcd from perfonned 
actions. That is'" moral agents are not evil or good by virtue of their 
performance of evil actions (actions contrary to law), or good actions (actions 
springing from the law); instead, they are.good or evil because there is present 
391<.ant says of the more basic and fundamental sense of act, it: 
.. .is intelligible action, cognizable by means of pure reason alone, 
apart from every temporal condition; 
of the second sense of act, as individual actions he says, it: 
... is sensible action, empirical, given in time (factum phomomenon). 
Ibid., 32/33 (26/27). . / 
In addition, this dual understanding of act can be seen in light of the 
comparable notion of object in Chapter one. 
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in the acting agent an underlying maxim which is either evil or good. v\Thether 
or not the determination of the underlying maxim consists of a commitment 
to good or evil is inaccessible to human cognition. This is the case since the 
subjective determination of the underlying moral maxim is a determination 
that takes place as a part of our noumenal selves. The true status of the 
underlying maxim is only apparent to an all knowing being. Hence to 
determine someone's moral status requires the a priori inference of an 
underlying .good or an underlying evil maxim. 40 
In short, the above has argued that Kant provides a program through 
which .m.Qral culpability is retained, while at the same time freedom is 
preserved. This system demonstrates its goal· of moral culpability insofar as we 
are able to say of a moral agent that she is by nature good or evil. To be by 
nature good or evil means only that there is in us an ultimate ground 
(inscrutable to us) of the adoption of good maxims or of evil maxims (i.e., 
those contrary to law). In addition, this primary predisposition towards good 
or evil forms the basis for the adoption of all of the subsequent maxims, 
through which actions are brought about. This organization comprises what 
40More on the status of our inner disposition will be explained relative to 
the ethical commonwealth as establishing the good over the evil principle in 
our maxims. For now, it is enough to realize that "the ultimate ground of the 
adoption of our maxims, ... cannot be a fact revealed in experience," [Ibid., 22 
(17)]. 
113 
according to Kant, it is to be human; it is our "nature". 
As a result of the above system of moral culpability, it makes no sense 
to speak of good or evil as that which determines the will. Freedom is 
preserved and, consequently, we determine the goodness or the evilness of our 
will as we freely adopt the maxims that result in such a good or evil 
determination. The determination of the will itself can only lie in maxims, 
that which consists of those rules made by the will for the use of its freedom. 
Human meral agents are then demonstrated to be the originators of the good 
or evil that is a part of our-characters. This is· the case, sinde. the ultimate 
grounding of our maxims is posited freely as the ground antecedent to every 
use of freedom in experience. With the introduction of the above conception 
of adopting a maxim, Kant preserves moral culpability and freedom, 
something that has not been completely clear in his previous works. 41 
Agents are never indifferent with respect to the moral law; they are 
never neither good nor evil. This is the case as a result of our adoption of our 
ultimate moral disposition. 42 This disposition is the ultimate subjective 
41We freely choose a subjective maxim, determined by our will (as willldir). 
Our subsequent acts, as good or evil, are then a result of the expression of our 
freedom and as such they can be moral or immoral. Ibid., 44ff (44ff). 
42 
••• if it were merely a question as to whether the law or the sensuous 
impulse were to furnish the incentive, man would be at once good and evil; 
this, however, .. .is a contradiction. Ibid., 44 (40). 
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ground of the adoption of maxims, it is singular and applies universally to the 
whole use of freedom. That is, whatever the dominant disposition within a 
moral agent, that disposition serves as the determining factor in the agent's 
moral status, as good or evil. As was established previously, human agents 
possess a drive to morality and the very same toward happiness or self-love. 
Relative to these drives, the moral agent is good or evil contingent upon which 
drive is subordinated to the other . 
... Henee the distinction between a good man and one who is 
evil ... must depend upon suburdination (the form of the maxim), 
i.e .• whidi•tfthe.e-, lncenthwhe makes the etmdltion of the other. 43 
It f0Dow&,1Wn, that the agent who has subordinated her moral drive to her 
drive·to fulfill the need for self-love has a morally evil predisposition and is 
thus an evil individual, Likewise, that agent who has subordinated her need 
for self-love to her drive to fulfill the moral l:lw has a morally good disposition 
and is a morally good individual. 
As a result of the above, the determination of moral evil and goodness 
can be·understood as based upon the hierarchical relation of the ground of all 
maxims. From this, Kant concludes that the human species is evil by nature. 
· This claims cn(:ompasses the entire moral status of the species. Generally, it 
43 Ako nrujl.Jn U1fUrsthid, ob iler Mensch gut Oller 1JiJre ·sei, nicht in dem 
Untersehiede der Triebfedern, die ,er in seine Maxime ausnimmt (nicht in dieser ihrer 
materie )) smulern ih dn Unterordnung ( der Form derselben) liege,,: welche vo,, beiden er 
zur Bedmgulfg "4r 11ndern 11Uldtt. [Ibid., 36 (3 I)]. 
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can be concluded that humanity has perverted the appropriate hierarchy of the 
subordination of maxims. Humanity has subsumed the principle towards good 
under the principle of self-love. 
Kant's explanation of humanity's propensity towards evil is 
contradicto:ry. That is, he is claiming to have knowledge of what he previously 
asserted was cognitively inacces.,iblc. Kant attempts to make his claim that 
humanity is evil through demonstrating that both the moral principles and the 
principle of self-love are enough to determine our will. Furthermore, it is only 
natural for us in being human that there is some mixture of these incentives in 
the determmin.g of our actions. However, humans have demonstrated time 
and again that they are morally evil. From this empirical and historical point, 
Kant concludes that.our species is morally evil insofar as we have perpetually 
subsumed the wge to morality under the principle of happiness and self-love. 44 
The evil of humanity is a radical evil. It is radical insofar as its source 
lies at·the root of all of our maxims and as their ground, corrupts all of them. 
It is, as a natural propensity, inextiYpable by human powers. This is the case 
44For more on this see: REL, 36-7 (Greene and Hudson, 31-2); 28/9 (27): 
... from what we know of man through experience we cannot 
judge otherwise of him ( that he is evil), ... we may presuppose evil 
to be subjectively necessa:ry to eve:ry man, even to the best 
Ibid., 27 (26) 
It is not really clear how Kant can go from an analysis of human volition to a 
statement about the status of said volition. 
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because any sort of moral revolution, a revolution which would reverse the 
immoral hierarchical relation of principles, would have to occur through the 
adherence of good maxims in the moral predisposition. This would be an 
impossible state of affairs, since the ground of all maxims is a corrupt ground. 
Thus good maxims could not take hold in the corrupt ultimate subjective 
ground of all maxims. In establishing evil as radical, there is a danger. That is, 
if humanity is to be free ( as well as culpable), evil must be possible to 
overcome. 45 If evil is an inescapable condition, humanity is no longer free, but 
determined by its evil nature. It is no surprise that Kant provides a means 
through which the under.lying evil of humanity is overcome. In what follows, I 
will demonstrate that the means for this overcoming of radical evil consists of 
the emergeJ\Cc·of the highest good as ·ethical comlh<>nwealth. 
The conception of the highest good as ethical commonwealth is a social 
understanding of the highest good through which that which is good in us is 
able to regain its soveteignty over that which is evil in us. As we have seen, 
human beings are radically evil in that within their original and most basic 
disposition lies a propensity to evil. As a result of this underlying propensity 
. towards evil, humanity has a dual motivation to pursue the highest good. 
That is, not only is the highest good a duty in that it is the object of the moral 
451bid., 37 (32). 
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law, but it is also a duty in a more fundamental sense. 46 In working to bring 
about the ethical commonwealth we are not only working to bring about the 
highest good, that object which the moral law requires, but we are also 
working to re-establish the sovereignty of the good principle within our 
internal subjective moral hierarchy of dispositions, thereby fulfilling the 
command of the moral law in our duty to improve our virtue. 
The society of the ethical commonwealth which Kant has claimed as the 
highest good, is required insofar as it is Kant's conception of the highest good. 
Furthermore, it is required to overcome our propensity towards evil. That is, 
no matter how much an individual .lw managed to have the good principle 
overcome the evil principle in their maxims, this correct ordering of things is 
constantly coming under attack from others who have.not done such a good 
ordering. 47 Thus, it can seem impossible for one to overcome their 
predisposition to evil since no matter how far the moral individual manages to 
46 About our duty to pursue the ethical commonwealth, Kant writes: 
The idea of such a state (the ethical commonwealth) possesses a 
thoroughly well-grounded objective reality in human reason (in 
man's duty to join such a state), even through, subjectively, we 
can never hope that man's good will will lead mankind to decide 
to work with unanimity towards this goal 
die ]dee in der menschlichen Vernunft ihre ganz wohlgegrundete objective Realitllt hat 
( als Pjlicht sich zu einem solchen Staate zu einigen ), wenn es gleich subjeciv von dem 
guten Willen der Menschen nie geh'!lft werden kitnnte, daft sie zu diesem Zwecke mit 
Eintracht hinzuwirk.en sich entscliirJJen wurden [Ibid., 95 (86). 
47Ibid., 93 (85). 
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change her own predisposition, her own progress becomes threatened when 
she comes into contact with others. Furthermore, moral agents can 
misunderstand this social threat to their individual morality and thereby 
become convinced that the evil of their maxim is not their fault, but rather 
that "of mankind to whom he (the moral agent) is related and bound."48 This 
is obviously ,a misguided understanding of the overcoming of evil which as a 
result of the exe:rcise of our freedom, it can be,. and must be, possible to 
overcome. It must :be possible to overcome our evil because we have no 
OOJIUlland.$'\O do il\at. which is impossible. Furthennott it ;is out ~sponsibility 
to strive with all of our power to overcome the sovereignty of the evil principle 
over the ,good principle within us. 49 
The fact that we are responsible for our own evil does nothing to 
diminish the effects, through our social contact, with others. .For it is through 
social interaction with those who are ~ as well as with others just because 
they are human, that we are led to the inevitable corruption of our 
predispositions. This is the case no matter how gteat our effort •has been to 
keep our moral dispositions pure. As a result of this condition of the social 
corruptibility of our dispositions we are called to: 
48lbid., 93 (85). · 1 
491bid., 44 ( 40 ). 
the forming of an alliance uniquely designed as a protection 
against this evil and for the furtherance of goodness in man--of a 
society, enduring, ever extending itself, aiming solely at the 
maintenance of morality, and counteraction of evil with united 
forces ... 50 
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This union is the ethical commonwealth. It is Kant's highest good insofar as it 
consists of the highest possibility of morality in society, through which our 
pursuit of happiness is to be conditioned. Without such a union, we are 
fore~r doomed to moral failure insofar as all of our individual moral progress 
will rount for naught since it will be lost as soon as we meet with others. Thus 
it is through the fortnation of the alliance at the root of the ethical 
commonwealth that we ate able to keep safe and illerea$C our moral progttss. 
That is, through the establishment of an ethical society we are able to 
safeguard the moral progress that we have already made. In addition, it is only 
through the ct.hkal commonwealth that we are able to combat our radical evil 
and work·towards the establishment of the sovereignty of the good principle 
within our subjective predisposition . 
. .. the sovereignty of the good principle is attainable, so far as men 
can work toward it, only through the establishment and spread of 
a society in accordance with, and for the sake of, the laws of 
50eine ganz eigmtlich af die V erhii.tung dieses Bosen und zu Beforderung des Guten 
im Mensdren abzwecknule Vermiigung als eine bestehnule und sich tmmera1tSbreitmde, 
blt!ft aus die Erhlllt,mg der Mumlit4t angelegte Gesellschaft zu mic:htm, welehe mit 
t1ereinigten Kriftm dem BIJsen entgegenwi-rfte [Ibid., 94 (85-86)]. 
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virtue ... 51 
This social union is the highest good insofar as it serves to safeguard and 
nurture that which is moral within humanity. In so doing, the highest good 
would promulgate the establishment of the good principle's sovereignty over 
the evil principle. In this way, the burden of virtue is shared by an entire 
society rather than by each individual in her isolated moral combat with the 
evil principle. From this conception of the highest good, as an ethical 
commonwealth understood as following from a duty to overcome our 
propensity to evil and to seek to bring about this state in others, the face of 
the highest good changes insofar as it is no longer that union for individual 
virtue and happiness. Instead, the highest good requires. 
a union of such individuals into a whole toward the same goal-
into a system of well-disposed men, in which and through whose 
unity alone the highest moral good. can· come to pass ... 52 
As required to be brought about, the highest good represents the moral life as 
a social· and collective undertaking given the general way in which evil and its 
51Die Herrschaft des guten Princips, so fern Menschen dazu hinwirken kiJnnen, ist 
also, so viel wir einsehm, nicht flnders erreichbar, als durch Errichtng und Ausbreitung 
einer Gesellschaft nach Tugendgesetzen und sum Behuf derselben [Ibid., 94 (86)]. 
52sondern eine V ereinigung derselben in ein Ganus zu eben demselben Zwech zu 
einem Systme 'WOhlgesinnter Mmsehn, erfortlm, in we/chem u,ul durdt dessen Einheit es 
atlein zu Stand kmnmen kann [Ibid., 97/8 (89)]. 
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requirements to be overcome are ascribed to the whole species. 53 Just as the 
promulgation of evil is socially rooted, so is the means through which it is to 
be conquered. It is not enough to do everything within your power to change 
your inner self, the moral agent must also strive to create such a society that 
has as its basis "a system of well-disposed men." 
The form of this commonwealth is to be realized as a result of the moral 
progression of the citizens that are already in a political commonwealth. 
These citizens would voluntarily leave their ethical state of nature. This 
ethical state of natUtt is likened to the political state of nature, which is a state 
"of war of every man against every other. "54 The ethical state of nature is 
similar to·political state of nature because it too is a state of war. 
1 
• ·. the ethical state of nature (is~, one of ope,, e0nflicf between 
principles of virtue and a state of inner immorality which the 
natural- man ought to bestir himself to leave as soon as possible. 55 
As such, the ethical state of nature is a bellicose atmosphere made up of the 
53See Sharon Anderson-Gold, "God and Community: An Inquiry into the 
Religious Implications of the Highest Good," as it appears in Kant's Philosophy 
ofReligion Reconsidered, edited by Rossi and Wreen, (Indiana: Indiana 
University Press) 1991, especially pages l 23ff. 
~. 97 (Greene andHudson, 88). 
55so ist der ethische Naturzustand eine iffentliche wechselseitige Befehdung der 
Tugendprinci[lien und ein Zustantl der innern Sittenlosigkeit, tlUS. we/chem der 
natiirliehe Mensch so bald wie mDglicl, lrerauszulwmmm sich ~igen soil [Ibid., 97 
(89)1., 
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conflicts between our own inner dispositions of good and evil and those same 
in all others. In being required to leave the ethical state of nature the moral 
agent is being required to pursue a new sort of duty. This is a duty of the 
society as a whole. Of this whole, Kant explains: 
... the idea of such a whole, as a universal republic based on laws 
of virtue, is an idea completely distinguished from all moral 
l 56 aws ... 
In being so distinguished, this duty requires our working towards something 
that is not in our power. This is the means by which Kant introduces God into 
the idea of the ethical commonwealth as the moral guarantor of this social 
understanding of the highest good. 
With the ethical commonwealth·not totally under the auspices of 
human domain, the conditions for the bringing about of the ethical 
commonwealth rely strongly on the role of God as moral governor and 
guarantor. We work to bring about a union of moral agents united for the 
furtherance of virtue, but we have very little guidance towards how, through 
our humanity alone, this will occur. Kant hints that its establishment will 
arise out of its basis in the republican constitution. 57 Likewise, the main 
56lbid., 97 (89). 
57This is part of the developmental notion of the highest good that will 
meet with in depth treatment in Chapter Four, see also REL, 94-5 (Greene 
and Hudson, 86-7). 
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guidelines Kant gives for the establishment of the ethical commonwealth share 
their origins with his political theory in that they are subject to the 
requirements of public legislation. This public legislation must be made up of 
laws which must ''be capable of being regarded as commands of a common law-
giver."ss 
With! the above, a picture of tbe,ethicalcommonwealth takes form. For 
itis,within the uniy~rsal ethical commonwealth where the laws~ internal, 
that-we ~to Q>d 35 the common law-giver. 
Hence an ethical commonwealth can be thought of only as a 
people under divine commands, i.e., as a people tf God, and indeed 
unw lllws if virtue. 59 . 
. With God·~ the mor,al governor of the :ethical COIM\Qnwcalth, the moral· law 
is now recognized as the. divine command of this lawgiver .. With God taking 
Ol\, this role in the ethical commonwalth.; the people within the 
CQmmonwealth come together under the auapices of this moral ruler united; as 
a "peo~ of God.1160 
As a result, the. members of the ethical commonwealth understand 
58lbid., ·98 (90). 
59ABD ist em etlrischts gemeines•Wdln mirwls ein Volk unter glttlithe Gebotm, d.i. 
als ein VolkGottes, und ZWtlr nad, Tuge,ulgesetzen, nt denken milglich. [Ibid:, 99 
(91)]. / 
60lbid., 99/100 (91). 
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themselves as a people of God, a consequence of which consists in their 
formation of a universal church of God. That is, Kant dictates that the 
people of God come together in no other form than that of a church, which 
will serve as the formal organon and archetype to be actualized on earth in 
order for the ethical commonwealth to be brought about. When the 
archetypal "invisible church" is actualized in its ectypal form of the ''visible 
chureh" we know we are on the right path towards the achievement of the 
ethical commonwealth. 61 
With the role of God demonstrated as moral guarantor through the 
fornt of the· church, the highest good as· ethical commonwealth shares some of 
the same characteristics of the more traditional, individwillstic notions of the 
highest good. Within the ethical commonwealth, we arc acting such that we 
make our moral selves worthy to dese~ God's assistance as we seek to make 
actual the invisible church on earth. God's assistance is required in order that 
we are able to make commensutate the ends of morality with the world as well 
as ·we are able to h\ake our own moral ends commensurate with our subjective 
61
"The true (visible) church is that which exhibits the (moral) kingdom of 
God on earth so far as •it' can be bJOUght to pass ey men" 
Die Wtlhre ( sichlbare )Kirdte ist kiejmige, welehe Jas (morausdu) .Reich Gottes ,nu 
Erden. so Fieles durch Moudtm gesdlehen kllnn, tlarsteUt... [Ibid .• 101 (92)]. 
This discussion of the invisible and visible church is like the discussion 
of the bringing about of the archetypal and ectypal worlds in the Analytic of 
the second Critique. See Chapter Two for a discussion of this connection. 
desires for happiness. 
Mankind (rational earthly existence in general) in its complete moral 
perfection is that which alone can render a world the object of a 
divine decree and the end of creation. With such perfection as 
the prime condition, happiness is the direct consequence, 
according to the will of the Supreme Being. 62 
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Only as moral agents work to make themselves worthy of divine aid, in being 
"morally perfect," through working to bring about the invisible church on 
earth, will divine aid be forthcoming. However, in working toward this 
ethical commonwealth, we are not to use it as that way in which to determine 
our actions (heteronomously). That is, we are not to seek to bring about the 
ethical commonwealth for the sake of happiness .in the world nor are we to 
zealously look to God for assistance. We have no knowledge of the 
connection or timetable God uses to determine his role in the manifestation of 
the ethical commonwealth. Even though a concern with the divine timetables 
is anxiety provoking, Kant implores us to have no concerns. It is only 
"essential to know what man himself must do in order to become worthy of this 
(God's) assistance. "63 This is assistance that will bring about the ethical 
62 Das, was allein eine Welt zum Gegenstaml des g/Jttlichen Rahschluffes und zum 
Zwec"ke der Schiipfung mach k(inn, istdie Menschheit ( das vernunftige Weltwesen 
ilberhaupt) u-,, ihrer moralischen, ga11UR Volllannmenheit, wwon ab oerster &dingung 
die Gluckselig"keit die unmittelbare Folge in dem Willen des hiJchsten wesens ist. [Ibid., 
60 (54)]. 
63lbid., 52 (47). 
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commonwealth as well as our own moral conversion as it stresses the role of 
God as guarantor of the concept of the highest good. 
To sum up, in this chapter I have argued that the highest good in 
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone is similar and different from 
Kant's other presentations of the highest good. This notion of the highest 
good is similar insofar as it serves: as a unifying moral ideal and requires God 
in order for it to be made manifest. Consequently, the notions of the highest 
good as presented in Chapters One and Two are demonstrated to be 
complementary and not competitive or exclusive. Hence, through the ethical 
commonwealth, the two notions of the highest good as expressed in the second 
Critique are united and made manifest. Thus to fulfill the command to pursue 
the ethical commonwealth is to fulfill the command to pursue the highest 
good as articulated in the second Critique. In addition, this notion of the 
highest good in the Religion differs from the previous notions. This notion of 
the highest good is a social conception of the highest good in the form of 
Kant's ethical commonwealth. Central to the social aspect of the ethical 
commonwealth is the way in which it fosters a notion of collective virtue that 
includes an orientation towards others in creating a more perfect social union 
as a church on earth. Hence with this third chapter, the similarities and 
differences between Kant's conceptions of the highest good are brought to 
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light. From the establishment of this integrated interpetation of the highest 
good, Chapter Four will consider the possibility of a developmental plan 
through which we are able to actualize this integrated interpretation of the 
highest good. This will be done as Chapter Four demonstrates the way in 
which the Kantian corpus contains a developmental program for achieving the 
ultimate articulation of the highest good .as the ethical commonwealth based 
on perpetual peace, that object which morality requires. 
CHAPTER4 
KANT'S DEVELOPMENTAL PLAN: 
THE CONSUMMATION OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 
In the prior chapters l have, argued for the three predominate themes of 
the highest good, in order to explicate ·and distinguish the various 
manifestations of Kant's complex object. To sum up, the highe6t good appears 
in primarily tJuee guises: first,•as that dialectical·ideal for the unification of 
our purposiveness, as demonstrated. in Caapter One; ·sCCK.md as that moral 
ideal which senves as a 'gllkle· for our action,, as demonstrated in Chapter Two. 
Third and finally; the aigltest good appears-as the ethical commonwealth. In 
this manifestation of theffl.ghest.good, the two prior appearances of the 
highest good are .combined as ,the highest good is made manifest as. a unifying 
moral ideal with a required social component as the means through which 
radical evil is to be overcome. This.third conception of the highest good 
consists of the ethical commonwealth. It is this third manifestation of the 
highest good, that which received treatment in Chapter Ihree, that Kant 
articulates as the supreme manifestation of the high.est good. Hence in what 
follows, instead of in.teq>reting the highest good through these various 
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instances, I ,vill present my main thesis, that duty determines just one object, 
the highest good, the consummate articulation of which is made manifest 
through a developmental plan culminating in the ethical commonwealth based 
on perpetual peace. 
Implicit in my thesis is the following: to grasp the highat,good in its 
complete relation to the moral law and moral agents is to appreciate the moral 
object. as it is manifested: in its entirety, that is, within what is falsely, albeit 
commonly, delineated as. Kant's separate realms. These faux separations are. 
oft~n,articulated as those of the individual as·comparcd to society; the .realms 
of the .political as compared to the ethical, .and that. of right contrasted to 
virtue,,just to name a few. Yet in its entirety,.·the most complek 
conswnmationof the· highest good comes about as a consequence .of the 
integration of .the5e realms by way of a developmental plan. The blueprint for 
this plan is contained within Kant's rorpus, but is by.no means obvious. 
What I have done: is to piece together the integral parts of this plan through a 
careful, analysis .of several of Kants developmental texts. This analysis leaves 
an .understanding of the highest good that not only serves as a means through 
which these disparate, perspectival, and exclusive statements of the highest 
good are integratc<i, but it also requires cooperation among them. In addition, 
analysis of this developmental plan results in the removal of the false 
polarizations within the Kantian project which serve as a barrier for 
comprehending the Kantian vision of what morality requires. 
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As has been discussed in the previous chapters, duty determines just one 
object. That is not to say that many objects are not compatible with the law. 
However, there is only one object which we are given a command to pursue. 
Many actions are required and we have many duties as a result of the 
command to obey the law, yet the law itself commands that we work to bring 
about only one object, the highest good as·bappi.ncn urharmony with moral 
worthintss . . in what ·follows I wiU further•demonsttatc. how it is· that .tluty · 
determines just one· object, the highest ~ irrespective .of,whether or not 
this is done relative to a "moral'', "political", "individual" or "social" ,project. I 
will. accomplish this through addressirtg the connections, and removing the 
roadblocks rhetwttn the above multifarious notions of the place from which 
one seeks to pursue and achieve the highest good. Included in this will be an 
analysis of the object of ·pure practical rea.,on insofar as it ihcludes a 
developmental-plan for its consummate articulation. In short; I will 
demonstrate that there is just one conception of the highest good - that object 
that·duty requires in its practitt. Howtver, the specific requirements in 
content of this object vaty and are to be understood perspectivally as relative, 
131 
that is, contingent on one's place in the moral venue. 1 
In order to establish my thesis, that duty determines just one object, the 
highest good; the consummate articulation of which is made manifest through 
a developmental plan culminating in the ethical commonwealth based on 
perpetual peace, I will: 1 )demonstrate that the practice of duty consists of the 
highest good. This is the case insofar as through the practice of duty there is a 
developmental plan which culminates in the ethical commonwealth. Thus 
after establishing, step one, I will: 2 )presertt the developmental plan that 
culminates in the ethical commonwealth based on perpetual peace. This plan 
consists of tluec moments, the moments of:, a)a person, b )a state, and 
c )humanity. This becomes apparent, through ,presenting the stages of the 
highest good insofar as they are actualized in these realms. Finally, after the 
above discussion I will: 3) present the consequence of this highest articulation 
of Kant's complex object. In short, these consequences will mnsist of the 
expression of the highest good as the ethical commonwealth based on 
perpetual peace which comes about as. a iesult of the developmental 
1 Part of my argument includes the claim that it is nonsensical to speak of a 
"moral" highest good and a "political" highest good. The highest good is that 
object which combines the greatest possible happiness in accord with the 
greatest possible enactment of duty (virtue) relative to that particular context, 
e.g. between individuals, among citizens, amidst republics, etc. This argument 
is substantiated in what follows, however it is useful for the explanation to give 
this short elucidation here. 
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ascendence of the prior notions. 
The Practice of Duty is the Highest Good 
Throughout the previous three chapters I have dealt with various 
definitions of the highest good. In each of these conceptions of the highest 
good some aspects have remained common while others have varied. 
Attention to· these •Similarities and differences enables us·to regard the highest 
good'front ,a more unified point of view. Within eacl\ presentation of the 
highest good three 'factors have mmained constant; , Aiways,and in cwry case, 
the high~st good is that otr,.jca. that is detcmniritd by the Jaw,,insofar as it is 
the,ohject of pure practical reason. Second, as determined by the law, this 
object is fflfUired to ,be pursued insofar as the law includes a command to 
pursue the highest good. Third and finally, the abstract notion of the highest 
good ·contalns a general program· as its.~ This task is the creating of an 
environment,stich that it becomes possible to achieve happiness in proportion 
to our wotthincss to receive ru- With regard to the conception of the highest 
good m: Chapter Ohe, as.a dialectical ideal of rcason,cthe environment of 
. happinas in proportion to virtue is brought about within the moral will. 
With regard to the conception of the highest good in Chapter Two, as a moral 
ideal, the environment of happiness in proportion to virtue is brought about 
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within the world. With regard to the conception of the highest good in 
Chapter Three,· the ethical commonwealth, the environment of happiness in 
proportion to virtue is brought about both internally and externally. This is 
the case insofar as we are required to bring about a commonwealth and 
overcome our internal propensity to evil. In brief, the highest good is the 
object of the law, required to be pursued, and that which brings about the 
coincidence of happiness and virtue. However, as we have ·se~n in the earlier 
chapters, for ·each of these three .factors, there are as many incidental 
differences.· . It is my thesis that these incidences of difference are expressed as 
a consequence of the perspective from which the highest good is being made 
manifest. 
In short, there is one highest good, the program for which is determined 
differently in its specifks relative to the perspective in the moral venue from 
which the highest good is being pursued. That is, each notion of the highest 
good shms · at least the above three characteristics. What differs about the 
various manifestations of the highest good is the perspective relative to duty 
from which each ofthese objects of pure practical reason is pursued. The 
three perspectives from.which to pursue the highest good manifest themselves 
'I 
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relative to the principles of morality, right, and moral right 2. Thus it is 
through these • various perspectives from which to perceive duty that the 
theoretical form of the highest good is required to be practiced as an object.of 
the law. 
Furthermore, the three principles upon which the individual 
manifestations of the highest good are based (morality, ·right, and moral right) 
are each pe:rspectival manifestations of duty. As a manifestation of duty, the 
object of each is the highest good as that practice which 1 )the law determines, 
2 )duty requires and 3 )happiness is present in proportion to virtue. Hence in 
what follows I will examine and prove the claim that the practice of duty, 
) 
perspectivally relative, is the highest good. The essay in which Kant devoted 
extended treatment to this relation between duty and its practice, "On the 
Proverb: That may Be True in Theory But is of No Practical Use," is an 
obvious choice as that place from which to begin. 3 
2With regard to the conception of the highest good as a dialectical ideal, 
the environment to be created, where happy moral right, I am describing the 
formulation of Kant's theory of duty that provides the basis for the ethical 
cormnonwealth. Here, what was once merely internal laws are now legislated 
ext.ernaJly. More simply, moral right is that pJace where morality agrees with 
· politics determined ·by what Kant refers to as the Tugendgesetzm · .... laws t.f virtue 
[REL :94, . (G~me and. Hudson,• 86)] . 
. 
3A b~f oote to clarify terms. The.object of duty (tJ\eory) is the highest 
gqQ4 (practice). Duty can be.approached from three perspectives: I )a person 
(individual), 2)the state (political), 3)humanity (people or world). The 
principle underlying the approach of the perspectives is: l )morality, 2 )right, 
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Kant begins this essay and its treatment of the relationship of theory to 
practice by clarifying his terms and thereby setting the stage for his 
presentation of the highest good as it entails the practice of the theory that is 
duty. He defines a theory as an aggregation of rules; even of practical rules, in 
which 
these rules are thought -of as principles possessing a certain 
generality and, consequently as being abstracted from a multitude 
of conditions that· nonetheless necessarily influence their 
application. 4 
Kant then elaborates that the theory with which he is exclusively concerned is 
none other than a theory based on the concept of duty. Since this theory is 
' . ' 
based on a concept of duty, its practice must be possible. This follows from 
the definition of duty, which would be empty if it were not possible to be 
pursued, for how could there be optional or occasional duties. Theory based 
on duty is that place from which we draw the law that determines our matters 
' '. 
of morality, including both moral and legal duties, (what Kant refers to as 
3 )moral right. All of this results in the following ina.nifestations of the highest 
· good: l Jmmmum bonum~ 2 )the state, which has multiple stages { a,)civil 
commonwealth,. b )fedeiation of iStates, c)perpetual peace]~ 3)ethical. 
commonwe.ith, based on perpetual peact., :The above is what the chapter will 
seek to establish, but it is helpful to have a preliminary explanation of terms in 
place. / 
+rrP, 275 (Humphrey 61). 
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Tugend- oder Rechtsp.flicht).5 These matters of morality are decided through the 
mediation of an act of judgment in the determining of our action, which can 
be thought of as a practice when it is ''brought about in consequence of certain 
generally conceived principles of procedure, 11 accomplished as a certain effect 
of our will. 6 
Throughout his prefatory remarks, Kant continues emphasizing that the 
practice of duty is not useless and it is an affront to philosophy to think of it 
as such. In addition, its pursuiVis worthwhile as-it is based "entirely on its 
appropriateness to its underlying theory, 11 and there is no more appropriate 
theory than duty. 7 Through emphasis and hyperbole Kant presents as 
ludicrous the. possibility that the moral ·law has no relevance for the real world. 
His is no impotent theory with a vacuous notion,of pncticalconsequences, 
rather it is a theory with carefully constructed practices which follow from it. 
Being mindful of Kant's inttoduction to this essay, how is it that we can 
interpret the practices that he goes on to discuss, the practices of duty, as 
5 At this point in Theory to Practice Kant is very clear that both moral and 
legal duties, those things which fall under' th'e' doctrine of virtue an:d right 
respectively, are both considered moral matters. This comes as no surprise 
when perpetual ~e is recognized as that place which allows· for the 
agreement of morality and politics, an agreement that is also a moral matter. 
Sec 1TP, 277 (Humphrey 62) and PP, 370-373 (Humphrey 127-129). 
61TP, 275 (Humphrey 61). 
7lbid., 277 (62}. 
137 
made manifest through the highest good? The evidence is presented by Kant 
himself, through his depictions of the object of duty, pursued as the practice of 
duty and therefore articulated in each of the latter sections of Kant's essay. 
There can be no doubt that throughout the three sections of Theory to Practice 
Kant is comemcd with the practice of duty since he explicitly states his task as 
such. Truly, duty can be practiced in a multiplicity of ways. However, Kant 
maintains throughout his writings that the consummate object of the moral 
law :catt be none other than the highest good. That is, ,many objects are in 
ac(X)rd with duty_ b~,duty. itselfdetctm,unes only .one object. .This is the case 
because it is through the hlgllcst. good that~ combine our supreme good -
The object of the theory of duty, that theory which gives us the law, is 
under oonsidemtion,tluoughout this AtSSay. In each of the sections of the 
essay, Kant articulates the object that he considers as theory's practice, doing 
approached as weff as criticized. The standpoints are each perspectives from 
' ', 
whiclM;o evaluat-e the object of duty, to understand it as it develops the 
doct.rint :thtt,ugh' whidl -. approach the achievement of the highest good, and 
to present ·Kant's· relation of theory to practice. It is 'with this in mind that 
• > "' • i ; '.t-,. ; 
/ 
8For more analysis and substantiation of this point, see Chapter One. 
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Kant sets forth to meet his critics in three realms wielding the practicality of 
his theory as it is variously manifested in its development toward the highest 
good. 9 
The Development of Duty's Object 
Keeping this in mind, we will begin our approach through continuing 
to concentrate on the essay Theory to Practice, in order to articulate the object 
of theory's practice. This essay is particularly suited to this enumeration since 
it is here that Kant gives the most complete articulation of that object ( the 
practice), which duty (the theory) determines and the manifest ways in which 
duty determines it. In addition, through the format of this essay Kant 
addttsses his critics directly, thereby demonstrating the consistency of the 
possibility of the highest good as it specifies the practical consequences of his 
moral theory. 
As has been mentioned earlier, Kant's presentation of the three 
9With regard to the perspectives through which to evaluate the relationship 
between theory and practice. l<ant says: 
I divide this essay in accordance with the three different 
standpoints from which a gentleman who boldly criticizes 
theories and systems usually judges his objects, thus from three 
attitudes: (l) the private person who is yet a man of affairs;[als 
.Privat-, aber doch Geschiljtsmllnn] (2 )the statesman; [ al.s · Staatsman.n] 
, (3)themanof the·wurld fals Weltmann (oder Weltburg,r aberhaupt)} 
, (or citizen of the world in general). 
SeeTfP, 277/278 (Humphrey 62). 
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standpoints from which to perceive the relationship between theory and 
practice is of great import. He addresses this issue near the end of the 
introduction to Theury to Practice. For our purposes, this relates to the 
perspectives from which the practice of theory (its object) is presented and 
pursued. From the standpoint· of each of the three different pe~ Kant 
enumerates the way in ,which the three aforementioned general points about 
the highest good are to be concretized.10 He• does this by first articulating the 
natu.:,,:of the contept pf the highest good in.the most abstract of terms and 
practice :.of duty enaded in three realms, those of: l )the,pcrsoit; 2,)the· state; 
and 3)humanity., Kant himseH refers to these· three momenu, in the 
development of duty's object as he outlines' the contents of the rest of Theory 
. , Thus, -we shall present the rdati.on,hip of theory to practice 
in three sections: first, in morality in general (in relation to the 
weJM>eingofach man); second, in politics (in relation to the· 
well-being of nations); third, in cosmopolitan perspective (in 
relation to,the wellpbeing of·~ humanrace as·a whole and 
insofar as its well-being is conceived as progressing through a 
sequence of,devclopmcnts during all future times). 11 
10See footnote 8. 
11Kant articulates the perspectives as: morality [Moral], politics [Politik], 
andjn ~Osm()J)Olitan perspective [kosmopolitischer Betrachtung]. He then goes on 
to express how these "express the relationship of theory to practice in morality 
[Moral}, political right {Staatsrecht] and mternational right {Viilkerrecht]" 
And thus shall I proceed to present the relation of theory to practice from 
these standpoints. 
140 
In treating these perspectives, I will enrich this analysis through 
appealing to Kant's other writings. That is, the perspective of the individual 
has already met with some treatment in Chapters One and Two. FurthennoIC, 
the perspectives relative to right, where Kant discusses the practice ·of duty 
relative to the state and the human race are given further treatment in lllc 
Metapeysigs Qf Morals.,• lt:is then ·through appeal to the ·essay Perpetrtal Jwce 
and Religion Witbin, the.IJmm, of,Rtason, Alone 1:lm. we arc able to further 
com~°'° the ramifications of these perspectives..' ,For in ~the hwnan race as 
a whole,..,· Kant proposes that the highest good.,as theory's practice is 
characterized by progressive, developmental moments that culminate in the 
.K"t.ualization of 'the;mghest good throughout the world, in its final form, none 
other than an ethical commonwealth based ·on perpetual peace. 
H these-manifestations of the highest good as they appear through.out 
these works are isolated and thereby viewed individually" th.at. is, in not "seeing 
the parts in their reciprocal interrelations,"12 the controversy about the highest 
··good can be sustained in perpetuity. However, the debate over the highest 
[Ibid., 278 (63')]. . . I 
12See footnote number one, in the introduction. 
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good can be silenced, or at least quieted a good bit, through recognizing that 
the highest good consists of a tripartite development, consisting of the three 
perspectives articulated above, culminating in the ethical commonwealth 
based on perpetual peace. In short, the confusion over the highest good is a 
consequence of not recognizing its unity and thereby putting forth competing 
notions of it. The best presentations of these notions that end up in 
competition·with one another are found in Kant himseH, when they are taken 
in isolation and not as diverse manifestations of the object of the moral law 
(diverse insofar as they are pursued from·various petspcctivcs). Hence it is 
through appreciating ,these~diverse, ,apparently competing moments as Kant 
articulates them that we take his view most seriously. 
Moments: A Person 
In Themy to Practice, the first perspective which Kant addresses is that of 
the moral person, through his response to the criticisms of Garve relative to 
his presentation of the demands of the. law on moral individuals. This 
perspective is one that is very prevalent throughout Kant's work. It is the 
· perspective from which we initially meet the law and fulfill. our -purpose as 
moral beings. 
Here Kant points to and describes the end required by duty, as dictated 
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by morality in general. It seems redundant at this point to argue that the 
theory with which Kant is here concerned is duty. It is not a controversial 
claim to assert that morality is the duty of the individual. The interesting 
aspects of this claim, the means through which Kant expresses the claims of 
the moral law on us and the determination of the object that the individual is 
required to pursue, are addressed in the previous chapters. Suffice it to say 
that morality is· based on the theory of duty as it relates to duty and the 
demands of the law on the moral individual. As such, the moral individual is 
required to pursue certain ends and is :subject to this requirement as she is 
required to preserve a will not in conflict with duty. 13 
, · Kant also tkscnbes the end of the individual moral a~nt as an action. 
This is the-case in that it expresses.an end the agent should actMdy seek to 
pursue, Kant describes the pursuit of the highest good as a consequence of a 
determination of fhe·wilL Once the will has accepted its. determination "the 
basis of which is that if we stand jn .certain moral relations to things in the 
world, we must everywhere obey the moral law;" the will is obliged to pursue a 
further duty. This duty is the practice of the theory of morality, and thus a 
consiequence ofth.e ~moral" perspective from which to pursue our duty. This 
perspective coosi,sts of the 
. ,·, 
13TrP; · 218 (Humphrey .63'). 
further duty to strive vvith all one's abilities to ensure that such a 
relationship (a world conforming to the highest moral ends) 
exists.14 
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Hence the highest good is demonstrated as that end that follows from the law. 
The highest good, as the end of the agent who has made a commitment to the 
moral law is required to be pursued. For the highest good, as determined by 
the theory that 'COmes from duty is the agent's moral end. Kant describes this 
end ofa,will determined by moral duty in a manner that is familiar. This end 
is 
... the highest good possible in the world (the. purest morality 
throughout the world combined with such universal happiness as 
,accords with it). 15 
This cndi as the highest good, includes a conccm for: the relationship of 
morality to the individual's well being where that well :being is understood as a 
will not in conflict with duty. This is the end of-the moral agent whether she 
is an acting agent in the state, as a member of the human race, or a singular 
agent. The end itself never changes; it is always happiness in proportion to 
our worthiness of it. 
14eine Welt, den sittlichen hiichsten Zweckm angemessen. Elsewhere in the 
footnote, Kant,refers to the highest good as: [eine Welt als das hiJchste auch durch 
unsere MitwurhlngmiigUtJhe Gilt] and [das hikhste Gut],·all wordings consist of 
that object which foJlows,from.the law and is required to be pursued,H die beim 
Menschen Pflieht ist. {ibid., 280 fn ( 64fn) ]; 
15das hiJchste in Iler Welt moglichf Gut [Ibid., 279 (64)]. 
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In bringing about a rnora11y good world, from the various perspectives 
Kant describes, the specific distractions and pitfalls that are present vary. 
However in this section Kant merely describes the moral agent individually as 
she interacts with the world. Here she is her own nemesis as she battles to 
keep happiness and selfishness away from the ground of her action. That is, 
Kan.t rehearses ,the arguments that are present elsewhere regarding the 
difficuhies of the pursuit of the highest good and the impurity of the will. 16 •, 
Kant stresses in this section that regardless of the skq,ticism of his 
critics and the evidence in the world, pure motives • in,prlnciplc possible. 
They are states for which we should,strive ap.d that which ~ty,should 
encourage.17 Consequently, Kant is concerned not so much with establishing 
the highest good and its viability, as he is with the establishment of its 
possibility relative to the perspective from which the theory of duty is 
1%ese difficulties are the familiar ones of: 
· ,-The highest, good is not a need of morality, but a consequence of the will' s 
needing an object to act. 
-The hi~st !gbod iS ·not a ground for action, the principle of morality is the 
only determinant of a moral will. 
' See TIP, 279-81, (Hutnphrey 64~5). 
Flbid., 288 (71 ). 
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articulated in its practice. 18 This practice itself is my main concern since it is 
the highest good. However, the issue of perspectivalism is likewise of concern 
since it grounds the various notions of the highest good that are present in the 
corpus as the practice of duty appreciated from the various points of view. 19 
Moments: A State 
Once Kant establishes. the practice of duty with regard to the principle 
o:f'morality1and the perspective of the moral individual,he goes on to discuss 
the practice of duty with regard th the' pth1df>l~ of tight and, the perspective of 
the state. :Here'.I<ant ardcmates!political •light as that :principle which is a 
reflectibn of the thet>ry;that is duty as it relates to its practice in the formation 
18With regard to the overarching issue, the establishment of the highest 
good relative to the perspective from which the theory of duty is articulated in 
its practice, Kant aplains: 
As will become apparent in what follows, the crucial issue at stake 
, here concerns the principle of morality not at Ml, but only the 
universal moral point of view. 
Ibid., 281, (65). 
19lt ·sh1>uld be noted here that the coaceptiol\ of the highest good as .An end 
or object for. moral uv:nviduals corresponds with the concepti® of.the highest 
go«l as discussed in Chapters One and Two. Both of the discussions of the 
previous chapters related to the highest good from the perspective of a moral 
individukl. 
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of the state. 20 
.Toe understanding of right as a reflection of the theory that is duty,· is 
somewhat controversial. Although controversial, this interpretation is easily 
sustained. The basis of this interpretation lies in the status of right consisting 
of the understanding that freedom must be able to be expressed in the world if 
the moral law is to have any veracity. Through right, Kant is providing a 
system that allows for coctcion and force in order to protect the minimum 
rights of individuals, within the context of his moral system. 
The concept pf an external right in· general derives cnmcly from 
the concept of freedom in the external relations among men ... Right 
. , ,is the limitation of each. person's freedom so that.it is compatible 
with the freedom of everyone, insofar as this is possible in accord 
-... 1. . ---!..----1 l 21 wiu, a wuTI:I:,aa aw ... 
Hence ,right supplies us with systemamed moral principles in the format of 
laws which allow the guarantee of an environment in which we can pursue our 
duty, based on freedom. These laws themselves are based on right as the 
external formulation of duty. 
As moral agents we are free, and this freedom, and its pursuit must be 
protected. The protection of these "rights" is accomplished through political 
,zoAll translators cite the difficulty of the term Recht. in English. However, 
with that stated, I will follow normal procedure, using the term right for the 
Germ.an R«ht. 
21TIP 290, (Humphrey 72). 
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organization, based on a system of duty. It is a system of duty, because it is 
derived from a first principle and remains on the level of principles that can be 
known a priori to be binding. For as Kant says, "Right is therefore the sum. of 
the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of 
another in accordance with a universal law of freedom. "22 This law of freedom 
dictates our duty and as such. right is not some separate realm for Kant, it is a 
further fotmulation of a context based on the theory .ef duty. 23 
What then-is the object of duty with regard· to th.e realm of the 
political? Very simply stated. Kant aclvocates that moral ·individwds come 
togethei' ,to form a nation• order to protect their freedom, because 
however well disposed and law-abiding ,men might: be, .it still lies 
a priori in the rational Idea of such a condition ( one that is not 
rightful) that befont: a public lawful condition is establishcdp 
individual men, peoples, and states can never be secure against 
violence from one another, since each has its owrt•right·todo 
what seems right and good to it ... 24 
That is, moral agents are required to leave the state of nature and enter into 
the civil commonwealth. This is required since the rights that are nevertheless 
22MM 230, '(Gregor 56): .. 
23See the ·"'Introductio'n to the Metiiphysics of ·Morals".',• specifically section 
one, and the "Introduction to the Doctrine of Right" in The Metaphysics of 
Morals. for a detailed discussion of rignt as a reflection of freedom and &cc 
choice. KgS, VI, 211-214 (Gregor, 40-43) and Mary Gregor, "Kant's Theory 
of Property,,. Revie\v of Metaphysics, 41 (June 1988) 7 65ff. 
24MM, 312 (Gregor, 124). 
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present in a natural state have no means for protection. That is, when conflict 
arises, there is no· arbiter present to settle disputes. Hence when disputes 
arise, there is no means through which we are able to guarantee that the rights 
based on freedom will be respected and upheld. Thus as human moral agents, 
we "ought above all else to enter a civil condition. "25 This required formation 
of a nation is brought about as the practice of duty. In this instance, the 
practice of duty is determined by its form as determined by the principles of 
civil right manifested in a civil constitution. The bringing about of a nation is 
required, and moral agents can be brought out of their state of nature by force, 
if they are not willing to fulfill the requirement of the law. 
Kant's argument stresses that a civil state is the only form that a nation 
may take, if it is to be grounded in the moral law. This civil state is arguably 
the highest good since it is that end, as practice, which follows from the theory 
that is duty. As the practice of duty, the civil state is an end that is required 
by the civil realm of moral life. This embodiment of the highest good consists 
of a unique type of contract that establishes the civil state, based on the law 
based on theory, that follows from duty, our civil right. 
The civil contract has some of the properties of common contracts, 
"Uniting many for some ( common) end (that they all have)," but it is unique 
25lbid., 312 (124). 
since it also acts 
as an end in itself ( that each of them ought to have) and, 
consequently as an end that is an unconditioned and primary 
duty with respect to every external relation in general among 
men.26 
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Thus the pursuit of this contract is required for the establishment of duty's 
object relative to right in the form of the civil state. Like the non-contentious, 
traditional understanding of the highest good, where the individual as a sole 
moral agent must not act to pursue her happiness alone, but act out of duty, 
the society must act from duty as well. This duty takes the form of an ought 
based on the civil law. This object of the law, the civil state, is the 
manifestation of the theory that gives us civil right. The means for the 
satisfaction of the contract establishing the civil state consists in the pursuit of 
a Republican Constitution embodying: 1 )the freedom, of human beings, 2 )the 
role of the subjects as equal, while being dependent on legislators, and 3 )the 
concept of a citizen, as wholly independent and equal. 27 
With regard to the practice of duty ( as the highest good) consisting of 
happiness in profX)ttion to virtue, this formulation serves that end. The civil 
commonwealth guarantees happiness insofar as ,tt allows for the equal pursuit 
of happiness (and virtue) .. However, it does not establish the pursuit of 
26TTP, 289 (71} I • 
2lTTP, 290 (Humpluey; 72) and PP, 350fn (Humphrey, 112). 
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happiness as a ground for the establishment of the commonwealth. Instead, 
what is stressed is the basis of the commonwealth on the rights of freedom; 
rights that are secured for everyone through the establishment of the 
commonwealth by law. 28 As such, civil right ensures the equal pursuit of 
happiness insofar as an environment based on the law is created. · Hence civil 
right leaves us with a necessary concern not only for our own well being, but 
also fur the relation of morality to the well being,of people in interactions~ In 
establishing a civil COll\JllOnwealth, we recognize that we ue pursuing the end 
determined by duty.s demand. This dcmandJor~tof duty is 
und.erstood1through, QUr appreciating that as we a1e given rights that follow 
fmm f'nredom,;they are grounded in freedom and allow for our happiness only 
insofar as we base the society' on the duty ,thatfollows from this freedom. 29 
Thus the high.est good when based on duty, reflccted in this context as 
28TrP, 290 (Humphrey, 72). 
29With ~ard to the formation of the state as guaranteeing happiness in 
proportion to worthiness to be happy, Kant explains: 
The pr~tion salus p-.blica suprrma civitatis lex est remains 
undiminished in value and esteem; but the [ aspect of the] 
public's well-being to receive.first consideration is precisely.that 
legal contract securing everyone's freedom through laws, that 
contract whereby each person remains at liberty to seek his 
happiness in any way he thinks best so long as he does not violate 
that universal freedom;Undcr law and, consequently, the rights of 
other fellow subjects.• 
Ibid., 298 (78). [De l"'hlic well-bmng is the highest law if the people]. 
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right, consists of a commonwealth that secures the pursuit of happiness in 
accord with conformity with right enacted through a civil constitution. 30 As 
such, Kant has defended the practice of duty, relative to the perspective of 
politics, from deteriorating into a Hobbesian "might makes right" civil state. 
His would be an empty moral theory if that was the world to which it would 
lead. Kant's practice based on duty in the form of the highest good 
emphasizes that a society united for the satisfaction of the desires of select 
individuals is not our goal. Such a society would not satisfy his theory, since 
its end would not be determined by dut.y~ 1he theory of duty, in the form of 
right, determines its practice in the form of the pursuit of a civil 
commonwealth.' This commonwealth, as determined by right is required to be 
pursued insofar as its establishment guarantees, as much as possible, freedom. 
In its fcmnation, based on a civil constitution, this object of duty has as its 
goal the greatest possible (pursuit of) happiness in conformity with right. 
At this point, it would be helpful to summarize our progress thus far. 
In the previous section I have argued that as a consequence of the practice of 
duty, moral agents are required to pursue the highest good, expressed relative 
. to a specific perspective, two of which have been addressed. From the first 
3°The civil commonwealth is the highest good manifested within this 
context. It is important to remember that any singular manifestation of the 
highest good taken in isolation is not the complete highest good, but rather a 
moment in the development towards the complete highest good 
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perspective, that of the individua1, moral agents are required to pursue what 
has been commonly known as the summum bonum. 31 From the second · 
perspective, that of the state, moral individuals are required to come together 
to-form civil commonwealths. Now that the possibility of a moral nation is 
establishecL I will discuss the next developmental move in the realization of 
the ,ethical commonwealth, this step is the consideration of the ,highest good 
from that ,of a moral people. In what follows; l will argue that this final step is 
comprised of the evolutionaiy developMcmts that arise from the unity of 
various nations. After which. I will present that way in which an drgani%ation 
of· nations works towards the agreement of morality and politics in an-ethical 
commomwalth based on perpetual peace. 32 
Moments: A People 
At this point, ·the discussion becomes ·somewhat more ·complex since it 
is oo longer present in one unified treatment or Kantian text. In this section, 
31See Chapters One and Two for a discussion of the traditional notion of 
the highest good as smmnum bonum (the combination of happiness in 
proportion to worthiness to be happy); that object the individual is 
· commanded by the law to pursue. 
, , , ~
2dt. should be pointed out here that Otap~r Three :represents Kant's social 
depiction of the highest good--as the ethical commonwealth. As the 
consummate articulation of the highest good, the ethical commonwealth is 
brought about "tluolilgh the previous section (a State )j but actually cor.reSf>onds 
to the section that follows ( a people). 
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using various Kantian texts, I will argue, that the progression from theory 
(duty-the moral law) to its practice (the highest good) that left us with the 
formation of the moral state, requires our pursuit of still another object. This 
is the case because those rights which were safeguarded through the 
establishment of a civil commonwealth are "up for grabs" in relations among 
nations. In order to safeguard that which has been secured by means of right 
in a nation, among nations and for the human race in general, inoral agents are 
required to fulfill their duty to pursue the establishment of an ethical 
commonwealth based.on perpetual peace. Thus, in what follows I will follow 
the progression of the moral state through to its fulfillment in relations of 
perpetual peace. · Once perpetual peace has been established, lwlll argue that 
moral agents art required to pursue yet another object of duty. That. is, they 
are required to leave their ethical state of nature and pursue that object which 
the law requires ·in the fo:rm of an ethical commonwealth. This. object is 
presented as a "universal republic based on laws of virtue". 33 
& a universal, virtuous republic, the ethical commonwealth is a 
complex commonwealth. It includes a large debt to morality insofar as it is 
. · based on virtue, but it also· includes a large debt to politics insofar as it is a 
commonwealth. "An ethical commonwealth must rest on public laws and 
33als einer allgemetnmRepllblik 1UICh Tugendgesetzen [REL, 98(Greene and 
Hudson 89)]. 
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possess a constitution based ·on these Jaws",34 hence the ethical commonwealth 
would not be such as it is without proper attention given to politics. That 1s, 
the ethical commonwealth _is the most complete manifestation of the highest 
good but its establishment is contingent upon the manifestation of the object 
of the theory of right, relative to the perspectives of intemational and 
cosmopolitan right. As will be shown in what follows, the ethical 
commonwealth has its politkal basis .in perpetual peace as the -highest 
manifestation of the object of theory appreciated from the perspective of right. 
For it is through perpetual peace that we am givm the po$Sibility of a, state of 
affairs where •moiality agrees with politics. Hence the task at hand is-to 
articulate the ethical commonwealth as the highest good ( the object of ,duty) 
through, which this final ~point, ·the consummation of virtue and 
happiness, is made complete. 
· I will present the. ethical commonwealth as the consummate articulation 
of the highest good by, of course, lmlding on the previous analysis. By 
building on the aforementioned, I will fil'st address the perspective of object of 
duty as :it is dnennined relative to the principles .of international and 
· cosmopolitan right. Kant treats these conceptions of right in both of the 
34Nar so fem 1ein ltlrischis gemeines Wesen doch auf iJffentlichm Gesetun beruhen 
u1Ul .. ·eb# ""1'4#/ $idi ~ Be,fassung enthalten mu.fl [Ibid., 96 ( 88)]. 
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essays Theory to Practice and Perpetual Peace.35 From there, with the formation 
of perpetual peace, we can move onto the plan Kant dictates in section three 
of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone in order to establish the 
bringing about of the ethical commonwealth. Finally, through the results of 
this analysis, begun in Theory to Practice, continued in Perpetual Peace and 
concluded in the R.eligum, the consummate articulation of the highest good in 
the formation of an ethical commonwealth based on perpetual peace will be 
made evident. 
With this in mind, we move on to the next development of the object 
of duty which Kant deals with in Theory to Practice. Here, in the section 
! 1 .. 1 
entitled On the Relationship of Theory to Practice in International Right, Considered 
from a Universal!, Philanthropic, i.e. Cosmopolitan Point of View, Kant addresses 
the object that is determined by duty relative to international right. That is, 
once moral individuals have come together out of their state of nature to form 
nations to have their conflicts adjudicated under the principle of right, Kant 
advocates that nations come together and unify under the concept of 
international right in order that their conflicts can be adjudicated as well. 
In this problem the only difference between the state of nature of 
individual men and of families (in relation to one another) and 
that of nations is that in the Right of Nations we have to take 
35They also receive helpful treatment relative to this task in Kant's work 
The Metaphysics of Morals. 
into consideration not only the relation of one state toward 
another as a whole, but also the relation of individual persons of 
one state toward the individuals of another, as well as toward 
another state as a whole. 36 
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By working towards a League of Nations we are able to address the problems 
that arise between individual nations which have established themselves under 
constitutional right, and those others that surround them. It is through the 
establishment of this object of duty as dictated from the perspective of 
international right that we further fulfill our obligations. For it is only 
through an association based on the concept of International Right ( the right 
of nations) that we are able to preserve the relations of right that have already 
; l 
been forged. This object dictated by international right Kant names as the 
"sole remedy" for the conflicts that arise between nations and which can 
eventually lead to war between nations. 37 
This object, dictated by duty from the perspective of international right 
consists in the formation of what Kant calls variously a "League of Nations", a 
"League of Peace", and a "World Republic". Thus the league of nations is 
dictated by duty as the object of international right. As dictated, its pursuit is 
required. Relative to the relations between nations, ( and no longer among 
individuals directed at the formation of nations), the moral end is no longer 
36MM, 344 (Gregor, 150). 
37TIP, 313 (Humphrey, 89). 
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dictated by constitutional right but by international right. As such, this end is 
dictated as an object of the law. As that object dictated by duty in the 
relations among nations, states are required to come together to work towards 
bringing about a league of nations, as "a rightful state of federation that 
conforms to commonly accepted [principle ofJ intermrtional right. 
· Hence· the highest good articulated as the object of duty in this context 
follows from right as we are morally required to pursue a· peaceful union 
among nations adjudicated by international right. ; Kant justifies the 
:requirement for the pursuit of peace amung·.nations as it allows for moral, 
progress. He purports, reasonably enc,up, that in a peaceful: nation, moral, 
agents are ootkr able to pursue moral progression and their personal 
betterment. Hence in a peaceful state, "succeeding generations ... will be able 
even m· a moral· sense to make ever more progress towards bettering 
themselves. "38 As such, this object is that organon providing the greatest 
Jbssible happiness ftiative to an organization of nations.. This is the case 
because in ·a league. of nations those· rights· achieved in the formation of 
nations are presclVed and not subject to acts ·of ·aggression. 
· ln·what. follows, I will demonstrate that in the essay PerpetualPeaa, 
Kant picks up on the themes he describes in Theory to Practice. That is, this 
38Jbid., 311'(88). 
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essay articulates a further development of the concrete program for bringing 
about the highest manifestation of the object of duty relative to right. Kant 
appropriates the model given in Theory to Practice and demonstrates that the 
republican constitution as it was developed in Theory to Practice is here 
understood as the only ground for perpetual peace. Without necessarily 
passing through this stage there would be no perpetual peace. That is, 
although the previous practices of duty are the consummate articulation of the 
highest good within their context, they are mere conditions for actual 
consummate articulation of the highest good context independent. As such, 
they are required as a developmental stage leading to tlw,highest good. This 
status as condition is clear in the establishment of the republican constitution, 
because 
Not only is a Republican Constitution pure in origin, whose 
source is the pure concept of right, it provides the only 
foundations of perpetual peace. 39. 
As we have seen,. after grounding his approach dictated by ·theory as ·it· is 
manifested in.constitutional right, Kant further characterizes the development 
of the enlightened people as ending up in a unity of states. This is the same 
. progressive Jl\Ovement that was discussed as a requirement of international 
right. 
/ 
391>P, 351 (Humphrey, 113). 
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Through the league of nations we are brought close to the actual 
culmination of the moral human race as it brings about perpetual peace. The 
pursuit of perpetual peace is only possible through the formation of the league 
of peace. 40 As such, its pursuit of ends required by duty as it is manifested 
from the point of view of the global realm of moral life can also be assessed 
from the perspective of cosmopolitan right. Through cosmopolitan right, .the 
perspective becomes that of the moral individual as a citizen of the world, 
thus combining the best aspects of all. three of the previously articulated 
political realms. 
Just as duty gave us the moral law as it was manifested from,the 
standpoint of the individual and then gave us constitutional right as it was 
manifested from the· standpoint of the state, we are now given cosmopolitan 
right as we are able to appreciate the ultimate $tandpoint of humanity. 
Through the recognition of cosmopolitan right, we are further impelled 
towards the formation of states based on a republican constitutipn interacting 
within a league of nations .(based on intemationalright), as .a precondition for 
perpetual peace as the highest end of the Kantian political system. For it is 
40
"0nly in a.universal association.of stlltes (analogous to that by which a 
people becomes a stat~) can.rights come to hold conclusivery and a true condition 
ojpeace a;>me about." Thus Kant presents "perpetual peace" [as], "the ultimate 
goal of the whole Right of Nations." 
See MM, 350 (Gregor, 156). 
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through perpetual peace that we are allowed to look for the appearance and 
genesis of the ethical commonwealth, where morality agrees with politics. 
However, with cosmopolitan right, this is taken further. 41 Reason can provide 
the way for related nations not to be at war or lawless through nations giving 
up their savage lawless freedom, just as individual persons do, and by 
accon)D'lodating 1thcmselves to the constraints of common law; establishing a 
nation <f pet,pl4s that will finally include all the,people of the earth. 42 This is the 
same notion of right that is tied to the formation of relations among nations 
relative td this: prlitciple of right. This same·~ t>f right is what drives 
the moral individual out ofhersolitude, into the· formation <:>f nations, 
towards 'What is ,tnbrally required, perpetual peace. However through 
cosmopolitan right, it evolves iir such a manner that it allows for the 
possibility of morality to enter the scene by way of an establishment of 
perpetual peace; 
Perpetual peace· is· not merely the condition of the possible ciessation of 
wars through the· republican constitution, for the·republican constitution can 
41With regard to Cosmopolitan Right, Kant says: 
; This right, since it has to do with the possible union of all nations 
with a view to certain universal laws for their possible commerce, 
can be called et>STnOpolitan Right (ius cosmopoliticum). 
Ibid., 350 (156). 
42Ibid., 357 ( l l 7J. 
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be brought about by a nation of devils held in check by their desires for trade 
and fear of punishment. 43 Perpetual peace as our "moral objective" goes · 
beyond the realms of politics and morality, arises as a consequence of its 
foundation in duty, and allows for the highest agreement of happiness in 
accord with virtue in this world in a law governed commonwealth: determined 
by right. As Kant says: 
... establishing universal and lasting peace constitutes not merely a 
part of the doctrine of Right but rather the entire final end of the 
doctrine •of Right within the limits of 1'¢ason alone ... 44 
This is the case among individual nations via a>nstitutional right., between 
nations in international right,. and· allowing·fm .. perpctua) peace via 
cosmopolitan right.45 
In going beyond the realms of the merely political and the merely moral 
and encompassing them both, perpetual peace includes another kind of 
commitment. This further commitment, required for the complete 
manifestation of perpetual peace is described by Kant in his work Religion 
Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Here, in describing the "founding of a 
kingdom of God on earth," Kant is describing in a more concrete way the 
43lbid., 366, (124). 
44Ibid., 355, (161). : 
45With regard to perpetual peace as a moral objective, see PP, 365 and 379 
(Humphrey, 123 and 133). 
162 
ethical aspect of the ethico-civil commonwealth made manifest through 
perpetual peace. As was previously mentioned, a peaceful state of affairs could 
be brought about by devils. However, true perpetual peace is the pre-
condition and reciprocal condition for the ethical commonwealth as a kingdom 
of god on earth. 46 Perpetual peace is then the possibility we are left with as 
the consummate culmination of the developments that have arisen out of each 
of the manifestations of the highest good relative .to right. 
As was previously mentioned, once perpeuul f>'8CC has been 
established, Kant explains that we are to pursue yet artOdler object, :relative to 
pMSCnCC of duty relative to the laws of virtue. This command of duty takes 
the following, form: 
Man ought to leave his Ethical State of Nature in order to 
become a Member of an Ethical Commonwealth. 47 
That is, just as the state of nature prior to the establishment of the civil state, 
and the establishment of the league of nations is one of war, so too is the 
4&fhe relationship of perpetual peace to the ethical commonwealth is 
· explicitly expressed as the former serving as a precondition of the latter. But, 
as will be discussed in Chapter Five, the establishment of the ethical 
commonwealth guarantees perpetual peace. In short, like so many other 
things, the connection between these two aspects is not simple. 
47Der Mensch soil aus dem ethischen Naturzustande berausgehen, um ein Glied eines 
ethischen gemeinen Wesens zu werden. [REL, 96 (Greene and Hudson, 88)]. 
163 
ethical state of nature. Here, as was discussed in Chapter Three, the good 
principle, which resides in all individuals, is continually attacked by the evil 
which is found in him and also in everyone else. Thus it is through the 
establishment of an ethical commonwealth that we are able to create an 
environment where the rights and morality that are not protected prior to this 
association are guaranteed. 
As was argued·•in Chapter Three, the ethical commonwealth was 
demonstrated to consist of Kant's social understanding of the highest good. 
Thus it is not nec.essary at this time to repeat those arguments. To summarize 
the conclusions of that chapter, the ethical co~ is the object of the 
law determinec1'by the laws of virtue (moral right), its pursuit is required, and 
it is the best means possihle' for the guarantee of happiness in proportion to 
virtue. Unlike the aforementioned objects of the law detennined·by duty 
relative.to· the·pnnciples of right, the ethical commonwealth does not ·require a 
justificatory explanation of its status as the highest good. This is the case 
since Kant explicitly states that the ethical oonunonwealth is the object of 
duty. as ~ highest. good. . In short~ as Kant himself says, "The species of 
. rational beings is objectively, in w idea of reason, destined for a social goal, 
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namely, the promotion of the highest as a social good. "48 
lnstead,of demonstrating that the ethical commonwealth is a 
manifestation of duty's object relative to moral right, I will demonstrate how it 
is the consummation of the highest good in this developmental plan. That is, 
we have ·shown how individuals must come together to form states, and states 
must come together to form a league of peace, and this league of peace must 
work towards ·petpetual peace. Thus it is only left to consider how the league 
of peace, based on international and cosmopolitan• right must serve as•the basis 
for the ethicalcommonwalth. Once this point is .established; the ,mbnination 
of the developmental plan will be! complct:e, and the various understandings of 
via the ethical common\\lCalth. 49 
It is ·the wk of the ethical commonwealth ~rationally to impress these 
laws (of virtue) in all t.neir'scope upon the entire human race. "50 This is a duty 
48/ede Gattung-verntlnftigtt Wesen ist nrlmlich objecttv; in der Idet der Vernujt, zu 
einem gemeinschaftlichen Zwecke, nilmlich der Be,forderung des hochsten als eines 
gemeinschaftlichiii Guts, bemmmt.· [Ibid., 97 .(89)]. · 
491be actual form of the ethical commonwealth relative to Kant's 
understanding of the one true church will be explicated in Chapter Five. That 
is, once the ethical commonwealth is established as the consummate 
articulation of virtue and happiness, we will go on to discuss the details of its 
construction. 
~L, 94 (Greene and Hudson, 86). 
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and is accomplished insofar as the ethical commonwealth consists of moral 
individuals coming together under moral right, for the formation of society. 
"And so far as these laws are public, an ethico-civil (in contrast to a juridico-civil) 
society or an ethical commo11:wealth" is formed. 51 In its formation, the ethical 
commonwealth builds on the aforementioned conceptions of the highest good. 
This is the case insofar as the ethical commonwealth has its basis in the 
political commonwealth; ccindeed, unless it is based upon mch a 
commonwealth it can never be brought into existence by man. "52 The ethical 
state, must have asits·basis t.Mesubtishment! bylaw, of the minimum 
criterion of freedom as it is dictated by right. ' Through'the civil state (the1 
object of right➔,·we havecmated\S1JCh:a·situation.ofindiviGlua:ls•united under 
laws, based on:.their status as citizens of the· state. This status as citizen must 
be·prcserved in the establishment of the ethical commonwealth:· That is, the 
constitution and form·of the ethical commonwealth 
shall contain nothing which. contradicts the duty of its members 
as citizens of the state--although when the ethical pledge is of the 
genuine sort the political limitation need cause no anxiety. 53 
Thus the ethical ·commonwealth must be based on·the prior development of 
51lbid. 
52lbid. 
53lbid., 95 (88). 
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the object of duty, as it was determined from the perspective of right, by 
means of perpetual peace. And, as was previously shown, the association of 
individuals organized into a civil commonwealth is a precondition for 
perpetual peace. This precondition is made manifest as a requirement of the 
law, in bringing about the highest good (as the civil commonwealth) from the 
perspective ofthe state or politics. Consequently, all of the prior stages 
contribute to the development of the manifestation of the ethical 
commonwealth. 
The final form of an ethical ooD\mOnwealth is an ethical whole. That is, 
what we.VI/CM ldt with in perpetual peace is.the league of nations where each 
society rehttive Oite'to another, and amengst its m.ethhers can be represented as 
in the ethical scite -of natute. That is, when a league of nations is formed 
under the doctrine·of iri.ternational right, pe~ is established, but not based 
on laws of virtue. It is as if we have peace by force rather than peace by 
conversion through the sovereignty of the good principle preseIVed via the 
ethical commonwealth. Even with the addition of cosmopolitan right, we are 
still dealing with right and that means for its presetVation in external coercion 
.. and not internal legislation. This is the situation with separate political states 
which have united through a public international law, but not through the 
laws of virtue. However, when a people comes together under the laws of 
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virtue we have the ethical commonwealth, which is not merely based on 
perpetual peace, but guarantees perpetual peace, not externally, but by virtue 
of its establishment through the law of virtue. 
Such, therefore, is the activity of the good principle, unnoted by 
human eyes but ever continuing--erecting for itself in the human 
race, regarded as a commonwealth under laws of virtue, a power 
and kingdom which sustains the victory over evil and, under its 
own dominion, assures the world of an eternal peace. 54 
The ethical commonwealth thus goes beyond the understanding of perpetual 
peace as its precondition, and bec<>mes its guarantor. 1lu1s" ~ough the 
analyses begun in Th«,ry to Prt.U:tiee and Perpenu,l Peace, then completed in 
Religion Within the Limits ofJeefiOO JJ.onc;, W¢, are able to see tbe 
concretiz•tion of~. culmination of the. high~st good through the ethical 
common~alth based on perpetual peace. This \.lQ.derstanding of the highest 
good takes us beyond the facile understanding of Kant's ethics as merely 
deontological toward a rich understanding of the deontological ethic with an 
eye for teleology requiring social and political philosophy for its completion. 
It leaves us with the ethical commonwealth based on perpetual peace and a 
perpetual peace based on the ethical commonwealth. 
54Das ist also die menschlichen Augen unbemerste, aber bestilndigfortgehende 
Bearbeitung des guten Princips, sich im menschlichen Geschlechtals einem gemeinen 
Wesen nach Tugendgesetzen eine,Macht und ein eich zu errichten, welches den Sieg uber 
das Bose behauptet und unter seiner herrschaft der Welt einen ewigen Frieden zusichert. 
[Ibid., 122 (114)]. . 
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To conclude, the above ana1ysis has demonstrated that there is a 
tripartite developmental plan that culminates in the supreme articulation of 
the highest good, the ethical commonwealth. In so doing, the ethical 
commonwealth integrates many of the understandings of the highest good. 
This occurs as a consequence of the various perspectives through which the 
highest good must be made manifest in order for the ethical commonwealth to 
be achieved. In short, this leaves us with an understanding of the highest good 
that consists of complementary, rather than competing interpretations insofar 
as these interpretations have been shown to contribute to the realization of 
the consummate articulation of the highest good-the ethical commonwealth 
based on perpetual peace. The next chapter addresses the way in which this 
consummate articulation of the highest good is made manifest. 
I 
CHAPTER5 
KANT'S KINGDOM OF GOD ON EARTH: 
THE ETHICAL COMMONWEALTII AND 
ITS CONSEQUENCES 
Having previously determined that the highest good has a different face 
contingent upon the perspective from which it is being approached, it is time 
to approach its best face. This consists of the consummate articulation of the 
) '. ,' '} 
highest good, the ethical commonwealth, based on the concept of perpetual 
peace. As was determined in Chapter Three, the ethical commonwealth is 
Kant's social highest good. As was determined in Chapter Four, the ethical 
commonwealth is the most complete articulation of the highest good. In what 
,,•.;(., 
follows, I will consider how it is that this consummation of the moral law in 
the world is to be brought about, concretely. That is, it has been established, 
relative to the aforementioned developmental plan, that it is a duty of the 
human race sui generis to pursue the ethical commonwealth based on perpetual 
peace, but how is it that once this stage of development has been attained, the 
·1 • 
ethical commonwealth is actually to be made manifest. 1 In this chapter, I will 
, , ~See REL 95/96 (~ne ari.d Hudson, 88/89). 
~ '\ \ 
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articulate: what the ethical commonwealth is like, how we bring it about, and 
whether the ethical commonwealth is to be hoped for or expected. It is my 
position that Kant answers these questions primarily in his work Religion 
Within the IJmits pf Reason Alone, and secondarily in his work The Conflict 
of the Faculties. From a careful analysis of these works, I will argue: I) the 
ethical commonwealth is demonstrated to be a people of God under laws of 
virtue,. 2 )the ethical commonwealth is pursued by means of humanity's 
organization in a church, and 3)the ethical commonwealth is to be hoped for 
or, opectted insofar .as we make ourselves morally worthy of God's assistance in 
the formation of His (Kant's pronoun) kingdom.2 •.These are•tht concerns I 
will take up in what.follows~ 
After further describmg•and examining the ethical commonwealth by 
dealing with the above, the only aspect of the project left to be pursued· is the 
relationship of this undcrst2nding of the highest good to the contemporary 
literature on the highest good. Throughout this study, p:re9ent in the 
background, has been a dissatisfaction with contemporary interpretations of 
~ highest, good. These approaches are inadequate in that they are 
problematic. I consider these approaches problematic insofar as they do not 
, . 
2For instan~ ~£ ~f,s, use. of a ~e p~noun for God, see the 
Religion, from the Introduction to the Conclusion. See especially footnote 
eight and Book Three of the &ligion. 
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recognize, or do not completely recognize the nature of the highest good as 
comprised of developmental moments which culminate in the ethical 
commonwealth based on perpetual peace. Thus with a complete 
understanding of the ethical commonwealth in place in the first half of this 
chapter, I will conclude the chapter with an analysis of the repercussions of my 
overall approach on contemporary Kantian .scholarship as it relates to the 
highest good • 
. · In short, as has been previously mentioned, it is my view that the 
contemponuy scholarship on the highest good:.approaches the object of pure 
practical reason iA a INMer that is ~ither misguided and mistaken or in a 
manner that is isolationist and·cxclusive~ In the second half of this chapter, I 
will. mtet the texts of the cont.empQrary• critics and commentators on the 
highest good ,and in so doing demonstrate their short.comings while· at the 
same · time demonstrating the merits of ,the tripartite developmental 
intetpretation of the hlghat·good with which ·this project has ll>een concerned. 
What is the Ethical Commonwelath? 
I li~ve p~otlsly tstablished. that tl\e ethical commonwealth 1s social~ 
and that if is required for the overcoming of evil. How and why this is the 
:; ',.·i ' , ''/ ·. ' 
~ w~ 1treat~d in Chapter three. Now I will address how it is that the 
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ethical commonwealth appears. Relative to its importance in his system, Kant 
treats the ethical commonwealth relatively briefly. A detailed treatment of the 
ethical commonwealth is contained in the third book of Religion Within the 
Limits:of Reason Alone: and is summarized 1n what follows. 
Before approaching the ethical commonwealth, it is important to 
remember. the lessons learned from Chapter Four. That is, it is only when 
humanity is:prepared to come out of its ethical state of nature that humanity 
is able to begin to progress towatds the ethical commonwealth. This is the 
case only when humanity has :made suffldem progress towatd the ,highest 
politkal good. This hlgheSt political good is,• of c.'!OtU'Se, perpetual :peare. 3 In 
Chapter Thtte l discussed how it was that humanity is impelled to pursue the 
ethical commonwealth· and ,in Chapter Four I disrussed how it is that 
humanity is impelled to leave hi5 ethical state of nature. Y ct once the ethical 
state of nature has been left, whett are we to•go?•:Kant explains, by giving 
some conteM. to the notion of an ethical commonwealth and to the means to 
its formation; as he says! "1be concept of an Ethical Coirtmonwealth is the 
3See Chapter Four for a discussion of the relationship between perpetual 
peace and the ethical commonwealth. For a discussion of perpetual peace as 
Kant's highest political goo4, see MM, 355 (Gregor, 161). In short, Kant 
refers to. perpetual peace as the highest political good. Yet p0litical is only 
that perspective ftom whidl th¢ highest good relative to right, both civil and 
international, is .•perceived. . Hence in calling perpetual ·pc8;Ce the highest 
political good, Kant stresses that perpetual peace is a manifestation of the 
higN!St good ~ative to the perspective of the principle of right (politics). 
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Concept of a PEOPLE OF GOD under Ethical Laws. "4 There are two major 
issues contained within this statement. First, the notion of what is entailed by 
the claim that those in an ethical commonwealth are "a people of God" and 
secondly, to what extent is a people of God "under ethical laws"?. In 
explaining these two notions, that of the ethical commonwealth as a people of 
God and that of those very same people of God as governed by the laws of 
duty, a full picture of Kant's ethical commonwealth will appear. 
Kant explains how it is that an ethical commonwealth is a people of 
God through differentiating the ethical commonwealth;from the juridical 
commonwealth. The jwidical commonwealth for:Kant has as its keystone the 
people giving themselves the law. That is •.. 
... if the commonwealth to be established is to be juridical, the 
mass of people uniting itself into a whole would itself have to be 
the law-giver ( of constitutional laws), because legislation proceeds 
from the principle of limiting the jredom '!f lllCh to tlwse conditions 
under which, it can be consistent with the freedom tf everyone else 
accurding to a common law, and because, as a result, the general will 
sets up an external legal control. 5 
What makes this commonwealth itself juridical is that the law is legislated 
extemally, and enforced extemally. This organization would not suffice for 
4This is the title of section three of the third book of the Religion. 
Der &g,ff tmes ethischen gemnnen Wesens ist der Beg,ff von einem Volke Gotta 
unter ethischen Gesetze. [REL, 98 (Greene and Hudson, 90)]. 
5lhid., 98/99 (90). 
174 
the ethical commonwealth because moral actions cannot be legislated 
externally. Once legislated externally, actions complied with under these 
restrictions are merely legal and not moral, since a moral action is one that 
takes place freely, not through coercion. That is, Kant is interested in the 
formation of an ethical commonwealth-free from coercion, not a juridical or 
civil commonwealth-governed by means of coetcion. This ethical 
commonwe~th is :a commonwealth with its underlying principle being the law 
of virtue and not merely the law of the land, ·or right. Thus in the 
cstahlishment of an ethical commonwealth, ·Kant explains: 
•.. if the commonwealth is to be: ethiettl, the people, as a people, 
cannot itseH be regarded as the law-giver. For in such a 
common.wealth 0 all :the laws are expressly designed to promote the 
morality of actions (which is something inner, and hence cannot be 
, ,subject te·public,human laws) whet~•, mcon1!l'8St, ·these public 
laws-and this would go to constitute a juridical commonwealth-
are ,~cd only tm,ard, the legliltty of actions, which meets the 
eye, and not toward the (inner) morality, which alone is in 
·question here. 6 · ··,' · 
As opposed to "the people" being regarded as the giver of the laws as in a 
state, the ethical commonwealth is a union of people under moral laws. Yet it 
is not enough that "the people" give up the right to be the source of the law. 
They must take a further step insofar as they recognize that what has 
previously been only an inner law ( of morality) must be submitted to as public 
61bid., 98 (90). 
legislation, under a law-giver that the entire community may regard as the 
giver of the law. Thus as a commo~wealth, 
... all single individuals must be subject to a public legislation, and 
all the laws which bind them must be capable of being regarded 
as commands of a common law-giver. 7 
175 
Hence as a commonwealth, the ethical commonwealth requires its constituents 
to be subject to its laws, and as not merely concerned with legality, their 
source cannot come from the people. ff the laws were to emanate from the 
ptt>ple as law-giver, their status would. be human laws.(• civil laws), and 
thereby 'subject to enforcement by means of· coercion: Yet external public 
enforcement of laws eannotservc as the ground for.moral action. This is the 
case since moral ·action must come from the individual's commitment to 
morality itself and not to her commitment to the mere legality of her action. 
Thus the origin of the law..giver must lie elsewhere than in the constituents of 
the•ethical commonwealth. 
· It has been established that the laws under which the ethical 
commonwealth is ruled are laws of virtue. Yet who is to be the giver of these 
laws-the sovereign of the commonwealth? As the ''public law-giver " of the 
ethical rommonwcalth, this sovereign cannot be the source of these laws. 
7 
sp musse,z. alk Einulne einer iJffentlichen Gesetzgebung unterwoifen werden, und alle 
Gesetze, welche jene verbindm, mussen als Gebote eines gemeinschaftlichen Gesetzgebers 
angesehen werllen kiJnnen. [Ibid.]. 
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Rather, the highest law-giver of the ethical commonwealth must be that one 
for whom "all true duties, hence also the ethical, must be represented as at the 
same time his commands. 118 Kant determines that God is the only possible 
sovereign that would fit this criterion. In determining that God is the ethical 
law..giver, the law cannot be thought of as emanating originally merely from 
the will of this superior being, for then they would not be ethical laws and the 
duty proper to them would not be the free duty of virtue, but the coercive 
duty of law insofar as ,the .laws would then be. supei'llatural and external to 
human beings. Instead, the sovereign is subject to the laws himself, he must 
' . 
submit to them as well as have them be his commands. 
This law..giver must also have other important qualities. He ( again, the 
pronoun Kant uses), must be able to plumb the depths of the human 
disposition in order to ascertain the individual's true motives and thus whether 
or not the good or the evil principle has sovereignty within the individual's 
disposition. Furthermore, the moral ruler must be able to guarantee that "each 
" 
receives whatever his actions are worth. "9 This ability for discernment and 
reward is Kant's criterion for a ruler in eve:ry commonwealth. However, with 
• the ethical commonwealth, the stakes are much higher. For in this case, the 
8Ibid., 99 ( 90/91). 
~ktt 99,(91). 
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discernment consists of the status of the individual's moral disposition as good 
or evil (not the legality of their action), and the reward consists of the 
individual's actual happiness (not the right to the equal pursuit of happiness). 
Hence the only possible sovereign in this instance and for this commonwealth 
is God, as God guarantees the rewards for the virtuous and for the virtuous 
common'Wl!alth.: 
... this is,the,concept of.God as moral ruler of the world Hence 
an ethical commonwealth can be thought of only as a people 
under divine command, i.e., as a ptt1ple if God, arid indeed under 
laws of virtue. IO 
Thus those in an ethical commonwealth are a people under God. This is so 
since God is the moral ruler of the world. They are a people under divine 
command, as well as a people under laws of virtue. Thus with God as the ruler 
of the ethical commonwealth, the commonwealth retains its status as a 
commonwealth, insofar as it requires a ruler and its members are subject to a 
public legislation. This ruler can be regarded as the source of legislation for 
l , 
the law, however this ruler cannot at the same time be regarded as the source 
of the law. The crucial difference in this distinction lies in the fact that the 
ruler of the commonwealth does not create the law, he commands the law, but 
the law arises elsewhere, independently of him. Thus the people of the ethical 
19.Al,o 1st ein ethisches gemeines We.wt nur ais ein Volk imter gtJttlidren Gdl«m, 
d. i. ttls tin Volk Gottes, uml z:war nach Tugendgesetzen, z,, dmken moglich. [Ibid.]. 
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commonwealth are under God insofar as He is the sovereign of the 
commonwealth, but they are under ethical laws, as the laws that ground God 
as the ruler of the commonwealth, insofar as the commands that emanate from 
God, emanate from duty. 
In a civil commonwealth the laws emanate from "the people 
themselves" (externally), in order that the individual people may submit 
themselves to the command of the ruler, insofar as he is a servant of the law 
and not a random despot. In an ethical commonwealth, although the laws do 
not emanate from "the people" as law-giver, the laws are present and known to 
the individual people (internally). It is in this manner that they too are able · 
to submit themselves to the law, as it can be regarded as having divine rule as 
the source of its legislation. In this way, God is the legislator of the law and 
not merely a despotic ruler or source of the law. 11 Thus as the agent of duty's 
legislation, God is at the same time a servant of the moral law. Laws of 
virtue, although public, are not legislated externally. Their power comes from 
their presence in the internal moral sense of individual people. Yet as 
legislated, they can be recognized to be contained within the commands of a 
. divine legislator for whom all true duties are at the same time this divine 
11:Kant is anxious to stress that God is not above the moral law, as 
witnessed in his scathing critique of the call of Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. See 
CON, 63 (Gregorll5) and REL, 187 (Greene and Hudson, 175). 
legislator's commands. 12 
For it is not a question here of a civil (political) government 
keeping the people under discipline, but of a government which 
has as its end the essence of this people's moral attitude of will 
(hence, a divine government). 13 
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God is the ruler of this divine government, which has as its end the correct 
internal setting of the will. Consequently, people are not to be externally 
forced to comply with the law, since that would leave us with a civil or 
juridical commonwealth, where actions conform to the law but need not spring 
from it. Rather, the people are to be compelled to internally have the law as 
the ground or source of their actions, thereby working to form God's kingdom 
on earth. 
To summarize, the ethical commonwealth looks like a political 
. ' . ~ ) 
commonwealth insofar as it has public laws, yet it is different insofar as it has 
a different law-giver. Unlike the political commonwealth where "the people" 
is the law-giver, the ethical commonwealth has God as its law-giver. God is 
not the source of the law, but rather its legislator. Thus the ethical 
commonwealth has its laws publicly legislated with their legislation centered in 
God. As such, this commonwealth is established as ethical and not juridical 
12REL, 99 (Greene and Hudson, 90/91). 
13
.De,,n IS ist hiu nicht von einer burgerlichen, das Volk unter Disciplin haltenden 
(politischen ), sondern einer auf da.s lnnere der moralischen Gessinnung abzweckenden 
(mithin giittlichen) regienmg die &lie. [CON, 67 (Gregor, 123)]. 
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because its goal is something inner, namely morality. In working toward the 
morality of its members, the ethical commonwealth seeks that its constituents 
recognize their own inner moral law as that same law publicly legislated by 
means of God as the divine ruler of this "republic under laws of virtue, i.e., a 
people of God. 14 
The Establishment of the Ethical Commonwealth 
The ethical commonwealth is an organization of which God is the ruler. 
It is in this; sense termed a "people of God". In adclitlon, God as well as the 
membet5 of the commoffl'fflllth recogmtt·the veracity of the moral law. The 
oommoriwealth is in this sense "under ethical laws ,(laws of virtue)". 15 With 
this established, I will •now move on to our second concern, that is, now that it 
is understood what it means to be a people under·God and at the same time 
under ethical laws, how is this state to be brought about. In his own words, in 
the title to the fourth section Gf this third book, Kant asserts, " The Idea of a 
People of God can be Realized (through Human Organization) only in the 
14einer Rlpubli/c unter Tugendgesetzen, ti i.. mit einer Volke Gottes, {REL, 100 
(Greene and,Hudson,.91)]. / ·. 
1%r the source of these quotes, see footnote number three. 
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Form of a Church. "16 It is here that he discusses what in actuality human 
moral agents must· accomplish in order for the ethical commonwealth (people 
under God) to be brought about. In short, the way in which the ethical 
commonwealth is to be made manifest consists in the establishment of a 
church. Thus, to work t(:)Wards the ethical commonwealth is to work towards 
bringing about a church. Cdnsistatt with this is the organization of humanity 
as a divine commonwealth under God as the divine moral ruler of this 
kingdom., 
For· Kant, the church providts the organizatbaalframework for 
bringing Ao fruition the ethical commollWCalth. This.eeonsists in bringing 
about what exists as a·"mc:re,idea ofthc union of alttbe-righteous under direct 
and moral divine world govcmment"·17 .~ real and concrete in the world.· That 
is, we are obligated to bring about in the world what exists as a mere idea, 
insofar as the idea scnres u the "archetype of what is to be ·established by 
men."18 . What this atchetype represents, Kant tefll\S the "invisible dlurch" 
which.in its heing brought about consists of the ~blc church", As the 
16Die [dee eines Volks Gottes ist (unter menschlicher Veranstaltung) nicht anders als 
in der Fohn eintr'Kirche hJzujuhmr: [REL; 100 (Greene and Hudson, 91)]. 
· 
17 eine ·bwfle ldei ·von tier V ereinigung al'ler Rechtschajfenen unter der gottlichen 
unmitklbaren,, 11#1" tnoraaschm Weltr~ng. wie sie jtder 11t1n Mmschm zu stiftenden 
mm, Urhilde dimt. {Ibid., l O l (92)]. 
~-
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visible church, whose form is dictated by the invisible church, the visible 
church represents the way in which the actual union of moral individuals can 
come to represent the ideal of the ethical commonwealth. 19 Kant gives very 
little attention to this distinction between the invisible and the visible church. 
In·thc glancing mention of the distinction that he does make, it would seem 
~tit: is through the invisible church as archetype that we are able t(>. perceive 
what it 'is,that could be brought about with Goers assistance. As mere ·human 
beings, we are, at our best, only able ;to bring about the visible church. This 
visible church' as a creation of out limited human .abilities a the· best that we 
can do, and it ism.small task. Although,a ~seooNIJ>est~,:dle visiblechurch is 
that means through whim we are ;able to make oumelvcs :\'VOtthy of, God's 
assistance and hctnce hope for the completion of the ethical commonwealth in 
its form deteffllined by. the· archetype .of ·the invisible qw.rc:h. 20 
Once Kant establishes the status of the visible church· as following from 
the invisible church, he articu.1at.es its specifics. .These speaftcs.consist of the 
way in which the church.·is to be organized and the principles·upon which it is 
to be based. These basic organizing principles perform a similar role to that 
of a constitution in a political commonwealth. As a church, what Kant terms 
19See Chapter Two for a discussion of the relationship between an 
archetypal and an ectypal object. ' 
JOJlEL, 100 .(Greene and Hudson, 92). 
the "true (visible) church", that which serves as the organon of the ethical 
commonwealth, the visible church must take a certain form. This form 
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consists of certain requirements as criteria to which the church must conform. 
I have included these requirements verbatim because each of them is of great 
importance as·it fllls'in the specifics of how the true visible church is to 
appear. In addition, these criteria are those conditions which must be fulfilled 
in order for the,visible church to serve as the vehicle for the achievement of 
the ethical commonwealth. They consist of the following:21 
I. Univmali~ -and hence its munerical oneness; for 
which it must possess this characteristic, that, although 
divided, and ,at variance·· in unessential .opinions, it is,none 
the less, with respect to its fundamental intentions, 
fourtded upon basic prirtctples as must necessarily lead to a 
general unification in a single church ( thus, no sectarian 
divisions) .. 
2. Its nature (quality); i.e., puriry, union under no 
tnotivating forces other than moral ones (purified of the 
stupidity of superstition and the madness of fanaticism). 
3. Its relation under the principle ofJrtllimn; both 
the internal relations of its members to one another, 
and thc·e:xtemal relations of the church to political 
power -- both relations as in a republic (hence neither 
a himmihy, nor an ilhmiinatism, which is a kind of 
21Kant himself introduces these requirements as follows: 
The true (visible) church is that which exhibits the (moral) 
kingdom of God on earth so far as it can be brought to pass by 
men. The requirements upon and hence the tokens of, the true 
church are the following: 
Die wahre (sichtbare) Kirche ist diejenige, welche das (moralische) Reich Gottes au/ 
Erden, so viel es durch · Menschen geschehen k.ann, darstellt. Die E,fordernisse, mithin 
auch llie Kmnzeidtm 4er wahren Kirche sindfolgende: [Ibid., 101 (92)l 
democrary through special inspiration, where the 
inspiration of one man can differ from that of 
another, according to the whim of each). 
4. Its modality, the unchangeableness of its constitution, yet 
with the reservation that incidental regulations, concerning 
merely its administration, may be changed according to time 
and circumstance; to this end, however, it must contain 
within itself a priori (in the idea of its purpose) settled 
principles. (Thus [it operates] under primordial laws, once 
[for all] laid down, as it were out of a book of laws, for 
guidance; not under arbitraty symbols which, since they 
lack authenticity, are fortuitous, exposed to contradiction, 
and changeable. 22 
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Kant enumerates these four criteria as the ~ems of the true visible 
chw:dt in order to estahlish the content of that for which we should st.rive. 
Through expanding and ana.lyzing these four cri~ l will demonstrate why it 
is that Kant.develops these as the criteria for the establishment of the one true 
church,. and bow it is that the orte truei church comes .~ut. Kant himself 
gives relatively little attm.tion to these criteria other than in their mere 
statement. For him, the truth of tM true dturch being based on these criteria 
as· they establish a religion based on the moral principle of reason :was 
apparently self-evident and required little or no explanation. For our purposes 
some explanation is required, since it is through a mligion that is-universal 
(requirement #1), moral (#2), follows from freedom (#3), and is basedon a 
priori principles (#4), that we are able to work towards the establishment of 
22Ibid., 101/102 (93). 
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the true church which serves as the organon for the ethical commonwealth. 
The true visible church has its basis in what Kant calls pure religious 
faith. Thus pure religious faith shares the above four requirements since they 
are the organizing principles of the true church, which is based·on this faith. 
Kant uses the terms true church and moral/rational/religious faith almost 
interchangeably. This is not too great a surprise since both constructs serve as 
the means for establishing the ethical commonwealth. 23 Throughout this 
section of Book Three l<Ju\t is seeking to establish what.can serve as the 
bringing about .(or basis) for a kingdom of God (the ethical· commonwealth). 
This is accompllslwd through establishing the· organization that will: serve this 
end,. just as agovcmment provides the organization that seeks to establish and 
secure a civil commonwealth. The establishment ;Of the ethical · 
commonwealth~ including God· as the moral law..giver and sovereign takes form 
in the establishment of the true church. The true chtnd\ is ·based on 
religio\W'mor:il/rational faith ,as. a requirement for its,bcing brought about. 
Thus it is through faith that the church is founded. 
Kant demonstrates in his first requirement that the church, with its 
basis in pure religious faith, must be universal. It must be this way for all to 
23Throughe>1,1t Book Three of the Religion Kant conflates. these terms, see 
especi;dlyy REL, 100-103 (Greene and Hudson, 90-95). In what follows I will 
merely accept Kant's use of these terms without questioning whether or not he 
is cottect.to equate.them. 
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share in the faith and thereby in the church and the ethical commonwealth. 
As Kant says, "Pure religious faith alone can found a universal church; for only 
[such] rational faith can be believed in and shared by everyone. "24 It is this 
faith that is a rational faith that must be the basis of the church, since it would 
make no sense to, have the faith rooted in anything empirical, as that is· so 
impermanent: In·a typical Kantian manner, the origin of faith is not 
something supernatural, or even natural, but rational. As such, pure religious 
faith is in. no. way a>ntingent;_ it is p.ne jn its nature (Kant's second 
rcqw.rement), and rncmd. llootcd in -~n, this rati:QNI faith grants no one 
individual or group special access to faith, :it•is-~ the case 1ihat "the 
inspiration of one man,can,diffe1tfrom that of another, according to the whim 
of each. "2•5 Thus as it is ,rooted in tMson and grounded in moral purity, Kant 
stres,es the rway in which this pure rdigious faith is a moral rational faith. 
: • ._ . As a rational, moral faith, ~ religious faith must also be rooted. in 
frectdom and based on a priori priociples. In its being universal, a rational 
faith is not based on anything that is contb\gen.t. As such, it is able to be 
recognized in .all individuals through their cognizance Gf how it rings true with 
24Dtr teine Religumsglaube ist zwar der, welchu al/tin eine allgemeine Kirehe 
grunden kann: weil er ein bwfler V ernunftglaube ist der sich jedermann zur Uberzeugung. 
mittheilen Ia.flt; [Ibid., 102 (94)]. 
25Ibid., I 02 (93 ). 
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their hearts. Kant addresses this point directly in The Conflict of the Faculties 
in his discussion of the way in which humans, merely in their being human, 
are able to be aware of God and the tenets of faith, as he says: 
since we cannot understand anyone unless he speaks to us 
through our own understanding and reason, it is only by concepts 
. · of our reason, in so far '5 they are pure inotal concepts and hence · 
infallible, that we can recognize the divinity of a teaching 
promulgated to us126 
Thus, God's teaching is equally accessible to everyone through their reason 
and not through anything empiriatl,(e.g. miracles, or appreciation of signs). 
Furthemore, as it els rooted in freedom, a pure religion relatts to its members 
and· the political organization with which it cooperates in a manner that can in 
no way tonstrain·its members~ As1 free, the pure moral faith is entered into 
from an·imemal decision' and not by means of extemal· coe:rdon; · 1 Freedom is 
recognized by·all in its priority for relations among individuals and thus this 
increases the·evidence that pure religion meets the criteria of universality. In 
addition, in being based on a priori conditions, such as universality, morality 
and freedom; a pure religion is not limited to being known only by those who 
have been .introduced and inculcated· into its rites. Instead, in being ·based on 
the above criteria, a pure faith can be "believed in and shared by everyone". 
After lauding the merits of a pure faith as the only basis of a ,people 
~N. 48 (Gregor, 85). 
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under God, Kant recognizes, that like the moral law, the pursuit of a pure 
moral faith, universal and based in reason, is very difficult for human beings in 
their imperfection to pursue. Instead of the pure moral faith, we are to aspire 
towards its pursuit as it takes form in a revealed faith. Kant calls such a faith 
ecclesiastical·faith. It is through ecclesiastical faith as a "concept of a religion 
of divine worship instead of the concept of a religion purely moral" that we 
are able to pursue the true church. Although the true church should be based 
on a moral rational faith; "by reason of a peculiar weakness ·of human nature, 
pure faith can never be ttlied-on as much as it dese:rws, that·.is, a church 
cannot be established on it alone. "27 
Human weakness as it requires the pursuit of moral rational faith by 
means of ecclesiastical faith is symptomatic -of the human condition insofar as 
we are not purely rational or purely moral. That is, we are not completely able 
to understand the,demands of the superscnsible .("Men are conscious of their 
inability to know supersensible things; ").28 H we were better able to perceive 
that which is required 'of our rational, moral selves, we would have no need for 
ecclesiastical faith as a medium to pursue the rsational. Moral individuals, 
27Allein es ist eine besmulere Schwllche der menschlichen Natur daran Schuld, daf, 
auf jenen reine Glauben niemaJs so viel gerechnet werden kann, als er wohl verdient, 
nllmlich eine KiTche •uf ihn allein zu griinden. [REL, I 03 ( Greene and Hudson 
94)]. 
28Ibid., 103 (94). 
according to Kant, are unable to accept that moral conduct is all that is 
required to be a member of God's kingdom (the ethical commonwealth). 
Instead, individuals have a need to perform acts of servitude and honor in 
order to in some way bear to witness to their faith. 
It does not enter their heads that when they fulfil their duties to 
men ( themselves and others) they are, by these very acts, 
performing God's commands and are therefore in all their actions 
and abstentions, so far as a these concern morality, perpetually in 
the service ,j God,· and that it is absolutely impossible to serve God 
more directly in any other way ( since they can affect and have an 
influence upon earthly beings alone, and not upon God). 2~ 
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Rather than realize that moraJ.oonduct is the sole requirement of being a 
citizen in God's lcingdo~ further requirements are fabti.atcd by the moral 
individbals. Insofar as they are not necessary for morality, these faux 
requirements are statutory. Hence, through a religion based on statutory laws 
"arises the concept of a religion Qf divine warship instead-of the concept of a 
religion pwdylhoral.,,30 ·This leaves us with an empirical faith, which will 
serve as a vehicle for a pure faith, allowing the pure faith itself to flourish only 
once the empirical elements of ecclesiastical faith are purged. 
In the enumeration of such statutory laws, their origin does not have 
the same genesis as the pure moral faith, reason. Since the statutory laws are 
29Ibid., 103 (94). 
30 
••• und so entspringt der Begriff einer gotesdienstlichen statt des Begriffs einer reinen 
moralischen R.tligionen. (Ibid.,]. 
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not present to pure reason, their source must lie elsewhere, in what Kant 
articulates as a revealed state. Thus through revelation we become cognizant 
of the statutory laws that reveal to us how it is that God wants to be 
worshiped. Insofar as these laws are made public, they serve as the 
constitution·of the church that is based on ecclesiastical faith.31 
In considering how the ethical commonwealth is to be brought about, it 
remains only to consider how it is that ecclesiastical faith relates to pure 
religious faith as its vehicle and thus the manner in which such an 
ecclesiastical faith is to be pursued. Kant argues that the IIW\RCr in which the 
ecclesiastical faith is to be punued is through its laws, based on scripture. 
, Since, then, it tcmains true once for. all that a statutory 
ecclesiastical faith is associated with pure religious faith as its 
•. vehide and as the means· of publk union of men for its 
promotion, one must grant that the preservation of pure religious 
· faith undumgcd, its propagation in the same form everywhere, . 
and even a respect for the revelation assumed therein, can hardly 
be provided for adequately through tradition, but only through 
scripture;32 
31As Kant explains: 
the question: How does God wish to be honored in a church ( as a 
congregation of God)? appears to be unanswerable by reason 
alone and to require statutory legislation of which we become 
cognizant o~ through revelation, i.e., an historical faith which, 
in contradistinction to pure religious faith, we can call 
ecx:lesiastical faith. 
Ibid., 104 (96). 
. . ~Ibid., l 06 (97). · 
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It is through scripture that the statutory Jaws of ecclesiastical faith gain 
currency. An important caveat of the statutes is that in no way are they to 
contradict the requirements of pure religious faith. Thus, we are to interpret 
scripture not solely as God's word, but rather through the "effect which its 
content has on the morality of the people." As the Bible has improved the 
moral worth of the people it is seen as.a moral document that has·rcvealcd 
"God's statutory (and so reveakd) will. "33 Thus :revelation as contained in the 
Bible gains value as it is a vehicle for the moral faith, its statutory (subjective) 
aspects must not,.and do not,. come into conflict with the supreme object of 
li.n.n (-H~n• ,,.1-..-;..,.. ..._,...) . th . ral :..:... ____ ..,... f·l..•----: 34 reAW,.,n · -'""-Uf;-L S ,;,,ur--'-'·.n'"' asy---- 1 e mo . .uupiuv~w.,.u,; 0 · I.R.1:UUU.Uty. 
According to, Kant, this: critsioa is fu1.flllcd by the· one holy book that seems 
to have fallen into our hands. That is, through the ]lible, Kant ,recognizes a 
soun:e for the statutory laws that will serve as the basis for an ecclesiastical 
faith leading to moral improvement. 
How fortunate, when such a book, fallen into men's hands, contains 
al.Qng with its statutes, or laws ctffaith, the• purest mor,al doctrine, of 
Idigion in its completenas---a doctrine which can be :brought into 
perfect harmony with such statutes ( [ which serve] as vehicles for its 
m. ..._...1. ....... 1-n~ 3s , ~ .U\IUU\.:l:.RJ /•'· · t' , '· , , · 
h .. 
33CON, 63 (Gregor, J 15). 
, ·:. ' , • ~ ""': , ·1, ' i. l \ 
34Ibid., 52 {93). 
35Gliicklich! Wenn ein sokhes den Mmschen zu HtJntlm gekmnmmes &u:J, neben. 
semm Suztutm,als Glllubenpsetzm zugleic die reinste moralische Religionslehre mit 
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Thus in establishing an ecclesiastical faith, it is to be based on revelation, 
through scripture, as it is contained in the -Bible. This organon serves as the 
vehicle for religious faith, which when itself is brought about, will consist in 
the establishment of the true kingdom of God on earth. 
· To summarize, as humans, the best we can do is to pursue an 
ecclesiastical faith, which has as its basis the pure moral faith;' to which we 
shall eventually aspire. Through the ecclesiastical faith, founded on a holy 
scripture, we are to "WOrk towards the establishment of a chmoo. · ·. Eventually 
ecclesiastical faith will set\'c as the vehicle ,of our·belicf in a pure faith, devoid 
of its ecclesiastical trappings, .. · Hence it is,thrt>ugh. the.establishment of a 
of a people under God, and the est.ablMhment of a;people under God is the 
establishment 0f the ethical commonwealth. 36 
V ollstdndigkeit enthiilt, die mit jenen ( als Vehifeln ihrer Introduction )in die beste 
Hamumie plwaiht wettlen btnn [REL,: 107 · (Gt-effie and Hudson 98)]. 
36lumt. specitlcally articulates this conclusion in a later discussion of the 
differences between ecclesiastical and pure faith. The above is a longer form of 
. this·vcry same,conclli$ion, which follows, with the implicit pre.mises ind.~d: 
In men's striving towards an ethical commonwealth, ecclesiastical 
faith thus naturally precedes (morally this order ought to be 
reversed) pure religious faith; 
Der Iar&l,englllube geht also in Bearbeitung der Menschen zu einem ethischen gemeinen 
Wesen naturlicherweise (Moralischerweise sollte es umgefehrt zugehen) vor dnn reinen 
Religtd,,,glauben vorher; [Ibid., I 06 ( 97)]. 
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Hopes for the Ethical Commonwealth 
Understood within Kant's discussion of the achievement of the ethical 
commonwealth is contained the warning that regardless of what we do as 
humans, it is impossible to know if we will bring the ethical commonwealth 
about on our own. Instead, we must prepare the way for God to come into 
the picture. and He will bring about the ethical commonwealth. With ,;:egard 
to our role then in bringing about.the ethical co:mmonwealth: 
... man. must proceed ,as though eN:e.rything, depended upon, him; 
only on this condition dare he hope that higher wisdom will grant 
the completion of his well~taltiOne<i endeavors. 37 
Hence> it is only through God •$at the moral kingdom, will come to pass, yet 
we must act as though its co~t;io.n depended on•~ alo:qe, ,~ we act to 
bring the kingdom abeut. We are·limited•in our ability to.bring about the 
ethical conunonwealth since as humans we are limited by the fact that we are 
not perfect, hence "How indeed can one expect something perfectly straight to 
be framed out of such crooked wood.?"38 
This is the condition in which the humam race is immersed. We are 
not able to bring about God's kingdom alone, just as we are not able to 
, appreciate a moral reUgion alone. Yet, just as we are assisted towards moral 
37Ibid., 101 (92). 
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faith -vvith ecclesiastical faith as it is presented through its statutes contained in 
the Bible, we are to hope for God's assistance as we work towards our moral 
betterment, thereby having "a rational faith and trust in His [God's] help". 39 
Thus we are still to have hope that we shall achieve· the pure faith that will 
serve as a basis for the moral religion that guarantees the fulfillmcnt of the 
ethical commonwealth. Hence it is through God's help that we are able to 
gradually purify ecdemstical faith, leaving behind all of its statutory content 
(the empirical), and·throu.gh,divine assistance proceed to a pure religious faith 
as that which will establish a kingdom.of God on earth. 
· . Hence a necessary consequence of the physical and, at the same 
time, the moral predisposition in us, the latter being the basis 
· and-the·mterpreter of all religien;·is thatm the end: religion will 
gradually be freed from all empirical determining grounds and 
from all statutes which rest on history and which througn the 
agency of ecclesiastical faith provisionally unite men for the 
requirements of God;· and thus at last the· pure ,:religion of reason 
will rule over all, "so that God may be all in all. "40 
This kingdom of God, Kant makes very clear is not to be brought about by 
means of external revolution. Pure religious faith will be scourged of the 
ecclesiastical only as moral agents realize that the true religion is the moral one 
that lies recognizably in everyone's reason. Through its recognition, the 
39CON, 47 (Gregor, 83). 
40REL, 121 {Greene and Hudson, 112) [Kanes reference is to lCorinthians 
XV~28]. 
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human race proceeds in moral action and in hoping for God's grace insofar as 
they are worthy of it. 41 
In sum, the ethical commonwealth is practically possible to achieve, yet 
not through human means alone. As humanity makes itself worthy of divine 
assistance through moral progress, divine assistance can be hoped for and 
thereby guarantee the coming of the kingdom of God in establishing a people 
of God organized under, laws .of virtue in the form of a church based on pure 
religious faith can be hoped for as well. 
With this the final discussion of •Kant's ethical comD,10nwealth as the 
consummate articulation of the highest.good, there are ~ral lessons· to be 
appreciated.· · Through the· ~thica mmmonwealth,Kant gives content to his 
moral project. 'l'hat is, we are to concretely strive to bring about certain states 
of affairs in the world. We are to enter into certain relationships with God 
and with each other. This is JeqUired as a part of Kant's moral theo:ry, it is a 
demand of the law. This is no vacuous command, but a concrete one, with 
specific content to be fulfilled; (e.g. follow the law, l>ring about a republican 
constitution, establish a league of peace, bring about the ethical 
commonwealth). 
41
" •• that is to .~y that he shall begin with the improvement of his life as the 
supreme condition under which ·atone a saving faith can exist." [Ibid., 118 
(109)]. 
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In working to bring about the state of affairs of the ethical 
commonwealth Kant has not left us without a way to proceed. From the 
moment the individual realizes she is subject to the law, enters into 
community to protect her rights and then further into a community that is 
international and worldly in its scope, Kant's program guides her. This 
guidance·takes form in the command --Bring about the highest good in the 
world. And this command takes form in realizing what this command entails 
as we are ettgagec:f moral individuals, striving in the face of the law. In so 
doing, we are given a guide for our action, a moral ideal to pursue. In 
addition, we are given a means to integrate the tlW> aspects of ourselves as a 
sensuous being and as a ,superse:nuous being as Kaat .points to God as a 
guarantor for·the moral .pfOject .of humanity. 
The IOngdom of Goel and Jts;CJonsequences 
· With this in mind, all that is left is to see· how this understanding of the 
highest-good ·fairs-against its contemporary critid$11l and commentary. 
Commentary on Kant's highest good is prolific. In its extensive presence in 
· Kantian literature it can be separated into two basic schools of thought: there 
are those that support a conception of the highest good and there are those 
. . 
that oppose a conception of a<c highest good. In what follows, I will address 
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those that oppose a conception of the highest good as I argue that they fail to 
recognize the entire role of the highest good insofar as I have presented it, 
resulting in a inaccurate understanding of the highest good as either 
heteronomous or superfluous. After this treatment, I will address those that 
support ,a conception of the highest good as I argue that they too, fail to 
recognize the .fntire role of the highest good, resulting in. an exclusive notion 
of the highest good insofar as it is one sided aJ\d .. does not appreciate ·the many 
aspects, of.the hlgaest· good, the ethical commonwealth ·based.· on ,petpetual 
peace.42 
In 'AllR, with this understanding of the higMst good., as a mo:tal.1.objcct 
we are requit'Cd to;pursue in its various forms; euhninating ill' thectthical: · 
commonwealth·based on perpetual peace, the playing field of,contemporuy 
scholarship on the highest good will hopefully not be so antagonistic. Now, 
instead of forms of the highest good competing and contradicting one another, 
the IIWUfestations of the highest .good con,ple~t 9ne anotl,.er. 
With regaJd to contradictory understandings of th~ ~~t .good, these 
interpretations fall into the categories of understanding the highest good as 
42'fhis division of the controversy over Kant's highest good is summarized 
very wdl in the following article by Lance Simmons, "Kant's Highest Good: 
Albatross, Keystone, Achilles Heel" Histoty oLPbUO§Ol>hy O,,artwly •.. 10; 4 .· 
(October, 19~) 355-368. 
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either superfluous and or heteronomous. 41 In both instances, it is my view 
that these interpretations are not well founded. With regard to the 
understandings that assert that the highest good is a viable part of the Kantian 
project, the claims of interpretation do not go far enough. That is, the 
proponents of the highest good concentrate on either an individual or a social 
understanding of the highest good. 44 Again, in both instances of exclusivity, it 
is my view that these interpretations leave an integral aspect of the highest 
good out insofar as they do not recognize a tripartite developmental aspect of 
the highest good that culminates in the ethical·. commonwealth. 
The heteronomous take .oft the highest good does not appreciate that 
the· highest gQOd must· always satisfy Kant•s aiterion ,of being grounded in the 
moral law. 45 · That is, the connection between the highest good and the law, 
insofar as the nighest good expresses what Kant calls an extension of the law, 
°The claims of superfluity and heteronomy are· made most strongly by 
Lewis White Beck (see A Comment,axy on Kant's Critiqye of Practical Rewn. 
as previously cited; and Thomas Awcte'r (see K;int•s ·Moral Tele<>IQgy. also as 
previously cited). 
44With regard to the understanding of the highes,t good as primarily·~ 
individ\lal endeavor, see John Silber as previously cited. With regard to the 
understanding of the highest good as a primarily social endeavor, see Sharon 
Anderson-Gold as previously cited. 
45See Thomas Auxter, Jeffrie Murphy, et al., for examples of those 
numbered among the Kantian commentators • hold that the highest 'good 
is heteronomous. 
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is not a heteronomous extension of the law.46 The highest good is always 
conditioned by virtue, even when the highest good is seen to be in a reciprocal 
relationship with the law. 47 This is the case regardless of the format of the 
highest good, via the individual, politics or within humanity. 
With regard to the superfluous talce on the highest good, this 
interpretation does not appreciate that the highest good not only serves as a 
dialectical ideal of reason* ·but it also serves as a moral ideal or guide for 
conduct. 48 As was demonstrated in Chapter 0ne~ there is a very strong aspect 
of the highest good that consists :of a dialectical ideal. · Yet thiS' is not an 
exhaustiw understanding of ·the ,highest good. :'The highest good consists of a 
command to .pursue the highest good insofar as a moral agent seeks to bring 
about the highest good in the world. In this sense~· the· highest good 
contributes somct.hing substantive to the moral project. In short, the 
accusation of superfluity with regard to, the highest good is accompanied by a 
far too narrow reading of what the hlghest good entails. 
In those instances where ](ant scholars have supported Kant's 
46See Chapter Three. for the way in which Kant discusses the highest good 
· as an extension of the law. 
47See Chapter Two for the way in which Kant discusses the highest good as 
reciprocally related to the law as both its source and consequence. 
4%e main proponent of the view that the highest good is superfluous to 
the Kantian moral project is of course, Lewis White Beck. 
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conception of the highest good, I contend that these interpretations do not go 
far enough. These interpretations concentrate on either the individual49 or the 
social perspective of the highest good. 50 In so doing, these commentators fail 
to recognize that the highest good requires being made manifest in both ways. 
The highest good is not locked into either an exclusively individual or social 
manifeStation, butmther, the highest good is made manifest variously, 
contingent upon the perspective of duty from which it is approached. Of 
course,: in appreciating these perspectives, it must be app:reciated that they 
culminate in the ethical commonwealth as the consummate articulation of the 
highest good. The individual manifestations of the highest good do not 
i 
recognize where this complex object should lead, while the social 
manifestations do not recognize where this object has originated. 
It is interesting to ask why this issue has plagued Kantian scholarship. 
Some of the reasons no doubt are a direct result of the presence of the highest 
good in so many places in the Kantian corpus. There is never a unified and 
complete discussion of the highest good from its justification to its application. 
Everyone has their favorite texts and a perspective from which to meet them. 
49The main proponent of an individual understanding of the highest good is 
John Silber, but see also the work of Gerald Barnes, Terry Godlove and 
Andrews Reath, among others. 
50-Jne main proponents of a social understanding of the highest good are 
Sharon Andersoa-Gold~ Stephen Palmquist, and Philip Rossi. 
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However, it seems that Kant himself may have a more accurate insight as to 
why this issue has been so problematic. In his essay Theory to Practice, as he 
was addressing those he thought had misunderstood and wrongly criticized 
him, Kant attempts to explain the genesis of these ill fate<;l and ~rhaps ill 
borne approaches to his work. 
These exceptions are thus nothing but misunderstandings (for I 
have no desire to regard them as misint~rp~tations), whose 
possibfilty would be puzzling if such a phenomenon were not 
explained by the human tendency to follow one's owx;i customary 
patterns of thought, even in the evaluation of the thoughts of . 
. others and so to impose the former on tlle lat~r. 51 
.' , t., i : l' , . , ,, _,r' 
In breaking free from our own biases, we are able to be more true to the 
";, ··, \ ;;. ' ', ' ' ' ',' ":' 
Kantian project. In the above sketch, I briefly applied the tripartite 
\ ' ; ~ ' u. : ' . ' ' 
interpretation of the highest good to the controversy surrounding it in 
' '.,: i' • ' ' ,. ' 
contemporary scholarship. 
'j 
51TfP, 281 (Humphrey, 65). 
CONCLUSION 
THE LESSONS KANT TEACHES: 
A CONCLUSION AND SUMMATION OF THE PROJECT 
.P1 ~s.pr,oj~ct~ I ~ave p~posed a,way of interpreting Kant's high~st 
g009 th.•t a,t~nwt& to integrate his multifarious remarks and explanations of 
this compl,ex ~bjfct~ }I\ so doiq.~:1:haye a}so. atteJllpted to dell)qnstr~te that 
COO~JD.J)P!azy CO~~~f.a~9,~ ~Ve,~~ .On the v:µipt.tS pf(SCn~tions of the 
highe~ go¢ in th~ corp\lS in ~ isqlati<>~st ~er. That j~, ~o~~tato,rs 
on, Kant) ~hest good o~n fail to~ re~ that th~~ ~ a:pr~q~~on of the 
high~st Jocxi. QCC\lIJing throughout JJ\9& of Kant'~ major wor~ and ~~l'al of 
the m,ino;r WOI'~ as vvell. A result .of this failure is that Kant; commentators 
often. leave.:u.~ ~th exq.usive or ~ompeting concepts of Kant's ltj.ghest good. 
~. ,~Ve$ a false ID1pression that there is not a unified concept of the highest 
good i~ ,~e. Kantian corpus. 
As a reSl,J,lt of t)µs
1 
dispar~te envif.onment in Kantian int~rpretation of 
. the. highest good, I have sought to present a unified conct:ptio:n of this 
complex object. In doing so,, my project concentra~d on the three 
p~ntat\ons C>f the 11.ighest ~ that I a,rgue arC! present and crucial in Kant's· 
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work. There is the role of the highest good as a unifier, as a moral ideal, and 
as the ethical commonwealth. It is through this last notion of the highest 
good, the ethical commonwealth, that the two former notions of the highest 
good are encompassed. This leaves us with a notion of the highest good that 
not only serves as a unifier and moral ideal, but also anchors Kant's 
conception of God as moral guarantor, and provides an added social dimension 
to the highest good. 
In its social aspect., the highest good provides us with a program for its 
fulfillment as we seek to .establish the· ethical· commonwealth .based on 
perpetual peace. This establishment is· accomplished through a developmental 
plane that takes into account the human moral agent in her individual role, 
her political role· and as a member of the human race. This notion of the 
highest good can bc:demonstrated ito lead to an ~tcommunity based on 
th.c law of virtue and· cstablished.1by• making manifest. Kant's notion of the 
invisible churl on.earth. 
With• this·. notion of the highest good in place, the shortcomings of 
contemporaiy commentators on the highest good.are ·made evident. Those 
who have argued that the highest good is superfluoU$ have not recognized its 
complete role~ Those who have argued that the highest good is hetcronomous 
have not realized that it fulfills a human need, and have not seen that it is a 
204 
requirement of the law. Other commentators on the highest good have 
concentrated too exclusively on a small aspect of its comprehensive role, such 
as that means by which our action is guided, or the means by which humanity 
is able to overcome evil. 1 By ending their analyses before a complete organic 
conception of the highest good is atticulated these commentators have faileo 
to see. the forest for the •trees. Hence,. my··interpretation·of the highat good, 
in presenting it as an mganic whom present t.brougnout th¢ corpus, is. able to 
address the •problems of conflict among contemporary commentatol'S, · · 
.. To conclude, there, ~::l>e no doubt .t!hat·t.hei~actrine of:Kantls ·highest 
goqd is1compiex and' d\fCn,obscule in places.· To-~ this, I have proposed 
a way of interpmuag.t.lu:. highest gooc:l.sadt•that: it, is demonstrated ,to 
articulate what :Jll0tality truly Kquites .. This is the case insofar as we are 
conunanded to·bring about·theltighest~ to bring the object c,f,the .. moral 
lflf to fruition in the<sensiblc world. ,This.task is not easy, nor is its .. 
take·. into aa:ount as,much .of the .Kantian corpus as is ·reasonably possible 
tlu:ough,myowr-arching approach. Ant I convinced of this approach?--only 
insofar as I am convinced of anything of extreme import that appears in its 
normal ambiguity and consequently without great exactness. As Kant himself 
/ 
· ,lStt the di5cussion of the previous chapter of the intetpretations of 
Silber and Anderson-Gold. 
says: 
... what duty is, is plain of itself to everyone, but what is to bring 
true, lasting advantage to our whole existence is veiled in 
impenetrable obscurity ... 2 
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The concept of the highest good as the ethical commonwealth based on 
perpetual peace is that whi~h ,c<>µ]d bring true, lasting, advan~c t() our whole 
existence. But the means through which it is to be achieved ancf brought into 
,:• T ' 
entirelJ ~ced of, is that in this program for interpreting the highest good, 
' '' : ·, ;_; ( \, J - : 
imple~u, will be veiled in impenetrable obscurity. 
FlnaDy, in offetjng, ~, ab(>ve, as a.~ptiQilf9I: Ute confusion over 
the concept of the~ pld anp its ~rsal irot;ll echoing, there is an 
implicit challenge. My analysis has demonsu:a~ what a Kan.tian Jl\()fality 
requires; thus the challenge consists in lifting the veil, revealing the means for 
its existenq: and manifestation.. In.so doing; we would be well served, for 
Kantian morality is neither so specific nor so antiquated that in the Kantian 
~rlence we are left: without echoes of our <>wn. 
2was Pflicht sei, bietet sich jedermann von selbst dar; was aber wahren 
dauerhaften V orteil bringe, ist allemal, wenn dieser auf das ganze Dasein erstreckt 
werden soil, in undurchdringliches Dunkel eingthullt ... [CPR, 37 (Beck, 38)]. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PRIMARY REFERENCES 
Kant, Immanuel. ( 1788) Critique of Practical Reason. Translated 
by Lewis White Bede. (New York, Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1956. 
(1793) On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, But is 
of No Practical Use. Appearing in Per.peu,aJ Poce and Otha: 
Essays. Translated by Ted Humphrey. (Indiana, Hackett 
Publishing) 1983. 
( 1793) R(q)igion Within the Limits of BeaSID Alone. 
Translated by Greene· and Hudson. '(New·York, · Harper 
Totthbooks) 1960. 
(1795) To PeipetualPeace:' A;~hiatLSketclL · 
Appearing in PrrpmmJ·Pcarr Hld·Qtbct: Euar Translated 
by Ted Humphrey. (Indiana, Hackett Publishing) 1983. 
(1797) The Meta~ '.Qf Morals. Translated by Mary Gregor. 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press-) 1991. 
. ( 1798) The Q>nflict Qf the Facwties. Translated by Mary Gregor. 
(New York~ Abarls Books, Inc.) 1979. 
References to Kant's works will be made in English, with the corresponding 
reference to the Royal Prussian Academy Edition as explained in the reference 
section of the dissertation, page iv. 
206 
SECONDARY REFERENCES 
Anderson-Gold, Sharon. "Kant's Ethical Commonwealth: The Highest 
Good as a Social GQal." Interuational fhi)osoJlhical Quarterly 
26: 1 (1986) 23-32. 
____ . "God and Community: An Inquiry into the ~ous 
Implications of the Highest Good. 11 as it appears in Kant's 
Philoso.phy: of Rs:Ugjon Reconsidered edited by Rossi and Wreen, 
(Indiana: l~.-University ~. 1991) 113-3 l. 
Auxter, Thomas, Kant's Moral Teleology (Macon: Mercer University 
1 Preas, l 982). 
----·~ ir:rhe v~·efi<.n.t'sttighest Good." Journal of 
the Histcu;y of Pbilo:,ophy 17:2 (1979) 121-34. 
'• f , ,, ·i, , :i t , 
l:,. )i,;;, ,, ~. · ... ' ,-. :.., ~~:;i, .. :,. ' 
Barnes, Gttald.1Wi '11ln. D¢fc,nse,. of Kant-S. Doctrine of the Highest 
Good." Pbilosqphical EQIUlI\ 2 ( 1971) 446-58. 
; ' 
Beck,~ WWte. -A~~llfr:9A"Kant'l·Qrit,iq.ue of Practical 
ReMQJl(Chi~ago: lJ~y of~·~; •I 960) 
Cavallar, Georg. "Kant's Society of Nations: Free Federation or 
· World llepµblk7~- · lotlll,l3l o.f the flistO()!·of PhijQsophy 
32·:·3 (July, 1994) 461-82. 
Dilsiag. Kla\lS. -"Das Prc>blem dethoch.sten .Q.a~ in Kants, 
pradruscher:·r~~)' ·.J',ant~~gjcp 62 (1971)5-42. 
Engstrom.; Stephen. "The C.Oncept of the Highest Good in Kant's 
Moral Theory. 11 PhiloSQl>h,v and Phenomenolo.gical Research 4 
. · (11992) 747-80. 
Friedman, R.Z. •. ''1lte ~po~ alld Function _of Kant's Highest 
GoQd.". Jouuvloftbe Histoxy of Phik>SOJ2hy 22: 3 ( 1984) 
325-42. 
207 
Godlove, Terry F. "Moral Actions, Moral Lives: Kant on Intending 
the Highest Good." The Southern Journal of Philoso_phy XXV: 
l (l 987) 49-64., , · · 
208 
Gregor, Mary. Laws of Freedom (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963). 
____ . "Kant's Theory of Property." Review of Metaphysics 41 (I 988) 
757.87. · 
Kim, Ha Poong. "For tht!;Pursuit of Pcatt' as· a Moral Task from the 
Kantian Perspective." IdeaJist,ic Studies 21 ( 1991) 114-23. 
Ludwig,"llernd. "'The Right of a State' in Immanuel Kartt's Domine of~ht." 
louma,I of the Hieory of· PhiloSC>phy 28: 3 { 1990) 403-!l 5. 
McFarland, J.D. Kant's Concept of Tdeolo.gy (Edinburgh: 
··&tin&utgh tJni\tmityPtt8$~ 1970)., _-;,,, i 
Murphy, Jeffrie, "The Highest Good as Content of Kant's Ethical 
"FotlrtaBsm~·/Kant-SWdiM 56ft965) l02-I&:C· · 
___ i lwtt; · The PhilqsaphJ Qf'JH• ~New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1970). 
O'Neill, Ortora~ · Constryctions of Re;v,on (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univeriity. Pre$s, 1989). . . .. 
Palmq'1i#, Stephen. "~ Kingdom of God is ,at Handl' (Did Kllnt Really Say 
1Juit7)" Hi$totf of Philosophy Ouarterly 11: 4 (October, 1994) 421-3 7. 
____ . "'Immanuel Kant: A Christian Philosopher." faitb·and Philosophy 
6: 1 (Jamialy.1989) 65-7.5. 
Paton; H.J. "Kant's Idea of the Good." Prooeeding& of the 
Ad§totc}i;m Societ)'45 (1944-45) ii-xxv. 
____ . The Categorical Imperative (Chicago: University of 
' Chicago PMS, 194'8). 
Reath, Andrews. "Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant." 
Journal of the HistOJY of Philosophy 26:4 ('l 988) 593-20. 
Reich, Klaus. "Rousseau und Kant." Neue Hefte fur Philosophie 29 
( 1989) 80-96. 
Riley, Patrick. Kant's Political Philosophy (New Jersey: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1983 ) . 
----
. "Persons as 'End in Themselves'." The Modem Schoo}man 
57 (November, 1979) 45-57. 
209 
Rossi, Philip J. "The Final End of All Things: The Highest Good as the Unity 
of Nature and Freedom." in Kant's Philosophy of Re)igi<m Reconsidered 
edited by Rossi and Wreen (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1991) 
132-64. 
Schrader, George.·· .. Kant's P~ Repudi-1on of the "Mor.i.Argument" 
in thcQpus Postrmam: An Examination c,fAdickes' Interpretation." 
Philosophy (July, 1951) 228-41 . 
. ' 
Schroeder, HJi. · "Some Common Misinterpretations of the Kantian 
Ethics,~ Jbe Philoso,hical Jlmdew 49 ( 1940) 424-446. ·· 
Silber, John R .... "Kant's 'Conaption of the Higbe,t Good as Immanent 
and J'1atlldmdent" 1M ·fhilpsqphic;al B1McW 68 (1959) 469-
492. 
___ . "'ilte It.bk.al Significanc:c of Kant'$ ,Reijgion." part 
of the introduction to Green and Hudson's translation of 
Kant's Religion Within the ljmits of Reason Alone (New York: 
Harper, l:960) .x:xix..cxx:xiv. , · .. 
___ .. _·.  . '%c Importance of ,(he:_liighest Good in Kant's Ethics." 
Ethics 73 (1963) 179-197. 
. "The Moral Good and the Natural Good in Kant's 
----
Ethics." Review of Metaphysics 36 (1982) 397-438. 
Simmons, Lance. "Kant's Highest Good: Albatross, Keystone, Achilles Heel." 
Histox:y of Philoso,Phy Quaxtrdy I 0: 4 (October, 1993) 355-368. 
Smith, Norman Kemp. A Conynent.aty to Kant's "Critiq.ue of Pyre 
Reason" (New York: Humanities Press, 1962). 
Smith, Steven P. 'Worthiness to be Happy and Kant's Concept of the 
Highest Good." Kant-Stµdien 75 (1984) 168-190. 
Sullivan, Roger J. Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
Van der Linden, Harry. Kantian Ethics and Socialism 
(h\~ianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988 ). 
Webb, Q~g;ient.. Kam'j Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1926). 
Wike, Victoria S. Kant on Happiness in Ethics (Albany: State University 
... ;Qf,.New York Press, 1994). 
Wffl.i~, ~qward Uoy4. ~- EsaJf ·AA ;lw}t!s PoJitjcal ~ 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
: • ;.. j: ... ·. .• 
Wood, Allen W. Kant's Moral &:Jjgjon (Ithaca: Cornell University 
. P~.1~70), 
____ . Kant's Rational Theolo,gy (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Ptcs.s. 1918). 
____ . "Unsocial Sociability: The Anthropological Basis of 
~an Ethics." Philosapbica,lTopig 19 · ( 199.l) 325-35 l. 
210 
Yovel, Xirmiahu. l'aDt MQ the Philosqphy of Hi&Qi:y .. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, I 980). 
' ' C , 
2.eldin, Mary-Barbara. "'The Summum-Bonum, the Moral Law, and the 
~stence of God." Kant-Studien 62 (1971) 43-54. 
VITA 
I currently reside in Canfield, Ohio. At this time I am employed by 
Youngstown State University at the rank of Assistant Professor. My 
appointment with Youngstown began as of September 15, 1995. My areas of 
specialization at this time are the history of modern philosophy, especially 
Kant, and ethics. My areas of competence at this time are the history of 
philosophy, the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of mind, applied ethics 
' ' 
and continental philosophy. 
Prior to my appointment at Youngstown, I taught philosophy during 
the Loyola Summer sessions of 1991 through 1993. ~t this time, I taught 
\ \ /, ~ i, 1 : ' ! , \ f• ( , • % , .' " \ , ! ~ , 
logic, at the rank of instructor, while completing my Master's degree 
(completed in 1991) and my Ph.D. (requirements completed in the Summer 
' ' 
of 1995). 
Throughout my graduate career, I have received generous financial and 
tuition assistance from Loyola. This past academic year, 1994 through 1995, 
' ' 
I was a recipient of a Loyola University dissertation fellowship. The academic 
year prior to this year, I was the recipient of a graduate research fellowship 
with Loyola's Center for Ethics. The Center for Ethics is an interdisciplinary 
j , / 
211 
212 
center for ethics research projects. In addition, while studying at Loyola, I 
have assisted in several courses; ethics, bio-medical ethic, philosophy of 
religion and logic. During this time I was a graduate assistant of the 
philosophy department. My assistantships took place over the academic years 
of i-990· through 1993. 
Pridr to attending Loyola; I graduated from Smith College of 
Northampton, MA .While at Smith, I ~jored in philosophy and minored in 
religion. . I graduated from Smith in·the · Spring of 19,89. After which I began 
my ~ stttdies· at,Loyola; ,while being assisted with a graduate tuition 
scholarship from ·Smith. Collcge's:Alt.tmnae Association. 
· My professional activity at this time consists of a publication and 
several conference presentations. My publication is "Individuality, Society 
and Perpetual Peace." This is published in the Proceedings <f the Eighth 
International Kant Congress, a work edited by Hoke Robinson, and published in 
1995 by Marquette University Press. In addition, I have participated in 
several professional conferences; such as the Eighth International Kant 
Congress at Memphis State University (1995), a graduate student conference 
• at DePaul University (1995) and the Toward Perpewal Peace Conference at 
Valparaiso University (1994). In the next year, I will be presenting papers at 
the AnnuaJ Meeting of the Society for Phenomenological and Existential 
Philosophy (October, 1995) and at the conference Ethics Medicine and 
Health Care: An Appraisal of the Thought of H. Tristam Engelhardt 
( September, 1995 ). 
213 
At this time I have proficiency in several foreign languages. I·cummtly 
have a high level of proficiency in both the speaking and the reading of 
German~ I have a moderate proficiency in the reading of Latin. I also have a 
moderate proficiency in the speaking and the reading of Spanish. I am 
Ct.lrren.tly a rnenber,in the following professional organizations: American 
Philosophical Association, American Association of University Women, North 
American Kant Society, and :ftnally ;Ilbc Society for Phenomenology and 
Existential Philosophy. 
DISSERTATION APPROVAL SHEET 
The dissertation submitted by Cynthia A. Brincat has been read and approved 
by the following committee: 
Victoria Wike, Ph.D., Director 
Associate Professor, Philosophy 
Loyola University Chicago 
Richard Westley, Ph.D. 
Professor~ Philosophy 
Loyola University Chicago 
Adrian Peperzak, Ph.D. 
Professor, Schmitt Chair in Philosophy 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and 
the signature which appears below verifies that the dissertation is now given 
final approval by the committee with reference to content and form. 
The dissertation is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy. 
~/¥;91/f' 
Date Director's Signature 
